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Former Prime Minister Tony Blair described the UK’s response to the Rwandan 
genocide as “We knew.  We failed to act.  We were responsible”;1 this thesis sets out to 
explore these three claims.   The thesis, which draws on newspaper archives, oral history 
interviews and government documents obtained by the author under the Freedom of 
Information Act, as well as British and US official documents already made public, begins 
by exploring Britain’s knowledge and understanding of events in Rwanda in the build-up to, 
and during the first few weeks of, the genocide.  It then moves on to review how the 
government responded and, by drawing on various theories of bystander intervention, to 
build up a multi-factor assessment of what influenced that response.  The thesis finishes by 
addressing the question whether the British government, or indeed any other British foreign 
policy actor, bears responsibility for the crisis.  It therefore looks at the Rwandan crisis from 
the perspective of various influences on foreign policy: the media, public opinion, 
Parliament and NGOs, as well as exploring the response of John Major’s government.  The 
thesis concludes that media coverage of the genocide led to a significant misunderstanding 
of the crisis; this misunderstanding influenced the public response and shaped discussion 
within Parliament and government.  In terms of official response, whilst it has to be 
acknowledged that the government initially failed to correctly identify the events in Rwanda 
as genocide and consequently delayed their response until the majority of killings had ended, 
the thesis shows that rather than failing to act the British government was in fact a leading 
aid donor to Rwanda and a leading provider of troops to the UN peacekeeping mission 
serving in Rwanda.  This aid did come too late to prevent or halt the genocide, but did save 
many thousands of lives in the immediate aftermath.    
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
DEC Disasters Emergency Committee 
DPKO   UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
EU European Union 
FAR   Forces Armées Rwandaises (the Rwandan Army) 
FCO Foreign & Commonwealth Office (The Foreign Office) 
JEEAR Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
OAU Organisation for African Unity 
ODA Overseas Development Administration 
PMQ Prime Minister’s questions 
RoE Rules of engagement 
RPA   Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military wing of the RPF) 
RPF   Rwandan Patriotic Front (largely Tutsi rebel group based in Uganda that invaded 
Rwanda in 1990) 
RTLMC Radio Télévision Libre Mille-Collines (Rwandan radio station) 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMIR  United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission to Uganda-Rwanda 
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1885 Berlin Conference carve-up of Africa makes Rwanda a German 
protectorate. 
1916 Belgium troops occupy Kigali during First World War. 
1933 Belgian authorities issue all Rwandans with an identity card, allocating 
them to one of three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. 
1959  November Hutu uprising forces thousands of Tutsi to flee to Uganda. 
1960 First free elections in Rwanda return a large Hutu majority. 
1962 Continued violence against Tutsi and failed attack on Rwanda by Tutsi 
refugees based in Burundi. 
1962 1 July Rwanda gains independence. 
1973 Coup d’état; Major Juvenal Habyarimana becomes President. 
1986 Habyarimana announces Tutsi refugees will not be allowed to return to 
Rwanda as the country is too small. 
1988 RPF forms in Uganda. 
1990 October RPF invades Rwanda sparking civil war. France sends troops to support 
government. 
 November Representatives of the RPF meet with the First Secretary and Military 
Attaché at the British High Commission in Uganda.  
1991 Civil war continues.  In Rwanda government begins building a civilian 
militia and enters into arms deals with South Africa and Egypt. 
1992 April Habyarimana appoints new Cabinet which includes members from Hutu 
opposition parties.  
August Formal opening of peace talks between government and RPF at Arusha, 
Tanzania. 
1993 March At the UN Security Council, France first suggests the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force to Rwanda. 
June UNOMUR established with a mandate to observe the border between 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
August The Arusha Accords are signed.  Multi-party elections scheduled within 
22 months. 
3 October 18 US Rangers killed in Somalia whilst serving on a peacekeeping 
mission. 
5 October UN Resolution 872 approves creation of UNAMIR. General Romeo 
Dallaire appointed its commander. 
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1994 1 January Rwanda takes up seat as non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. 
January  Violence towards Tutsi continues in Rwanda.  No progress in made 
towards implementation of Arusha Accords. 
11 January Dallaire sends the Genocide Fax to UN headquarters and is refused 
permission to raid arms dumps across Kigali. 
22 February Edward Clay, Britain’s High Commissioner to Uganda, visits Rwanda for 
three days and becomes first British non-resident Ambassador to present 
papers to the Rwandan government in over 4 years. 
March An additional 900 British troops are sent to Bosnia, taking total to over 
3,000. 
5 April  UN Security Council approves Resolution 909, which renews 
UNAMIR’s mandate. 
6 April  President Habyarimana killed when his plane is shot down returning 
from a regional meeting in Dar-es-Salam. 
7 April  Systematic violence breaks out across Kigali, genocide begins. 
 10 Belgian peacekeepers killed by Rwandan Presidential Guard. 
9 April Evacuation of foreign nationals begins. 
 RPA renews the civil war and begins moving on Kigali. 
10 April US closes embassy in Kigali. 
14 April Publicly announced that Belgian peacekeepers in UNAMIR are to be 
withdrawn. 
 British delegation at the UN officially complains that it is not being 
provided with sufficient intelligence by the UN Secretariat. 
21 April David Hannay convinces US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine 
Albright, to ignore her instructions to vote in favour of full withdrawal of 
UNAMIR.  UN Security Council approves Resolution 912 which 
authorises the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR.  
 British government announces £820,000 of emergency aid for Rwanda. 
28 April Oxfam press release suggests that what is happening in Rwanda is 
genocide. 
29 April Rwandan refugees begin to cross border into Tanzania. 
2 May The Times is first British newspaper to call the crisis in Rwanda 
“genocide”. 
3 May Oxfam lead a delegation to Downing Street calling for a more robust 
response to the crisis from the UN. 
4 May Members of the Shadow Cabinet write to government ministers calling 
for the government to pressure the UN to respond to the crisis. 
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1994 10 May Nelson Mandela inaugurated as first black President of South Africa. 
 12 May John Smith, leader of the Labour party, dies unexpectedly. 
13 May Disasters Emergency Committee launch a campaign for public donations 
to aid refugees in Rwanda. 
17 May UN Security Council approves Resolution 918 which authorises the 
deployment of 5,500 troops to Rwanda, to be known as UNAMIR II. 
18 May UN Secretary General makes a request to African countries to provide 
troops. 
22 May British press extensively reports bodies being washed up on the shores of 
Lake Victoria in Uganda. 
24 May Adjournment debate on Rwanda held in Houses of Commons, lead by 
Labour MP Tony Worthington. 
25 May Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal make commitment to provide troops to 
UNAMIR; Zimbabwe and Nigeria make similar offer over next week. 
15 June British government offers UN 50 trucks as contribution to UNAMIR II. 
17 June France announces plan to send troops to Rwanda to act as an interim 
peacekeeping force pending the deployment of UNAMIR II. 
22 June  UN Security Council approves the French mission in Resolution 929. 
First French troops enter Rwanda the following day as Operation 
Turquoise. 
 In House of Commons Tom Clarke, Shadow Minister for Overseas 
Development, calls events in Rwanda “holocaust” and “genocide”. 
4 July RPA take full control of Kigali. 
12 July Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, writes to MOD suggesting British 
troops should be sent to Rwanda. 
13-14 July Estimated 1 million Hutu flee across the border to Goma in Zaire. 
18 July RPA announce a unilateral ceasefire.  
19 July MOD rejects Hurd’s request to send British troops. 
22 July President Clinton announces US troops will deploy to Zaire to help with 
the distribution of aid. 
24 July FCO Minister Baroness Chalker visits Uganda and Rwanda. 
 MOD’s Current Operations Group recommends the deployment of a 
British logistical support contingent to serve in UNAMIR. 
28 July The Cabinet sub-committee on Overseas Policy and Defence approves 
the deployment of British troops. 
29 July Chalker announces British government aid to Rwanda and the region has 
reached £60m. 




In March 1994, Steven Spielberg’s film about a German industrialist who saved over 
1,200 Jews from the Nazi Holocaust won the Academy Award for Best Picture.  In his 
autobiography, written sixteen years later, former Prime Minister Tony Blair recorded the 
profound effect seeing Schindler’s List for the first time had on him.  Watching the film, in 
spring 1994, made him think of the responsibility individuals and states have to come to the 
assistance of others; accepting that the responsibility to help those geographically near was 
beyond question, he continued: 
But what of situations we know about, but we are not proximate to?  What of 
the murder distant from us, the injustice we cannot see, the pain we cannot 
witness but which we nonetheless know is out there?  We know what is 
happening, proximate or not.  In that case, we are not bystanders either.  If we 
know and we fail to act, we are responsible.  A few months [after I saw 






In the one hundred days from 7
 
April to 8 July 1994, just weeks after Schindler’s List had 
been honoured, nearly a million Tutsi were brutally murdered, in the tiny central African 
country of Rwanda.  In a killing spree, that had been meticulously planned, ordinary Hutu 
men, women and children became accomplices in genocide.
2
  Hutu, who made up the ethnic 
majority in the country, goaded by propaganda, and often fuelled by drugs and potent 
banana beer, used machetes, home-made clubs, and garden tools, as well as guns and 
                                                          
1 Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Hutchinson, 2010), p.61. 
2 There is great debate amongst scholars about which events fall into the category of genocide and what exactly is meant by the 
word.  Paul Boghossian suggests that “One cannot use the word ‘genocide’ without supplying some definition or other, 
because one cannot rely on some common understanding that we all have of that word” (Paul Boghossian, “The Concept of 
Genocide” Journal of Genocide Research. Vol 12, No 1-2 (2010): p.70).  William Schabas, however, argues that the word 
already has an established meaning (William Schabas, “Commentary on Paul Boghossian, ‘The Concept of genocide’” 
Journal of Genocide Research. Vol. 12, No 1-2 (2010), p.97); ‘genocide’ has been defined by the United Nation’s 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and therefore the Convention gives us a common 
understanding of the word.  The definition included in the Convention though, does not appease everyone; in response to 
Boghossian’s article Schabas notes that there are as many definitions of genocide as there are scholars working in the field 
(Schabas, “Commentary on Paul Boghossian,” p.99); see Samuel Totten & Paul Bartrop (eds) The Genocide Studies Reader 
(New York: Routledge, 2009) for a number of articles on alternative definitions.  Boghossian also questions the Convention’s 
definition highlighting a number of weaknesses, including suggesting that the groups included in the Convention are overly 
restrictive and that the use of the phrase “as such” is unnecessary – but the 1948 definition is ultimately the definition of the 
word.  It is therefore this official definition which is adopted in this thesis.  However, when discussing Rwanda, 
retrospectively, it is not necessary to engage overly in the semantics of the term ‘genocide’.  Whilst scholars debate whether 
the Turkish treatment of the Armenians in 1915, or the murder of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995, constitutes 
genocide, the vast majority of scholars accept that the events in Rwanda in 1994 were genocide.  As Schabas argues, “The 
definition in the 1948 Convention fits the Rwandan genocide like a glove” (Schabas, “Commentary on Paul Boghossian,” 
p.9).   
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grenades, to enact a genocide more bloody, more personal and quicker than the Nazi 
Holocaust of Jews fifty years earlier.  Yet whilst thousands of people were being 
slaughtered, as US President William J. Clinton was later to suggest, “all over the world 
there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully 
appreciate the depth and speed with which [Rwanda was] being engulfed by unimaginable 
terror”.3  
This thesis considers the international response to the events in Rwanda, but from a 
perspective that to date has been largely ignored by academia – it considers the response of 
the United Kingdom (the UK).
4
  Although there are various existing histories of the events in 
Rwanda and the international response, such as Samantha Power and Jared Cohen’s studies 
of the US response or Daniela Kroslak and Andrew Wallis’ two studies of French 
involvement,
5
 the British response has never received the attention it warrants.   This thesis 
aims to fill that gap; it sets out to address Tony Blair’s claims – did the UK know, did it fail 
to act, was it responsible? 
History of the Crisis 
There is no generally accepted number of Tutsi that were massacred in the period 
April to July 1994.  Alan Kuperman uses extrapolations from the 1991 census and survivor 
data to claim very precisely that 494,008 Tutsi were killed; Alison Des Forges in what is 
considered by many as the definitive account of the events of 1994 quotes “at least half a 
million”; General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of UN troops in Rwanda in 1994 
typically refers to over 800,000 Tutsi having been killed; and Shaharyar Khan who during 
the second half of 1994 was the UN Special Representative to Rwanda, places the figure at 
                                                          
3 Extract from speech given by President Clinton on 25 March 1998 during visit to Rwanda.  Quoted in Philip Auerswald, 
Christian Duttweiler and John Garofano (eds), Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), p.220. 
4 Although pedants would argue that such an approach is technically incorrect, this thesis uses “the UK” and “Britain” 
interchangeably.  “England” and “English” are only used in referenced quotes. 
5 Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide (Lasham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2007); Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (London: Flamingo, 2003); Andrew 
Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide (London: IB Tauris & Co, 2007); 
Daniela Kroslak, “The Responsibility of External Bystanders in Cases of Genocide: The French in Rwanda, 1990-1994.” 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2002).  There are also some studies of the Belgian 
involvement in the crisis, however these are exclusively written in French. 
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between 800,000 and 850,000.  Linda Melvern, who has written most about Britain’s 
involvement in the genocide, quoting figures from the Red Cross, is at the higher end of 
estimates, claiming one million were killed.
6
  The truth is that we will never know the true 
number of dead; the fact that whole families and communities were murdered means that 
there were often no survivors left to report the missing and the lack of accurate census 
information means that in reality it is impossible to know even how many Tutsi were living 
in Rwanda before the genocide.  However, based on these various estimates it seems that a 
figure of around 800,000 killed in approximately 100 days is not unreasonable; Adam Jones 
calculates that this makes Rwanda the quickest genocide ever experienced with a killing rate 
five times that of the Nazi Holocaust.
7
  The semantics of whether it was half a million, 
800,000 or a million makes the events no less tragic.  To understand what motivated this 
scale of killing it is necessary to go back in time.  Whilst there are already many excellent 
books and articles that chronicle the history of Rwanda and specifically the events of 1994
8
 
it is useful to summarise the events in the years leading up to the outbreak of genocide and 
also the international response once the killings had begun. 
Although it oversimplifies many years of history, the key issue in the pre-colonial 
period, given the events of 1994, was the relationship between the three ethnic groupings in 
Rwanda; the Hutu, about 82% of the population, the Tutsi (17%) and the Twa (less than 
                                                          
6
 Alan Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), p.122.  Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1999), p.1.  Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow 
Books, 2004), p.5. Shaharyar Khan, The Shallow Graves of Rwanda (London: IB Tauris, 2000), p.1.  Linda Melvern, 
Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. Revised ed (London: Verso, 2006), p.4.  
7 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), p.232. 
8 Perhaps the two most complete histories of the Rwandan genocide are those by Alison Des Forges (Leave None to Tell the 
Story: Genocide in Rwanda) and Gerard Prunier (The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide).  However, there are 
numerous other authors that provide very good summaries of the build up to and execution of the genocide.  Amongst these 
the following are worthy of further reading and give a good cross section of the events: Alain Dexstexhe, “The Third 
Genocide,” Foreign Policy Winter 94/95, no. 97 (1994) and Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. 
Revised ed. both provide a useful general account of the build up to 1994.  In “Rwanda in Retrospect,” Foreign Affairs 79, 
no. 1 (2000), pp.94-118, Alan Kuperman provides a good account of the spread of genocide across the country. Paul 
Magnarella, “The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, (2005), 
pp.801-22 and Peter Uvin, “Reading the Rwandan Genocide,” International Studies Review 3, no. 3 (2001), pp.75-99 both 
discuss the causes of the genocide.  There are also a number of firsthand accounts of life in Rwanda in 1994; for example 
Paul Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man: The True Story Behind Hotel Rwanda (London: Bloomsbury, 2000) provides a 
survivor account and Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil is a very frank memoir from the commander of the UN 






  The origins of the Tutsi and Hutu are not known with any certainty and although there 
were differences between the two groupings, particularly in terms of wealth distribution and 
cattle and land ownership, with the Tutsi typically, but not always, being richer, there was 
much that united Hutu and Tutsi.  The one difference was that throughout this period the 
small aristocratic elite which governed the country was almost exclusively Tutsi.  Peter Uvin 
however suggests it is more important to recognise the similarities between the two groups - 
they shared the same religion, the same language and the same customs and festivals.
10
  As 
Tony Vaux suggest, although the relationship between the groups was certainly complex, it 
did not seem to match the “Western stereotype of Africa [which] demands ... the monolithic, 
indivisible tribe, liable to fight other such tribes as a matter of custom”.11   
Rwanda came under colonial rule in 1885 having been claimed by Germany during 
the Berlin Conference’s carve up of Africa.  German control however was brief, ending 
during World War I, when in May 1916 Belgian troops entered the capital Kigali.  The new 
colonial power though made little impact on the country until 1926, when a series of 
reforms, known as “les reformes Voisin”, were introduced and then in 1933 required all 
Rwandans to carry an identification card showing their ethnic grouping.  The main effect of 
these reforms was to codify the grip of the Tutsi elite on government and widen the gap 
between the Tutsi elite and ordinary Hutu; ordinary Tutsi, like ordinary Hutu, did not 
particularly benefit from these changes, though in Hutu minds they were now seen as 
different.
12
   
 Tutsi and Belgian domination continued until the late 1950s when the Belgians 
finally accepted increasing demands for independence.  However, having governed through 
the Tutsi elite for four decades, the Belgian authorities, foreseeing the inevitable dominance 
of the Hutu majority once the country was granted independence, unexpectedly switched 
                                                          
9 Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” p.95. 
10 Peter Uvin, “Reading the Rwandan Genocide,” International Studies Review 3, no. 3 (2001), p.76. 
11 Tony Vaux, The Selfish Altruist: Relief Work in Famine and War (London: Earthscan, 2001), p.189. 
12 Magnarella is keen to point out that ordinary Tutsi peasants were also adversely affected by these reforms, with many losing 
their land and fleeing north to Uganda. (Magnarella, “The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda,” p.808.) 
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their favour to the formerly discriminated against Hutu.
13
  Prunier suggests that the shift in 
Belgian favour was also partly driven by Belgian domestic politics; he suggests that by the 
late 1950s Belgian priests and soldiers in Rwanda increasingly came from the working class, 
Flemish part of Belgium and therefore had no sympathy with the aristocratic Tutsi, instead 
their democratic ideals led them to more readily empathise with the “downtrodden Hutu”.14  
Either way, emboldened by the new found Belgian patronage, Hutu were encouraged to 
form political parties and to begin to exert their position as the country’s majority.  Suddenly 
in November 1959, false claims that a Hutu politician had been killed by Tutsi triggered 
Rwanda’s first major spate of ethnic violence.  This one rumour was the spark that ignited 
the tinder box of resentment between Hutu, who had suffered years of discrimination and 
displacement at the hands of the Belgians, and the Tutsi.   In the violence no discrimination 
was made between the Tutsi elite who had governed the country and ordinary Tutsi, all were 
attacked; within two weeks over 300 had been killed.  In response, large numbers of Tutsi 
fled to neighbouring Uganda and Burundi.  Once begun, the shift to Hutu domination was 
unstoppable: in 1960 only 19 of the 229 newly elected bourgmestres were Tutsi and in 1961 
Hutu took 35 of the 42 seats in parliament.  For many outside of Rwanda this was seen as a 
victory for democracy;
15
 however, these events led the United Nations (UN) to conclude in a 
1961 report, “The developments of the last 18 months have brought about the racial 
dictatorship of one party ... An oppressive system has been replaced by another one ... It is 
quite possible that some day we will witness violent reactions on the part of the Tutsi”.16    
Rwanda formally gained independence on 1 July 1962.  Other than a second period 
of severe ethnic violence in 1964 following a raid by Tutsi refugees, that was firmly put 
down by President Kayibanda the situation in the country looked relatively stable until the 
mid 1980s.  Then following the collapse of coffee and tin prices, Rwanda’s only two 
exports, the country became dependent upon foreign aid.  Fairly quickly Rwanda came 
                                                          
13 Ibid, p.809. 
14 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, p.44. 
15 Kroslak, Responsibility of External Bystanders, p.159. 
16 Ibid, p.53. 
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under pressure from donor countries, particularly France, to renounce the system of one 
party government that had been in place since 1974.  With no alternative but to acquiesce to 
the demands Rwandan politics was opened up and immediately a number of Hutu dominated 
liberal parties opposed to President Juvenal Habyarimana’s dictatorship sprang up.  
Meanwhile, the number of Tutsi refugees, in Uganda since 1960, had swelled to 700,000; 
now under pressure from their hosts to leave, they saw the unsettled political situation in 
Rwanda as an opportunity to negotiate a return home.  However, having initially failed to 
agree a peaceful return to Rwanda, the Tutsi, organised now as the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF), launched an armed invasion of Rwanda on 1 October 1990 with the intention of 
forcing their way back home.  
At this point the RPF had 2,500 soldiers, armed with equipment plundered from the 
Ugandan army;
17
 whilst the Rwandan army (FAR) was 5,200 strong and equipped with 
modern weaponry supplied by France as part of a rather one sided military cooperation pact 
between the two countries.  Despite their numerical superiority, FAR initially suffered 
losses; but by November the RPF had retreated back into Uganda.  However, it was not 
FAR’s numerical superiority that forced the RPF back.  On 4 October 150 French 
paratroopers arrived in Kigali to support the Rwandan government and were soon reinforced 
by 450 more French troops sent on the personal instructions of President Mitterrand; France 
was effectively propping up the Rwandan government.  The relationship between France and 
Rwanda had developed during the 1970s and mirrored the association between Paris and a 
number of other Francophone African countries.  Daniela Kroslak in fact suggests the 
relationship with Rwanda is a clear example of France’s “activist Africa policy” begun by 
Charles de Gaulle and continued by all subsequent French presidents.
18
  The paternalistic 
nature of this policy was though, she continues, all about promoting France’s national 
interests; French presidents, she suggests, believed relations with African countries, 
                                                          
17 It is has also been suggested by various people, including Alison Des-Forges and Hazel Cameron, that the Ugandan army 
looked the other way, whilst knowingly letting the RPF walk off with the equipment.  Allowing the RPF to arm themselves 
and launch an invasion, would have potentially solved the Ugandans’ problem of Tutsi refugees occupying valuable 
agricultural land in the south of the country. 
18 Kroslak, The Responsibility of External Bystanders, p.132. 
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including Rwanda, allowed France to dominate Africa economically, culturally and 
politically and as such confirmed France’s role as a global power.  The agreements though 
did mean that in cases of war, such as Rwanda in 1990, France was obliged to respond, even 
if it only to reassure other African leaders that they could trust their French friends. 
 The RPF though were not destroyed.  Throughout 1991 and early 1992 their raids 
continued.  Within Rwanda Hutu ultra-nationalists responded: over 2,000 Tutsi were killed 




  By 1993 Rwanda, one of 
the smallest countries in Africa had become one of its largest arms importers.  Linda 
Melvern for example has uncovered details of contracts between the Rwandan government 
and South African arms dealers worth a staggering US$56 million between October 1990 
and May 1991 alone, as well as over $10 million of deals with Egypt in a similar period.  
Such was the extent of the arms purchases that by 1994 in the town of Gitarama, which had 
a population of only 150,000, the government was able to distribute over 50,000 rifles, 
pistols and machetes to the Hutu population, as well as grenades and mortars.
20
   
In March 1992, finally succumbing to internal and French pressure, President 
Habyarimana announced the formation of a new coalition cabinet which included some of 
the Hutu opposition parties.  The newly appointed ministers were quick to act, first agreeing 
a ceasefire with the RPF and then beginning peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania.  After 
numerous false dawns, and intermittent violence from both sides, the Arusha Accords were 
finally signed in August 1993.  The Accords provided for fairly radical change: a broad 
based transitional government would be installed until democratic elections could be held, 
the Tutsi refugees would be allowed home, the two warring armies would be merged, French 
troops were to withdraw completely from the country and the position of president would 
become largely ceremonial.  It was this last provision that made it obvious to Rwanda 
observers, such as Human Rights Watch’s Alison Des Forges, that Hutu extremists close to 
                                                          
19 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families (London: Picador, 2000), 
p.88. 
20 Melvern, A People Betrayed, pp.64-6. 
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Habyarimana would not support the agreement and that therefore peace was far from 
inevitable.   
In November 1993 UN peacekeeping troops arrived in Rwanda, after the Security 
Council agreed to oversee the Accords’ implementation.21  The force, known as The United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was mandated to oversee the transition 
to a broad-based government and the merger of the two armies.  The Accords’ plans for 
power-sharing and elections seemed to be a perfect fit with the ideological belief that rapid 
liberalism and democracy would create conditions of stable and lasting peace that was 
permeating much of the international community in the early 1990s.  For some in the UN, 
the mission was potentially a textbook example of how liberal peacekeeping could work.  
However, the key step of transferring power to the new government was delayed repeatedly. 
By April 1994 the broad based government had still not been formed and the 
international community was losing patience.  On 5 April the UN Security Council voted to 
renew UNAMIR’s mandate, but a review after six weeks was stipulated in the hope that this 
would reinvigorate the peace process.
22
  Regional leaders also applied pressure, particularly 
to President Habyarimana who was seen as being responsible for the stalling.  On 6 April, 
Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam, for a meeting with the Presidents of Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda and Burundi, all of whom demanded an end to the procrastination.  Scolded, the 
President boarded his private jet, a gift of the French government, to return to Rwanda.  As 
the plane came in to land at Kigali two surface-to-air missiles illuminated the night sky and 
the jet was shot down; all on board were killed.  
Within hours road blocks, manned by government backed militia (the Interahamwe) 
and FAR, sprang up across Kigali.  The next day opposition leaders and influential Tutsi 
were rounded up and killed by the Presidential Guard in a systematic manner that was 
                                                          
21 UN S/Res 872 (1993), 5 October 1993. 
22 UN S/Res 909 (1994), 5 April 1994.  The Security Council had used a similar tactic in the UN mission to Western Sahara in 
1992; by only extending the mission by three months in this case they hoped to indicate to the two warring parties that “the 
patience and the resources of the international community were finite” (William J. Durch, “Building on Sand: UN 
Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara,” International Security 17, no.4 (1993), p.168.) 
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indicative of thorough organisation.  The killings quickly spread from Hutu opposition 
leaders to ordinary Tutsi, first in Kigali and then across the country.  Among the first victims 
were ten Belgian peacekeepers captured and executed as they tried in vain to protect the 
moderate Prime Minister elect, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. 
Two days after the killing started the RPF resumed the civil war and this time the 
French did not intervene.  Three months later and after one hundred days of fighting and 
genocide, on 4 July the RPF captured Kigali, on 5 July Butare, the country’s second city, 
and on 14
 
July Ruhengeri, the temporary home of the Hutu government.  In the face of this 
relentless drive westward by the Tutsi guerrilla army, huge numbers of Hutu had fled, 
encouraged by local leaders and Radio Television Libre Mille Collines (RTLMC), a radical 
Hutu radio station which throughout the genocide had incited the ethnic violence.  In the 
week ending 18 July alone, over one million Hutu, including the interim government and the 
majority of FAR, crossed the border into Zaire.  On 18 July the RPF announced a unilateral 
ceasefire and installed a new government the following day.  The events of those one 
hundred days were both the quickest genocide ever seen and the immediate cause of one of 
the worst refugee crises that the world has had to deal with. 
The International Response 
Before turning to the more thorough examination of the British response, it is worth 
the slight diversion of briefly considering why other countries responded in the way that 
they did.  As Ian Budge has suggested, other states are generally a key influence on British 
foreign policy making
23
 and as we will see this was true in the case of Rwanda.  Here the 
responses of the three main international protagonists in the crisis are considered; the United 
States, France and Belgium. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Budge, The New British Politics, p.531. 
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The United States 
It is evident throughout the crisis that although there were a few mid-level officials 
that sought some form of US response, at a senior level the Clinton Administration, despite 
being aware of the genocidal nature of the crisis,
24
 actively took steps to avoid becoming 
involved in Rwanda.  Although options were considered, the response was always the same 
– there was a reason why direct US involvement should be avoided.  For example, at one 
stage the State Department suggested jamming RTLMC; however, the idea was quickly 
rebutted by the Pentagon, who raised legal arguments against the plan and highlighted the 
cost and presumed inefficiency of the scheme before finally arguing that jamming a civilian 
radio station infringed the right to free speech.  As early as mid-April the State Department’s 
legal advisers were considering whether the atrocities constituted genocide.  Although they 
did eventually acknowledge that “acts of genocide” were happening, in April their advice 
was to avoid the use of the word “genocide” as this could “commit the [US government] to 
actually do something”.25   
 Why the US were so hostile to any intervention can be explained by four key 
factors.  Firstly, the response was dominated by the events in Somalia in late 1993.  Only six 
months before the genocide broke out 18 US Rangers, in Somalia as part of the UN 
mandated peacekeeping force, had been killed during a failed mission to capture a Somali 
war-lord.  The horror of the event was flashed across the globe as CNN showed a dead 
American being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.  In response to this incident, 
President Clinton promised to withdraw all American troops from Somalia.  The tendency to 
“fight the last war” meant that events in Rwanda were viewed through a Somali lens - the 
fear of another Mogadishu terrified American decision makers.  Without the shadow of 
Somalia hanging over the US, maybe the response would have been different; as National 
                                                          
24 John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes 1992-2000, (London & New York: Routledge, 2009), p.79.  
Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention, pp.32-3. 
25 Discussion Paper, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of 
Defense, 1 May 1994. Accessed at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050194.pdf on 12 June 2010. 
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Security Adviser Tony Lake was to subsequently suggest, “Rwanda was a casualty of 
chronology”.26  
 Secondly, Congress heavily influenced the response.  Clinton had taken office better 
disposed towards peacekeeping than any other administration in US history.  But by 1994 
Congress had made it clear that it did not support the rising cost of peacekeeping and that it 
felt the US, and UN, had to learn to say “no” to proposed missions.  Although there were a 
few in Congress who called for greater US involvement in Rwanda, the majority were keen 
for the US to keep out; for example after the evacuation of American nationals from Kigali, 
Republican Leader in the Senate, Bob Dole, appeared on the CBS news programme Face the 
Nation saying “I don’t think we have any national interest here ... I hope we don’t get 
involved there.  The Americans are out, as far as I am concerned in Rwanda.  That ought to 
be the end of it”.27  Ever conscious of the need for Congressional support to push through 
domestic reforms, there was no way that Clinton was going to incur the hostility and wrath 
of Congress over Rwanda.   
 The third factor is the drafting of US Presidential Decision Directive 25.  Although 
not published until after the genocide had begun, PDD25 was being drafted in April 1994 
and was therefore at the fore of decision makers’ minds.  In the wake of the events in 
Somalia, the US’s future involvement in peacekeeping was reviewed and the new directive 
set out when the US would and would not intervene.  From now on, US involvement would 
depend on certain criteria being met: whether US interests were at stake; whether there was a 
threat to world peace; a clear mission goal; acceptable costs; Congressional, public and 
allied support; a working ceasefire; and a clear exit route.  Rwanda failed all these and 
passed only one of the criteria, evidence of a humanitarian emergency.  In the absence of 
                                                          
26 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence, p.60. 
27 Melvern, A People Betrayed, p.172. 
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clear instructions to the contrary from the President, no senior government official was 
going to champion intervention when it clearly failed to satisfy the new stated policy.
28
   
 The final factor influencing US policy was the fear in the White House and the 
Pentagon that the US was assumed to be the peacekeeper of last resort.  Having seen what 
had happened in Somalia, the Administration feared that supporting any mission, even at the 
UN, would inevitably lead to US involvement; as Samantha Power suggests there was a 
“fear, articulated mainly at the Pentagon but felt throughout the bureaucracy, that what 
would start as a small engagement by foreign troops would end as a large and costly one by 
Americans”.29   The Pentagon had seen foreign troops first hand in Somalia and did not 
believe in the capability of African troops to mount a mission in Rwanda; if the Belgians had 
been forced to withdraw what hope did African troops have?
30
  The US was also aware that 
only they had the logistical resources necessary to support such a mission; no other nation 
had the airlift capacity to transport troops and equipment to the land-locked country. For this 
reason the US opposed not only their own involvement but also that of others. 
 The US did eventually deploy troops to the region, but only after the genocide had 
ended and only then into neighbouring Zaire to provide aid in the Hutu refugee camps.  
Jared Cohen nicely sums up the US response, calling it “100 days of silence”.31 
France 
 The French response to the events of 1994 was also influenced by history, though in 
their case a longer history than the events of 1993.  Since the wave of African independence 
in the 1950s and 1960s France had viewed Africa as falling within its sphere of influence, 
French presidents since De Gaulle believed that by dominating Africa they cemented their 
position as a world power and justified their permanent seat at the UN Security Council.   
French relations with Rwanda particularly had been especially strong as demonstrated by the 
                                                          
28 Burkhalter, “The Question of Genocide,” p.49. 
29 Samantha Power, “Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001. 
30 DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians, p.76. 
31 Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence. 
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very close personal relationship between Presidents Mitterrand and Habyarimana and their 
families.
32
  However, by the 1990s France, or at least President Mitterrand, was losing 
confidence in the dominant position in Africa; as Asteris Huliaras notes: 
The developments in Rwanda were considered by many French politicians, 
diplomats and many journalists as evidence of an ‘Anglo-Saxon conspiracy’, 
part of a plot to develop an arc of influence from Ethiopia and Eritrea via, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon. For them, the ‘Anglo-
Saxons’ had a hidden agenda ‘to oust them from Africa’.33 
 
 
Some, including Gerard Prunier, have called this French perception the “Fashoda 
Syndrome”34 referring to the 1898 territorial dispute that nearly led Britain and France to 
war in the small Sudanese village of Fashoda.  The syndrome, he continues, explains the 
tendency within French foreign policy to assert French influence in areas which may be 
susceptible to British (or more recently US) influence.  This underlying belief led the French 
government to conclude that the RPF incursions into Rwanda were supported by the English 
speaking Ugandan government and therefore by extension by the wider Anglo-Saxon world.  
If France was to retain its close relations with its various client states across Africa it had to 
stand up to the aggression of the RPF; President Mitterand was determined to reassure the 
French public and African heads of state that France’s position in Africa, and therefore the 
world, would not be threatened.   This meant actively intervening in support of the Rwandan 
government throughout the civil war, which they did by sending troops and supplying 
weapons. 
 Once the killings began in April 1994 the French political elite steadfastly refused to 
accept that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide.  Throughout the summer of 1994, 
the French government described Rwanda as a civil war and called for a ceasefire between 
the two parties.  They justified their relations with the interim Rwandan government on the 
grounds that this was the only way to encourage them to negotiate.  When the French did 
                                                          
32 Kroslak, The Responsibility of External Bystanders, p.134. 
33 Asteris Huliaras. “The ‘Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy’: French Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis,” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies. 36, no. 4. (1998), p.594. 
34 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p.104. 
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eventually acknowledge the genocide, they perpetuated the theory of double-genocide; for 
example, in May French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé spoke of both sides committing 
crimes and in September Mitterrand spoke of “genocides” deliberately using the plural.35   
 The French, more than anyone, must have known what was happening in Rwanda; 
as well as deploying troops as part of the effort to evacuate foreign nationals there were still 
reputedly 200 military intelligence agents in the country in April 1994.  The close 
connections with the Hutu regime also meant that the French government received first hand 
intelligence about what was happening on the ground.  Yet the French did not intervene until 
June, did not encourage the UN to intervene more robustly, did not share their intelligence, 
did not seek to have the Rwandan ambassador removed from the Security Council and made 
no effort to influence their former allies in the interim government.  As Andrew Wallis 
concludes, “Whilst Clinton used every trick in the diplomatic book to avoid getting involved 
in a country in which the USA clearly had no interest, Mitterrand and his military advisers 
were determined to get the best outcome for France out of the carnage”.36  This meant 
deliberately ignoring the genocide and preservation of the Hutu government that France had 
supported since the mid-1970s; victory for the RPF was seen, by Mitterrand and others in 
the French political elite, as a threat to France’s position in Africa and hence its standing in 
the international community.   
Belgium 
Whilst it was unusual for ex-colonial powers to contribute peacekeepers to missions 
in their old colonies, the Belgian government was initially keen to support UNAMIR and 
Belgian troops formed the backbone of the UN mission.  Why Belgium was the only NATO 
country willing in 1993 to offer troops is not clear, but Romeo Dallaire suggests that “a deal 
may have been struck with the French for Belgian troops to protect their [France’s] interests 
                                                          
35 Kroslak, Responsibility of Bystanders, p.324. 
36 Wallis, Silent Accomplice, p.210. 
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in Kigali after the French battalion was shipped out”.37  Once in theatre, however, it quickly 
became obvious to the Belgians that the peace process was precarious and in danger of 
collapsing.  Belgian intelligence appears to have been more aware than most of the growing 
tension in the country: in November 1993 it noted the distribution of grenades across the 
country; in December officers warned that youth militias were being trained; and in January 
1994 Belgian intelligence officers worked with Jean-Pierre, the Hutu informant that led 
General Dallaire to send what has infamously become known as the Genocide Fax.  This 
fax, sent to UN headquarters in New York, has since been held up by some as the “smoking 
gun” that proves that genocide could have been foreseen; in January 1994 Jean-Pierre 
approached Belgian officers with intelligence about the planning of genocide.  He claimed 
that he was a senior military instructor involved in training the Hutu militia and had seen 
lists of intended Tutsi victims.  In return for asylum he promised to lead UNAMIR to a 
number of arms caches across Kigali.  On 11 January Dallaire faxed New York with this 
information and requested authority to carry out raids on the caches based on Jean-Pierre’s 
intelligence.  The request was denied by DPKO, who evidently feared a repeat of the 
Mogadishu fiasco, without ever having been discussed with Security Council members.  
Based on this catalogue of evidence, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali informed Brussels 
that UNAMIR should be given a more forceful mandate or be withdrawn.  In February Willy 
Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister, visited Kigali to see the situation first hand.  On his 
return to Brussels he contacted UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to warn him 
that given its current mandate and resources UNAMIR was ineffective and it was therefore 
necessary to reinforce the mission.  The Belgian ambassador at the UN also tried to push this 
demand but was reputedly told by officials that UNAMIR was considered a low cost and 
low priority mission and expansion would not be considered.
38
 
The initial response of Belgium to the renewal of fighting was to argue for a rapid 
deployment of extra troops.  At the UN, the Belgian ambassador asked for UNAMIR’s 
                                                          
37 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p.84. 
38 Melvern, A People Betrayed, p.104. 
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mandate and rules of engagement to be changed so that their troops could intervene to stop 
the violence, but acknowledged they would only do this with UN support.
39
  There was no 
such support; on 8 April the Belgian ambassador informed Brussels that “certain permanent 
members” were opposed to broadening the UNAMIR mandate.40   At home the government 
also came under fierce criticism following the death of the Belgian peacekeepers and public 
opinion quickly soured towards the involvement in Rwanda.  In the face of this opposition, 
and with no international support, the government did an about face and on 10 April Belgian 
paratroopers landed at Kigali airport to assist in the evacuation of Belgian nationals.  At the 
same time Boutros-Ghali was informed of the Belgian decision to withdraw its forces from 
UNAMIR.  The official reason was that UNAMIR was now ineffective and that nothing 
could be done to stop the civil war. 
Once this decision had been made, the Belgian Foreign Ministry set out to convince 
other Security Council members that UNAMIR should be withdrawn immediately.  The 
effort devoted to what was effectively a face saving exercise, far exceeded their previous 
efforts to have UNAMIR reinforced; Willy Claes reputedly contacted many of his 
counterparts personally.  As the former colonial power, with the most recent experience in 
Rwanda, the Belgian government was considered, by many, as the most qualified to speak of 
what was right for Rwanda.  The murder of the Belgian soldiers and the public backlash was 
clearly the turning point for Belgium; like the US in Somalia, the government was forced to 
withdraw and wanted nothing more to do with the country.  Like both France and the US, 
Belgium placed its own national interest before any belief in humanitarianism. 
 
 
                                                          
39 The rules of engagement (RoE) for UNAMIR, as drafted by General Dallaire, did actually authorise the use of force, up to 
and including, deadly force, to prevent “crimes against humanity”.  Dallaire states that these rules were cribbed from the UN 
mission to Cambodia and sent to New York and all troop contributing nations for approval.  Only the Belgian government 
responded to Dallaire, and that was to indicate that they did not want their troops to be used for crowd control.  The Belgian 
government had therefore tacitly agreed that force could be used to stop crimes against humanity, yet when the genocide 
began did not feel able to follow the RoE that they had signed up to. (Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp.72&99) 
40 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell The Story, p.619. 
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The UK and Rwanda 
Turning now to the UK’s response to the events in Rwanda, it is immediately 
apparent that the existing literature is limited and works that do anything more than touch 
briefly on the subject are rare.  What literature there is on the UK is dominated by the former 
Sunday Times journalist Linda Melvern, who has written two books and a number of articles 
on the genocide.  Although Melvern mainly concentrates on the role of the UN in the crisis, 
her various studies have more material on the UK than any others.  A second area where 
there is slightly more, though still incomplete, coverage of the UK’s involvement is in the 
media coverage of the crisis.  The Glasgow Media Group has published two short studies on 
the crisis, Georgina Holmes has reviewed coverage of the genocide on the BBC’s Newsnight 
programme and there are also a number of accounts written by journalists who reported from 
Rwanda either during, or in the immediate aftermath of, the genocide.
41
  Overall though, the 
existing literature’s coverage of the UK’s involvement in the genocide is incomplete and 
patchy.  The summary below reviews the literature under five headings: the UK at the UN; 
the government’s response; when did the government become aware of the genocide; the 
role of the media; and the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
However, given that so little has been written about the UK and Rwanda, it is maybe 
appropriate first to explain why the UK is a valuable case study subject.  If we adopt Ervin 
Staub’s definition of bystanders as being “people who witness but are not directly affected 
by the actions of the perpetrators”, 42  the UK’s role in the Rwandan crisis was that of 
bystander; the UK was neither perpetrator nor victim.  Specifically looking at genocide 
Daniela Kroslak expands on this definition: 
                                                          
41  Georgina Holmes, “Did Newsnight Miss the Story? A Survey of How the BBC’s ‘Flagship Political Current Affairs 
Program” Reported Genocide and War in Rwanda Between April and July 1994,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 2 
(2011), pp.174-192. Journalist accounts include accounts by Richard Dowden who was Africa editor of The Independent in 
1994 (“The Rwandan Genocide: How the Press Missed the Story. A Memoir.” African Affairs, no. 103 (2004): 283-90), 
Mark Doyle, who was the East Africa correspondent for the BBC (“Reporting the Genocide,” in The Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide edited by Allan Thompson (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 145-59) and George Alagiah (Passage to Africa. 
(London: Abacus, 2007)) and Fergal Keane (Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. (London: Penguin Books, 1996)), who 
both reported for the BBC. 
42 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), p.86. 
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 bystanders to genocide are those people who are not directly affected by the 
genocidal policies of a regime. The crucial element to ascribe the label 
‘bystander’ to a person or group is that they have to be aware of the events 





 Despite the fact that bystanders are not actively involved in the genocide or other 
crises, a study of their behaviour is still valuable given the potential influence they can have 
on events by way of their intervention or non-intervention.  Staub observes that “opposition 
from bystanders, whether based on moral or other grounds, can change the perspective of 
perpetrators and other bystanders”.44  He points to Hitler’s avoidance of clashes with the 
established churches during the Holocaust as evidence of this claim.  Ernesto Verdeja 
agrees: “Foreign support, indifference or hostility plays a crucial role in setting the 
parameters of genocide.  The number and types of external deterrents, and their impact (or 
lack thereof) on the perpetrator regime, affect the scope and duration of the violence.”45  In 
the specific case of Rwanda, Jean Hatzfeld, during numerous interviews with Hutu who had 
participated in the genocide, discovered what an impact the withdrawal of UNAMIR and the 
lack of international condemnation had had on the killers.  One for example, told Hatzfeld 
“We witnessed the flight of the [UN] armoured cars with our own eyes.  Our ears no longer 
heard rumours of reproach ... [we were] assured of unchecked freedom to complete the 
task.”46  Although not active participants in the genocide, bystanders have a role that needs 
to be understood; it is this role which makes a study such as this one valuable. 
The UK, amongst all bystanders, has been chosen specifically for this study because 
of the belief that the UK was/is a powerful and influential member of the international 
community: 
The UK plays a unique role in the world’s affairs.  A member of NATO, the 
European Union, the Western European Union, the Commonwealth, the Group 
of Seven leading industrial nations and a Permanent Member of the UN 
                                                          
43 Kroslak, The Responsibility of External Bystanders in Cases of Genocide, p.33. 
44 Ibid, p.21. 
45 Ernesto Verdeja, “On Genocide: Five Contributory Factors,” Contemporary Politics 8, no. 1 (2002), p.42. 
46 Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), p.92. 
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Security Council: no other country holds all these positions of international 
prominence and responsibility.
47
   
The UK has also been an active participant in international military interventions; for 
example since 1990 British troops have been deployed in the former Yugoslavia, northern 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Libya, Sierra Leone, and twice made significant contributions to 
the Gulf War coalitions.  The UK’s position in the international community is also affected 
by the close relationship with the US; as a partner, or even agent, of the US the so-called 
Special Relationship arguably means that on the international scene the UK punches above 
its weight.  The UK then is one of the few countries potentially capable of significantly 
influencing world events.  As Andrew Gowers concludes, the UK is amongst the few nations 
that make up what is commonly called the “international community” and it is this 
community that can influence world affairs: 
The true international community – the one whose health and togetherness 
will determine the course of world events – is the group of states that created 






The final reason for a UK study comes from General Dallaire himself.  Dallaire has 
written “the level and type of involvement of these three Western countries [the US, France 
and UK] in the genocide in Rwanda were unique and therefore worthy of special 
attention.”49  Despite this suggestion, to date the UK has not received the special attention 
Dallaire suggests is needed. 
The UK at the United Nations 
The role of the UK mission to the UN is the area best covered by the existing 
literature.  In this literature the UK is typically portrayed as initially having been hostile to 
any intervention in Rwanda, then moving slowly towards a position of supporting African 
led intervention once it became impossible to ignore the genocide.  For example, Michael 
                                                          
47 A. Cooke, ed. The Campaign Guide 1994: A Comprehensive Survey of Conservative Policy (London: Conservative & 
Unionist Central Office, 1994), p.v.  Although now known as the G8, in 1994 it was correct to talk of the G7 as Russia only 
formally joined the group in 1997. 
48 Andrew Gowers, “The Power of Two,” Foreign Policy, no. 132 (2002), p.32. 
49 Dallaire et al, “Major Powers on Trial,” p.862. 
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Barnett, an American academic temporarily seconded to the US mission to the UN, had 
responsibility for advising the US mission on Rwanda in 1994; he records the British 
position as: “Britain fought against the initial push for intervention in April and then shifted 
position in May when it had overwhelming evidence of the genocide. Still it contributed no 
real resources.”50  Additionally, in many peoples’ analysis the UK’s position on the Security 
Council makes it responsible for the UN’s failure.  Dallaire, for example, wrote in a co-
authored article: 
Faced with incontrovertible evidence of the most clear-cut case of genocide 
possible, the international community failed to denounce the evil and to take 
action to stop the killings taking place in Rwanda in 1994. Under the 
influence of three major powers - France, the United States and the United 
Kingdom - the United Nations was disabled from taking the necessary action 
because the mass slaughter of the Tutsi people did not impinge on these 
powers’ narrowly defined national interests.51 
 
 
A report produced by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) makes a similar claim, 
quoting from an interview with Boutros-Ghali, it states “The US effort to prevent the 
effective deployment of a UN force for Rwanda succeeded, with the strong support of Britain 
.... The international community did little or nothing as the killing in Rwanda continued.”52  
In this analysis, the UK, as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, was 
directly responsible for the United Nations’ failure to halt the genocide.   
The main reason used to explain this opposition is the suggestion that the British 
government believed UN resources were already overstretched and UN peacekeeping was 
becoming too expensive.  With regard the first point, Alison Des Forges notes that the “UK 
government supposedly wanted to limit UN involvement to diplomacy, apparently fearing 
that the organisation might collapse under the strain of trying anything more ambitious”.53  
Alan Kuperman highlights both the cost of UN missions and the risk to peacekeepers in his 
explanation of inaction: “The United States and Britain blocked this initiative [to reinforce 
                                                          
50 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.171. 
51 Romeo Dallaire et al, “The Major Powers on Trial,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, (2005), p.861. 
52 Masire Ketumile, HE (Chairman). “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide,” Organisation of African Unity, (1999), p.87. 
Interestingly this quote actually refers to the “Thatcher government” of Britain, suggesting either Boutros-Ghali, or more 
likely the report’s authors, were slightly out of touch with UK domestic politics. 
53 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p.638. 
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the UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda in February 1994], citing the costs of more troops 
and the danger that expanding the mission could endanger peacekeepers.”54  In support of 
the argument that peacekeeping had become too expensive, Melvern claims that the US and 
UK “adamantly opposed” the Belgian plans to reinforce UNAMIR in February 1994 “for 
financial reasons”.55  Melvern continues that throughout the crisis the UK tried to pass 
responsibility for Rwanda from the UN to the OAU, in an attempt to avoid the expense and 
risk associated with further UN involvement.
56
   
The literature also typically claims that the UK mission in New York allowed the 
US to take the lead in policy formation.  Richard Dowden makes the general claim, “The 
US, backed by Britain and Belgium, forced the UN Security Council to cut the peacekeeping 
force as the genocide plan was rolled out across Rwanda” (emphasis added).57  Similarly 
when describing the discussions at UN Headquarters on 7 April, when the US first proposed 
withdrawing the peacekeeping troops from Rwanda, Des Forges notes “Several members of 
the Security Council – described as ‘permanent’ and ‘western’ – shared these points of view, 
probably meaning that at least the UK supported the US position.”58  For Mark Curtis, a 
rather radical and critical author on British foreign policy, such behaviour fits precisely into 
his model of how the UK operates at the UN.  Curtis quotes The Guardian journalist Richard 
Gott to suggest that British support of the US at the UN is fairly typical: “[The Security 
Council] is a tight run ship organised chiefly by the British on behalf of the Americans ... 
Whilst the Americans provide the economic arm twisting, the British supply the diplomatic 
expertise”.59   
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The Government’s Response 
Whilst the UK mission at the UN, along with their US counterparts, were supposedly 
trying to control the UN’s response to Rwanda, the literature suggests that back in London 
there was no interest in the crisis.  Richard Dowden writes: 
Rwanda, a former Belgium colony, was of little interest to the Foreign Office, 
which had been forced to cut its staffing levels in Africa through the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Rwanda had no diplomatic, historical or commercial links with 






Both Mat Berdal and Gilbert Khadiagala support this interpretation, noting that post-
independence Africa was not a core priority for the UK, and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) resources dedicated to the continent had gradually been reduced.
61
  For 
Dallaire the government’s response can “be characterised from the outset by a determination 
to play the matter down”.62  Linda Melvern and Paul Williams similarly conclude, “Based on 
the evidence presented we conclude that the British government displayed a deeply troubling 
indifference towards the victims of Rwanda’s genocide”; they accuse the British government 
of a “deliberately misconceived version” of what was happening in Rwanda and a “wilful 
neglect of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.”63  
Melvern though does quote one senior UK civil servant as saying “We weren’t 
indifferent, it’s just we didn’t know what to do”.64  In support of this sentiment, there is 
certainly a consensus amongst many involved in the crisis that they were not looking for or 
expecting genocide in Rwanda and were therefore guilty of missing the signs when it did 
begin.
65
   As something so out of the usual course of international events it caught many 
people, apparently including the British government, unawares and unprepared. 
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However although the government was slow to respond to the genocide, it was 
quick to take action in response to the refugee crisis that followed the genocidal killings.  
For Prunier this is largely a reflection of the absence of the genocide from TV news – 
“events that do not happen on TV do not happen for people in the west.  Whereas the 
genocide was not seen on TV the refugee crisis was”.66  Dallaire also notes this obvious 
difference in the way the two events were treated; he somewhat backhandedly acknowledges 
that “the British government was rather more forthcoming with its response to the refugee 
crisis that followed the genocide”.67  For some this is an indication that the UK government 
used the refugee crisis as an opportunity to disguise their lack of action and policy on the 
genocide itself. 
When Did the UK Government Become Aware of the Genocide? 
A key test of any bystander’s responsibility for events is their awareness of those 
events; clearly no-one can blame the British government for not doing more in Rwanda, if it 
genuinely did not, or could not, have known what was happening in the country.  The timing 
of when the British government became aware of the fact that genocide was occurring is 
therefore an important point, yet to date this has not been fully or adequately explored.  Des 
Forges, for example, notes “The major international actors – policy makers in Belgium, the 
US, France and the United Nations – all understood the gravity of the crisis within the first 
24 hours”.68  She notably does not include the UK in this list; in fact, she does not make any 
claim of when she believes the UK did become aware of the gravity of the situation.  
Dallaire on the contrary believes that as one of the world’s major powers, with a well 
equipped High Commission in Kampala (Uganda) the UK must have known about the 
genocide fairly early on.
69
  Melvern agrees with this conclusion, noting that in March 1994 
Edward Clay, the British High Commissioner in Kampala, had provided the FCO with a 
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report detailing what was happening in Rwanda after he visited Kigali.
70
  Melvern also 
alleges that the UK had access to the reports that General Dallaire sent from Rwanda to the 
UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations in New York; these “increasingly desperate 
cables” she claims “[warned] of impending calamity” in the country.71  Melvern certainly 
believes that the UK knew more about the situation in Rwanda than widely believed and 
sooner.  The literature also suggests that whilst the UK must have been aware of the 
genocide, the government initially deliberately spoke of the crisis as a resumption of the on-
going civil war.  Both Hazel Cameron
72
 and Melvern, in her various works, suggest that this 
deliberate use of rhetoric was employed to avoid the need for the UK to actually respond.   
The second point about knowledge of genocide relates to the alleged close 
relationship that the American and British governments had with the RPF prior to and during 
the genocide.  Hazel Cameron, Wayne Madsen and numerous internet conspiracy theorists 
allege that the RPF received extensive support from the British and Americans in Uganda.
73
  
Cameron for example, suggests that the British army provided military training to the RPF 
guerrillas and that the 1990 invasion was launched with the full knowledge and active 
assistance of the British Secret Intelligence Service (more commonly known as MI6).
74
 
On the other hand, writers do also recognise that British intelligence may not have 
been that good.  Melvern, for example, does quote Sir David Hannay,
75
 the British 
Representative at the UN, as having said that the UK was “extremely unsighted” over 
Rwanda.
76
  The fact that there was no British embassy in Rwanda and the low level of trade 
between the two countries meant that Rwanda was of little interest to the UK and 
intelligence and FCO resources were not at all focused on the country.  Therefore, Hannay 
continues, the UK, like the non-permanent members of the Security Council, was dependent 
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upon the UN Secretariat for information on Rwanda.
77
  British officials were not looking for 
genocide, so when the killings began, the UK, looking through the frame of four years of 
protracted civil war and failed ceasefire agreements, saw these fresh events as a civil war 
spilling over into massacres of non-combatants; the view was therefore taken that Rwanda 




The Role of the British Media 
The literature generally suggests that the media in the UK missed the Rwandan 
genocide and only became interested in the story once it had become a refugee crisis.  
Dowden, who in 1994 was the Africa editor for The Independent, for example recalls the 
media response: 
For most people, Rwanda was just another incomprehensible and irrelevant 
small war in Africa. The antagonists spoke French.  They had silly names: Hutu 
and Tutsis?  News editors giggled and spoke of ‘Tutus’ and ‘Whoopsies’ in 
news conferences.  Even when they took it seriously they came up against an 






The Glasgow Media Group’s two studies support Dowden’s comments.  In the first 
study, which looks at the portrayal of African disasters and rebellions generally, the group 
concludes that there is very little public knowledge of Africa, and that this is often also the 
case amongst the journalists who cover Africa.  This ignorance leads to sweeping 
generalisations being applied to events there.  For example, the study highlights how 
journalists assumed that as the state infrastructure had collapsed in Somalia in the early 
1990s the same must be true of Rwanda, when the truth is that the two countries are far from 
analogous in this respect.
80
  The second report, which focuses solely on television news 
reporting of Rwanda in July 1994, concludes that the media’s focus was on the refugee 
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crisis, whilst giving very little coverage to the genocide that precipitated the second crisis.
81
  
The study found that the television media failed to provide any context to the refugee crisis 
and the limited coverage of the genocide was confused and fragmented.
82
  Georgina Holmes 
is similarly scathing of the media in her detailed study of Newsnight’s coverage of the crisis.  
She concludes that despite being the BBC’s flagship current affairs programme, Newsnight 
failed to give sufficient coverage to the crisis and failed to challenge British politicians over 
their handling of the crisis.  She continues that Newsnight by “whitewashing events” failed 
to arouse the public’s attention.83 
The Role of NGOs 
The role of NGOs can be split into two geographical spheres; firstly what the NGOs 
did in the UK and secondly what they did in Rwanda and neighbouring countries.  The 
NGOs’ prime role in the UK was to attempt to highlight first the potential for, and then the 
actuality of, genocide in Rwanda.  Anne Mackintosh, who was the Rwanda country co-
ordinator for Oxfam in 1994, records that in the years 1991 to 1994 Oxfam made a number 
of attempts to highlight the increasing tension between Hutu and Tutsi; for example in 1993 
Oxfam campaigner David Waller wrote, “Rwanda stands on the brink of an unchartered 
abyss of anarchy and violence, and there are too many historical, ethnic, economic, and 
political pressures that are likely to push it over the edge.”84  Mackintosh, herself recalls 
warning her superiors that the war in Rwanda was likely to resume in 1994, though she does 
not pretend to foretell the genocide that would accompany the resumption of fighting.  But 
as Tony Vaux, himself a senior Oxfam manager, notes once the genocide did break out: 
 Oxfam did well to alert the world to the true nature of the genocide, but in the 
end no one can say that they did enough.  Even those in Oxfam who wrote 
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letters to the newspapers rightly labelling the event as genocide when it was 





Although Oxfam, and some other NGOs, did try to alert the UK to the genocide that was 
occurring in Rwanda it is not clear how successfully that message was spread and what 
impact it had on government and public opinion. 
 Secondly, the NGOs had a role in Rwanda.  Having left the country when the war 
resumed and genocide broke out, British NGOs did not have a presence in Rwanda during 
the course of the genocide itself.  However, NGOs, both British and those from other 
western countries, flocked to the region once hostilities ceased.  Vaux describes this as “an 
unseemly scramble of aid agencies to respond to the genocide after the worst had 
happened”.86  However, rather than working in Rwanda itself, most of the NGOs set up their 
operations in the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania.  These were occupied by Hutu 
refugees, some of whom certainly had been the perpetrators of genocide.  As Andy Storey 
discusses, this led to accusations that the NGOs were aiding the perpetrators of genocide 
whilst the victims were ignored.
87
  The fact that the refugee camps provided a base for the 
old government forces to launch armed raids into Rwanda also led to accusations that NGOs 
were feeding combatants.   
It is also not clear how the NGOs in the region affected the media coverage of the 
crisis.  Storey quotes the conclusion of an African Rights report, “with few exceptions, it is 
fair to say that the staff of international organisations and NGOs ... [did] not have a grasp of 
the political situation, let alone an incisive analysis”.88  Vaux similarly notes, “some aid 
agencies apparently did not even realise that the people in the camps were killers rather than 
victims. They sent out aid workers who suddenly discovered that they were helping 
murderers.”89  Yet the media rushed to hear the, often ill informed and frankly wrong, 
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opinions of aid workers in the refugee camps.  Again what impact this had on public opinion 
and government policy has not been addressed, but as Vaux notes: 
The public response to the camps in Goma, which were full of people who had 
been involved in the Rwanda genocide, was exceptionally large; possibly 
because the public failed to appreciate that their aid was mainly going to those 





Central Research Question 
As the above summary shows most of the existing work has focussed on the UK 
mission to the UN in New York or is written by journalists or aid-workers with personal 
experience of Rwanda, without setting this into the broader context of UK foreign policy or 
the response back in London.  For example, although most of the literature is critical of the 
UK for failing to do more, only Melvern acknowledges that in 1994 the UK military was 
already heavily involved in the peacekeeping missions to the former Yugoslavia.
91
  Also no 
author has considered what the UK could realistically have done in Rwanda, as Alan 
Kuperman has done from a US perspective;
92
 Cameron for example accuses the government 
of gross failure with regards to Rwanda but gives no suggestion of what she expects the 
government to have done.
93
  Instead the literature seems happy to blithely suggest the British 
government should have done more without considering the available resources to support 
such a response.  Also, only Melvern and Cameron give any consideration to how 
parliament responded to the crisis, and then only in a very cursory fashion, less than one 
page in both cases.  There is scant documentary evidence ever quoted for the general claims 
that the UK opposed the UNAMIR mission for financial purposes, rather this appears to 
have become a generally accepted truth.  Nor has any author considered what UK troops and 
NGOs did actually do in Rwanda once they did respond to the crisis.    
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Conscious of these gaps, the primary aim of this research is to understand how the 
UK responded to this unprecedented crisis.  The thesis aims to build up a multi-factor, and 
indeed multi-actor, assessment of what influenced the British response.  At this level, the 
research looks to answer two of the issues highlighted by Tony Blair; namely, to what extent 
was the UK aware of what was happening in Rwanda and secondly whether the UK did fail 
to act.  In this respect the research provides new knowledge about the UK’s role in the crisis 
and also a comprehensive and critical analysis of the policies and potential motivations of 
the key actors.  Given the UK’s initial reluctance to intervene in the crisis and then the 
eventual deployment of British troops to Rwanda, the study is also potentially a valuable 
contribution to the wider literature on foreign policy decision making more generally and 
also to the understanding of what triggers and motivates intervention.  Having explored the 
existing literature on interventionism in Chapter One, the thesis seeks to answer the question 
of whether the UK’s response could have been anticipated – can the response be explained 
by either of the two main theoretical frameworks of foreign policy, realism or liberalism, or 
does the response to this particular crisis add something new to our understanding of 
interventionism?  
 Finally, the thesis addresses the allegations of responsibility.  The thesis attempts to 
look at this accusation objectively, rather than beginning the debate from the common angle 
of moral indignation.  In line with the differentiation included in the United Nations 
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Genocide 
Convention), the question of responsibility is considered at various stages throughout the 
genocide.  The Genocide Convention talks of a responsibility to prevent genocide, a 
responsibility to suppress genocide and a responsibility to punish genocide.  The punishment 
of genocide falls outside the scope of this thesis, but Britain’s role, and responsibility, in 
firstly preventing the genocide and secondly in suppressing the genocide will be explored.   
In terms of actual scope, the thesis covers the period to 31 August 1994.  Whilst it 
predominantly focuses on the events of 1994, the thesis necessarily reviews the UK’s longer 
30 
 
term relationship with Rwanda – the “historic hinterland” as Peter Catterall would call it.94  
The thesis is predominantly interested in the response to the genocide and subsequent 
refugee crisis, and does not address the punishment of genocide in any depth.  Finally, whilst 
the subject of the thesis is the genocide, this is first and foremost a study of foreign policy; 
the thesis has nothing original to say about the cause of the genocide in Rwanda or its 
practice. 
Responsibility 
Before proceeding it is worth a brief pause to address the question of responsibility; 
if we are to review the UK’s “responsibility” for the events in Rwanda it is important to 
consider what is actually meant by this word.  The Cambridge Dictionary includes three 
separate definitions of responsibility.
95
  The first relates to duty; to be responsible means to 
have a duty to ensure that certain things happen.  Secondly, to be responsible means to 
accept the blame for something.  The third definition is to have good judgement in decision 
making.  To ask whether someone was responsible for something therefore is to ask the 
question of whether they had a duty to act in some way, or if they are to blame for an 
outcome.  However, what these definitions do not make clear is that degrees of 
responsibility can vary.  It is surely evident that we cannot all be equally responsible for all 
outcomes.  We therefore need some way of measuring, or attributing responsibility. 
 Daniela Kroslak identifies three key factors which must be present if responsibility 
is to be assigned to a bystander of genocide; knowledge, involvement and capability: 
 How much did the bystander know about the preparation of the genocide or, 
during the genocide about its implementation? To what extent was the 
bystander involved with the genocidal regime prior to and throughout the 
atrocities? And what capabilities did the bystander have to intervene in some 
way, shape or form to prevent or suppress the genocide?
96
 (original italics) 
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Kroslak’s test not only differentiates between a bystander who knew of the genocide and the 
one who did not, or the bystander that had an army which could have intervened and the one 
that did not, but continues to imply that a bystander can be responsible for omissions as well 
as commissions.  On this basis the definition suggests that we are responsible for the results 
of our failure to act as well as for the outcomes of our actions.  However, as J.R. Lucas 
argues, wrong commission is not on the same footing as omission, which means standing by 
and watching someone being killed cannot be considered equal to committing murder.
97
  The 
suggestion therefore is that there are different degrees of responsibility; one for the person or 
state committing the act, another for the person who fails to respond to the act, a third for the 
person who tries to intervene but fails and so on. 
Fritz Heider also argues that the degree of responsibility can vary.  He indentifies 
four levels of responsibility, measurable on a linear scale.  The first, and lowest level, is 
mere “association”, in the sense of an accidental co-occurrence (i.e. being in the same place 
when something goes wrong).  The second level is “causality” or cause and effect 
relationship; one is responsible if one’s action A leads directly to outcome B.  The third level 
is “foreseeability”, meaning having knowledge of the consequences of an action (i.e. 
knowing that your action A would lead to outcome B).  The final level is “intentionality”, 
meaning that the actor was not only aware of the consequences of their actions, but fully 
intended those consequences (i.e. deliberately undertaking action A to cause outcome B).
98
  
Therefore the bystander who by coincidence was present at the scene of an emergency bears 
the least responsibility; whilst the actor who intended the premeditated consequences of their 
actions bears the most.  The Heider model is certainly a useful tool for measuring the level 
of responsibility that can be attributed to an actor.  We will return later to these models to 
evaluate British responsibility with the regard the crisis of 1994. 
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 The fact that this study was undertaken before the release of official documents to 
the National Archives, under the 30 year rule, obviously affects the sources available.  As 
Peter Catterall notes, without access to the traditional archives it is only with a much 
“great[er] difficulty” that a history of the recent past can be written.99  However, this is not to 
say that it should not be attempted.  To alleviate the fact that government documents relating 
to the crisis are not yet available, this study draws on a range of material; as Catterall 
continues “government documents are only one type of source for most fields of history ... 
and to assume that history simply cannot be written without the records that are eventually 
deposited in national archives seems to privilege one set of sources above all others”.100  The 
major primary sources used in the study are outlined below. 
Freedom of Information Act 
 Although government documents have not yet been released to the National 
Archive, it has been possible to obtain many documents under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FoI).  During the course of the research over fifty requests were made to access 
information under FoI; these were mainly made to the FCO, but also to the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), Treasury, Department for International Development and The Cabinet 
Office.  Any documents obtained under FoI are clearly referenced as such in the footnotes.   
 There are however, weaknesses that must be acknowledged in the use of FoI.  Prime 
amongst these is the fact that there are a number of exemptions to the Act, which mean that 
certain documents cannot be released; this includes any documentation which potentially 
damages the UK’s relationship with other states and also legal advice given to ministers.  
Copies of correspondence between the UK and the governments of other states will also be 
withheld.  Documents will not be released if the cost of retrieval and copying is excessive; 
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therefore, the volume of documents that will be released is limited.
101
  For these reasons it is 
not possible to use the FoI to obtain all relevant documents.  Nor can one be sure of which 
documents, if any, have been withheld.  Therefore, whilst the FoI has proved an incredibly 
valuable source of evidence, it has proved necessary to use other sources to identify and fill 
any gaps.   
 FoI requests were also made to the US State Department and the Bill Clinton 
Presidential Library.  Additionally, the US government has already released a number of 
documents relating to Rwanda, including previously secret CIA papers, and made these 
freely available on the internet.  The Rwanda Documents Project has also made all 
documents used at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda available on the internet.  
Whilst only a few of these documents relate to the UK, the documents do provide 




 The possibility of interviewing people is a resource uniquely available to historians 
working on the very recent past.  Although not without controversy, the use of interviews 
offers a number of benefits to the contemporary historian.  Firstly, interviews can reveal 
information either not recorded in documents, or recorded in documents not yet released.  
Secondly, interviews can help explain documents and fill in blanks; for example, through 
interviews it is possible to explore decision makers’ motivation and assumptions, things that 
are not typically recorded.  Finally, interviews provide an opportunity to interpret 
personalities; documents for example, fail to record the underlying philosophies and 
approaches of decision makers, which is something that can be explored in an interview.  As 
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Anthony Seldon succinctly concludes, “obtaining an interviewee’s comments can thus help 
clarify and explain areas that otherwise might remain baffling”.103 
 Critics of interviews as a valuable historical resource would highlight that there are 
inherent weaknesses in the method; memory is fallible, interviewees tend to put themselves 
at the centre of their narrative, people may lie, there may be inaccuracies (intentional or 
otherwise), and interviews will naturally be distorted by hindsight.  Two other significant 
weaknesses of interviewing are first that the technique can generate an unrepresentative 
sample (it is not possible to interview everyone) and secondly, interviewing is expensive in 
terms of cost and time.  Because of these two latter factors Steinar Kvale suggests that most 
interview studies tend to be based on five to twenty interviews.
104
  However, through 
triangulation with other sources most of these risks can be mitigated, making interviews a 
source that contemporary historians cannot ignore. 
 In this study eleven oral interviews were undertaken including with Sir Malcolm 
Rifkind (Secretary of State for Defence in 1994) and Baroness Lynda Chalker (Minister of 
State at the FCO, responsible for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA)); a list of the interviewees is included in the bibliography.  
Additionally, a number of off the record discussions and written correspondence with 
individuals involved in the crisis, or foreign policy decision making, have informed the 
conclusions; the more significant of these are listed in the Bibliography.  The identity of 
interviewees and correspondents is only included when they gave their permission to be 
named and quoted.  It is accepted that it was not possible to interview everyone that played a 
key role in the response to the crisis – Seldon’s issue of a limited sample.  This has been 
mitigated by interviewing people with differing perspectives (politicians, civil servants, 
journalists and military) and also using autobiographies as a proxy for an interview. 
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On the basis that much of what the public, and for that matter politicians outside of 
the FCO, “know about foreign places comes from the news media”,105 press coverage of the 
genocide is an important source for this study.  The media also frames foreign crises; Garth 
Myers et al for example suggest that “borrowed, repeated and reinforced labels for and 
images of places, people or events are often key ingredients of interpretative frames” and 
impact how people understand an issue.
106
  The media therefore not only provides the raw 
facts of a foreign crisis, but also leads the public to a particular interpretation of that crisis.   
 For this study a systematic review of the coverage of the crisis in British newspapers 
was carried out, over two thousand articles in total.  Whilst it is acknowledged that the 
television news potentially has a wider impact on public opinion than the print media, this 
study has not attempted to fully explore television coverage of the crisis.  This decision was 
made for three reasons: firstly, television coverage of the crisis has already been explored 
elsewhere,
107
 secondly the resources were not available to ensure that a complete sample of 
television coverage could be reviewed,
108
 and thirdly because interviewees that spoke of 
media coverage suggested that they were more familiar with newspaper coverage than 
television coverage.
109
  Therefore, it was decided to concentrate on the UK print media, 
which has not yet been fully explored.    
Following what has become fairly standard practice in fields such as linguistics, 
sociology, anthropology and communications studies, newspaper articles were identified by 
undertaking a computer assisted search on the LexisNexis database.
110
  The search term used 
was “Rwanda” and articles were obtained for the period 1 October 1990 to 31 August 1994.  
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Received, edited by Greg Philo (Harlow: Longman, 1999); or, Susan Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell 
Disease, Famine, War and Death (London: Routledge, 1999) 
108 Some of the ITN coverage of the crisis is available on-line and I have drawn on this on a number of occasions. However, it 
has not been possible to access the full archive of BBC, Sky News or ITN. 
109 This is in line with Piers Robinson’s findings that elites are more influenced by what they read in the press than what they 
see on the television, mainly as they do not have time to watch television. (Robinson, “The CNN Effect,” p.3). 
110 Myers et al., “The Inscription of Difference,” p.27. 
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The newspapers searched in this way were: The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, The 
Financial Times, The Herald, The Daily Mail, The Evening Standard and The Scotsman.
111
  
Additionally LexisNexis was used to identify articles in the current affairs journal The 
Economist for the same period.   
Other Sources 
 A number of other sources have also been used in this thesis.  Official documents 
relating to Britain’s bilateral relationship with Rwanda, prior to 1980 were accessed at the 
National Archives (Kew).  The paucity of such material was particularly informative of the 
historical links between the two countries.  The Conservative Party Archive (Bodleian 
Library, Oxford) provided transcripts of over fifty speeches given by Douglas Hurd, as 
Foreign Secretary, in the period 1992 to 1994, as well as a number of speeches given by 
Baroness Chalker and other FCO Ministers.  Parliamentary debates, in both the House of 
Commons and House of Lords, were reviewed in Hansard.   The minutes of Shadow Cabinet 
meetings and meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party, were also accessed to provide 
evidence on the response of the Official Opposition.  The regimental museums of the Royal 
Army Medical Corp, the Green Howards and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(REME) provided information relating to the deployment of British troops to Rwanda.  
Finally, a number of official reports were used; these include reports undertaken by the UN, 
The OAU and the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda committee.  A full 
list of sources is included in the bibliography. 
Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is laid out in five chapters.  Chapter One explores the 
existing literature on intervention, with the aim of building up a model of the factors that 
potentially influence intervention.  It begins by examining the literature on foreign policy, 
identifying a number of schools of thought with regard to foreign policy.  The chapter then 
                                                          
111 The Sunday editions of the newspapers were also searched.  In the case of The Guardian this is taken to be The Observer. 
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moves on to consider why bystanders respond to crises, before finally reviewing British 
foreign policy and involvement in peacekeeping prior to 1994.  Chapter Two examines the 
British response in the first few weeks of the crisis, covering the period to 21 April when the 
decision was taken to withdraw UNAMIR.  It looks specifically at the early response and 
asks the question when did the UK realise that genocide was happening in Rwanda.  Chapter 
Three covers the period from the end of April to the end of June.  This chapter looks at the 
decision making in this period and also considers what the UK could actually have done in 
response to the crisis.  Chapter Four considers July and August 1994.  The chapter looks at 
the deployment of British troops, the involvement of NGOs and media coverage and 
concludes by comparing the response to Rwanda to similar humanitarian emergencies.  
Finally, the Conclusion summarises the British response and compares this back to the 
theoretical model of the factors influencing intervention.  The thesis concludes with an 
assessment of whether the UK does rightfully bear any responsibility for the genocide. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
TOWARDS A THEORY OF INTERVENTION 
  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US led coalition’s success in the 
first Gulf War (1991) humanitarian intervention looked to be on the way to becoming an 
international norm.  The peaceful collapse of communism appeared to herald a new period in 
foreign policy, a period which US President George Bush (Senior) was to call “a new world 
order”.  The end of Cold War hostilities seemed to mean an end to the proxy wars between 
the US and Soviet Union and a refocusing of foreign policy and military might, in western 
countries at least, away from the super-power standoff to the achievement of moral good.  
There was now, Bush believed, an opportunity to use the military and aid to bring peace to 
the world.  Consequently, in the first half of the 1990s alone, there was intervention in 
Somalia, Angola, Western Sahara, Bosnia, Haiti, Cambodia, Croatia, northern Iraq and of 
course Rwanda all aimed at bringing peace.  In the years before President George W. Bush’s 
(Junior) unpopular intervention in Iraq, a typical response to incidents of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing or even natural disasters was that “something must be done”.   
But despite the sudden increase in intervention, in many cases the international 
community’s actual response was seen by many as not going far enough.  Certainly in the 
case of Rwanda, the criticism of governments for not having responded sooner or more 
rigorously is strong.  Ingvar Carlsson, for example, condemns the Security Council for its 
inaction, noting:  
The parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention took upon themselves a 
responsibility to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The Convention 
explicitly provides for the opportunity to bring such a situation before the 
Security Council.  The members of the Security Council have a particular 
responsibility, morally if not explicitly under the Convention, to react when 





                                                          
1 Ingvar Carlsson, “The UN Inadequacies,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, (2005), p.844. 
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Romeo Dallaire et al accuse the UK, United States and France of “shirking their legal and 
moral responsibilities”2 in Rwanda, by failing to act sooner and Linda Melvern makes the 
claim that having established a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, the UN became 
“responsible” for the country’s future and had an obligation to have done more.3  These 
critics suggest that the international community should have launched a more robust 
humanitarian mission to Rwanda and sooner than it actually did – the international 
community had a responsibility to do something.  That “something” is generally meant as 
putting troops on the ground; Dallaire, Melvern and Carlsson argue that “humanitarian 
intervention” was the only appropriate response.   
This chapter looks at this concept - humanitarian intervention - in more detail.   It 
begins by providing a definition of the term before moving on to the theoretical basis 
underlying humanitarian intervention, looking at the two main schools of thinking on foreign 
policy, realism and liberalism.  The chapter then moves on to review the literature relating to 
what triggers or motivates intervention.  It addresses the question of why bystanders 
intervene in crises both at a state and an individual level and explores the various factors that 
have been identified as influencing (non)intervention, including: the CNN effect, the 
bystander effect, race, the importance of political leaders and bureaucracy.  As the Rwandan 
genocide is a comparatively recent event, the review adopts a practice common in 
contemporary history and takes a cross-disciplinary approach, drawing on fields other than 
just history, including international relations, politics, sociology and psychology.  The 
chapter concludes by looking specifically at the UK’s role in humanitarian intervention prior 
to 1994 and also foreign policy practice in the decades before the genocide. 
Humanitarian Intervention Defined 
One succinct definition of humanitarian intervention is provided by Adam Roberts: 
“humanitarian intervention is defined as coercive action by one or more states involving the 
                                                          
2 Romeo Dallaire et al, “The Major Powers on Trial,” p.887. 
3 Linda Melvern, “The Security Council: Behind the Scenes,” International Affairs, 77 (2001), p.108. 
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use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the 
purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”4  In 1994 the 
European Parliament defined humanitarian intervention as “the protection, including the 
threat or use of force, by a state or group of states, of the basic human rights of persons who 
are subjects of and/or resident in another state”.5  As with most definitions, neither of these 
is universally accepted. The definitions do, however, capture the essential features of 
humanitarian intervention: it is a military response; it is by an actor outside of the state; 
consent is absent; it involves the use, or the threat of use, of force; and there are 
humanitarian motives for launching the intervention. 
 Humanitarian intervention can also be seen as sitting somewhere on a continuum of 
military action, which has war at one extreme and peacekeeping at the other.   Whereas war 
is combat against a designated opponent, for gains in territory, resources or power, 
humanitarian intervention is motivated, not by a thirst for more power, but by a 
humanitarian concern for the welfare of others.  Humanitarian intervention also is not 
necessarily against a known opponent; in humanitarian missions the military will often be 
deployed to stand between civilians and potential attackers, which could include armies, 
militias or gangs, where, as in Rwanda, the line between the person to be protected and the 
potential threat is not necessarily obvious.  But nor is humanitarian intervention traditional 
peacekeeping.  Traditional peacekeeping is based on consent, neutrality and the limit on the 
use of force to self defence only.  In a traditional peacekeeping mission, the military will 
typically be deployed between two warring parties who have reached a mutual peace 
agreement.  Marrack Goulding, the head of UN peacekeeping missions in 1988, summed up 
traditional peacekeeping as: 
Peacekeeping soldiers carry arms only to avoid using them; they are military 
forces, but their orders are to avoid, at almost any cost, the use of force; they 
                                                          
4 Adam Roberts, "The So Called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention," In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2000 
(The Hague: TMC Asser, 2001), p.4. 
5 Official Journal of The European Communities, Nr C 128/225, Wednesday 20 April 1994. Note this resolution was being 
drafted at the height of the killing in Rwanda. 
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are asked in the last resort to risk their own lives rather than open fire on those 





When we talk of humanitarian intervention, then, we are implying more than passive 
observation of a peace agreement.  Troops on a humanitarian intervention mission will 
typically undertake a wider range of tasks, including protecting aid convoys, enforcing safe 
zones, confiscating and destroying weapons, assisting in the disbandment of armies or 
monitoring elections.  In humanitarian intervention missions, troops would also be permitted 
to use force to protect non-combatants.  This then is the sort of mission that the above 
commentators suggest should have been deployed to Rwanda.   
Theories of Intervention  
Placing humanitarian intervention into a historical context, it is immediately obvious 
that during the Cold War period suggestions that there was a moral or legal responsibility to 
intervene for humanitarian purposes in another sovereign state were exceptional.  Yet during 
the 1990s there was a wave of UN peacekeeping missions launched on humanitarian 
grounds; Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, Western Sahara, Angola and 
Rwanda all saw some form of humanitarian intervention.  Statistics show this change: in the 
1990s 35 UN peacekeeping missions were launched, nearly twice the 18 missions of the 
previous 45 years.
7
  It seems then that in the case of intervention in the early 1990s there was 
a period of evolution, which immediately followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and end 
of the Cold War. 
 The literature on international relations is vast and contentious, but a brief review of 
the main arguments is sufficient to understand the influence the debate has on humanitarian 
intervention in practice; as Roland Dannreuther notes, “international relations theories can 
be bewildering in their complexity and proliferation, making them often as impenetrable as 
                                                          
6 Quoted in Adam LeBor, "Complicity with Evil": The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), p.15. 
7 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml. Accessed on 7 May 2010. 
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the reality they seek to explain”.8  Although this is somewhat of a simplification, the theory 
of international relations can be split into two schools: realism and liberalism.
9
  The two 
schools, to which we now turn, offer very different views on intervention and potentially go 
some way to explaining the international response to the crisis in Rwanda. 
Realism 
 The realist theory can be briefly summarised as the assumption that the international 
system is anarchic, containing multiple units (or states) with no overall authority and that the 
key factor differentiating the units is their relative power.  The realist world is one where 
“states constantly fear one another and seek to alleviate this fear through maximising their 
power and domination”.10  However, in order to instil some order into this anarchy a theory 
of sovereignty has developed which provides some protection to states, by reinforcing their 
position within the international system. 
 The realist interpretation of sovereignty dates back to 1648 when at the conclusion 
of the Thirty Years War, the Treaty of Westphalia established a principle of “the sovereign 
right of the state to act as a supreme arbiter within its national borders”.11  The Treaty 
founded the principle that all states were independent and legally equal.  Although borders 
were frequently crossed in times of war, the principle that no state would interfere in the 
domestic affairs of another essentially dominated international relations theory until at least 
the end of World War I.  There was however a limited move away from this theory of 
sovereignty after the end of the War.  Based on the belief that the First World War had been 
the “war to end all wars” the League of Nations was founded to promote international peace, 
but despite the foundation of the League as a supranational institution, international relations 
remained state focused.  In fact by withdrawing a state’s legal right to go to war, other than 
in self defence, the League in many ways actually strengthened the Westphalian principle of 
                                                          
8 Roland Dannreuther, International Security: The Conteporary Agenda (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p.35. 
9 These names are not universally accepted, but are in common usage; for example, Chris Brown prefers communitarian theory 
and cosmopolitanism. Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 2001). 
10 Dannreuther, International Security, p.38. 
11 Quoted in Richard Conaughton, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p.1. 
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state sovereignty - borders were now truly sacrosanct.  Article 10 of the League’s charter 
stated, “[each member state] undertakes to respect and preserve against external aggression 
the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League”.12   
The principle of state sovereignty was reinforced in 1945 when the League of Nations was 
superseded by the UN.  In the UN founding charter Article 2(7) states: “Nothing contained 
in the present charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.   But as well as defending the territorial 
sovereignty of states, the other thing that these various treaties and charters reinforced was 
the primacy of the state over both international institutions and the individual.  This primacy 
of the state, over both the individual and supranational institutions is core to realist foreign 
policy theory. 
But what is more relevant than the theory of realism, or the legal basis for the 
theory, is the impact that it has had in practice, particularly with regard to humanitarian 
intervention.  In realist theory the belief that states should only intervene to protect their own 
national interests predominates.  Aidan Hehir notes, 
In the absence of a sense of community, states are compelled to act 
strategically, not morally, and aim at all times to maximise the national interest 
and protect their security.  Therefore, a concern for those suffering abroad 
does not motivate states to act unless there are national interests involved.
13
   
 
 
Alex Bellamy similarly argues that states have just one moral duty, and that is to prioritise 
the welfare of their own citizens.  To intervene in other countries when no national interest is 
at stake is therefore a dereliction of that duty, especially if that intervention imperils the 
intervening state; for example, by risking the lives of its own citizens or incurring financial 
costs.
14
  Michael Smith continues, “states are necessarily self-interested creatures and are by 
definition unable to act in any other than self-interested ways.  To expect them to do so – to 
support a genuinely humanitarian action – is to engage in self-delusion, error and 
                                                          
12 Ibid, p.6. 
13 Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.62. 
14 Alex Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit,” Ethics & 
International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2006), p.9. 
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hypocrisy.”15   Such arguments have at their core the realist belief that national interest alone 
should motivate foreign policy and in the realist framework national interest is essentially 
defined as power – either gaining power or maintaining power. 
 But clearly states do intervene and the realist school is able to explain such 
intervention through this focus on power.  For example, Smith notes that there is a realist 
case for structuring and enforcing a more orderly international system, which may explain 
intervention such as the US involvement in Haiti in the early 1990s, or the leaders of Kenya, 
Tanzanian and Uganda’s willingness to pressure President Habyarimana to implement the 
Arusha Accords in 1994 (whilst these Presidents did not consider military intervention in 
Rwanda in early 1994, they did involve themselves in the domestic affairs of Rwanda for 
their own countries’ benefit).  In the case of Haiti, Smith argues that if the US was to remain 
credible as a Great Power it could not allow Haiti, a near, but impoverished neighbour, “to 
thumb its nose at everything it [said]”. 16   The intervention in Haiti was then less 
humanitarian and more about re-establishing the pecking order in the western hemisphere.  
Similarly, Noam Chomsky, a critic of humanitarian intervention, argues the US intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999 was more about ensuring NATO, and therefore US, credibility, than any 
moral purpose.
17
  The application of this theory means that it is hard to predict when a state 
will intervene (though it is somewhat easier to predict when they will choose not to 
intervene); rather than intervention being based on some objective, identifiable criteria, it is, 
realism suggests, actually driven by the more nebulous idea of national interest.  As Hehir 
suggests, “international issues are dealt with according to prevailing exigencies rather than 
some abstract moral code”.18  He continues to suggest that in practice states maintain a case-
by-case approach to humanitarian emergencies, and will intervene only when national 
                                                          
15 Michael Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues.” Ethics & International Affairs 12, no. 1 
(2006), p.70. 
16 Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p.72. 
17 Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West (London: Verso, 
2000). 
18 Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention, p.62. 
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interests are at stake.  Thomas Weiss suggests you do not have to be a “theoretical Realist” 
to accept this proposition, just a realist.
19
   
The realist tradition can thus be summarised as opposing the norm of humanitarian 
intervention. It suggests that states do not act on the basis of moral concerns and 
international institutions do not significantly influence state behaviour.  In fact, states adopt 
a selfish disposition, focused on their own narrow national interests, which curtail altruistic 
action.  Rather than morality, “power is the primary catalyst for state action”.20 
The liberal tradition 
However, whilst it is apparent that realism dominated political thought throughout 
the Cold War period, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was, in some quarters, 
a shift towards a more liberal view of foreign policy.  Roland Paris argues: 
 At the end of the Cold War, there was a widely shared conviction that political 
and economic liberalism offered a key to solving a broad range of social, 
political and economic problems from under-development and famine, to 





Whereas realism subordinates the rights of the individual to the state, liberalism inherently 
believes in guaranteeing the liberty of the private individual, manifesting itself 
internationally as preference for laws and practices that privilege the individual over the 
state.  As Vaclav Havel wrote in the New York Review, “The enlightened efforts of 
generations of democrats, the terrible experience of two world wars ... and the evolution of 
civilisation have finally brought humanity to the recognition that human beings are more 
important than the state”.22  In the liberal tradition there is then a natural inclination towards 
intervention for the good of humanity; therefore “intervention in protection of human rights 
is considered part of the march of human progress and a means by which the global 
                                                          
19 Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 
20 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954). 
21 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding” Review of International Studies, 36, No.2 (2010), p.340. 
22 Quoted in Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line, p.2. 
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transition to liberal democracy can be facilitated”.23  So whilst realist theory is guided by the 
principle that intervention is negative, linked to the prohibition of the use of violence against 
a sovereign authority, the liberal tradition confers a positive view upon intervention, seeing 
it as an instrument for imposing human rights and democracy on a global scale.
24
 
The shift though was not purely a theoretical one; the post-Cold War period also 
saw a shift in foreign policy practice and international law.  The European Parliament’s 
“Resolution on the Right of Humanitarian Intervention” of 1994, for example, recognised 
the move in political thought and practice that was evident in the period.  The resolution 
confirmed an important move in international law towards an internationally acknowledged 
expansion of human rights that would not have been possible only a few years previously.  
In 2001, a panel of experts, brought together by the Canadian government as the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), published a report 
on humanitarian intervention, which promoted the concept of “Responsibility to Protect”.  
This report was then discussed at a World Summit in 2005 where the concept was generally 
accepted.  ICISS placed the responsibility to protect citizens primarily on the state; however 
it went further, by claiming that if a state was unable or unwilling to offer such protection to 
its citizens the international community had, not just a right but, a responsibility to intervene.  
Ramesh Thakur summarises the general conclusion of the report, “Where a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and 
the government in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the norm of non-
intervention yields to this international responsibility to protect”.25  Lindberg, writing in the 
Washington Times, noted that the ICISS declaration “replaced the state with human 
individuals as the primary focus of security and deterritorialised protection by giving all 
states a responsibility to uphold and protect basic human rights regardless of where they 
                                                          
23 Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention, p.68. 
24 Zanetti, “Global Justice: Is Intervention Desirable?” p.215. 
25 Ramesh Thakur, “No More Rwandas: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect.” Humanitarian Exchange 
26, (2004), p.7. 
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were violated”.26   This was a significant normative shift from the realist tradition that 
promoted non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states.  In less than fifteen years, 
immediately following the end of the Cold War, 350 years of Westphalian sovereignty 
appeared to have been overturned. 
The early 1990s also saw a number of actual interventions justified partially on the 
liberal grounds of protecting human rights.  The first such mission was Operation Provide 
Comfort, which was launched in 1991 to provide both security and aid to the Kurdish 
population in northern Iraq, which was being persecuted by Saddam Hussein’s government 
following Iraq’s defeat in the first Gulf War.  The mission, which saw British, American and 
French troops deploy into Iraq without the permission of the Iraqi government, can arguably 
be seen as a tipping point from the realist ideology to the new liberal ideology.  By the end 
of 1991 a new context of forcible humanitarian intervention, albeit still controversial (only 
ten of the fifteen UN Security Council members voted in favour of the Iraq intervention) had 
been founded.  UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar wrote in his 1991 annual 
report, “It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference within the essential 
domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity”.27  
This normative shift consequently redefined what was meant by sovereignty.  Whilst 
realists staunchly defend the sanctity of sovereign states, the liberal interpretation is that 
state sovereignty is contingent.  Boutros-Ghali for example wrote in Agenda for Peace in 
1995, “the time of absolute state sovereignty has passed”.  Thomas Weiss described the 
position as, “when a government massively abuses the fundamental rights of its citizens, its 
sovereignty is temporarily suspended”.28  In this liberal view, the sovereignty of a state rests, 
not on its own presumptive legitimacy, but rather it is derived from the individuals whose 
rights and well being are to be protected.  Michael Waltzer, therefore, asserts that if a state 
                                                          
26 Quoted in Bellamy “Whither the Responsibility to Protect?” p.144. 
27 Quoted in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse. Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996), p.84. 
28 Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, p.23.  
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commits acts of aggression against its own population, it “can be invaded ... to rescue 
peoples threatened with massacre”.29   Smith argues that “it follows, that a state that is 
oppressive and violates the autonomy and integrity of its subjects forfeits its moral claim to 
full sovereignty”.30   This sudden, and arguably revolutionary, shift in thinking meant that 
when it came to human rights national boundaries were swept away.  In this school of 
thinking, intervention in Rwanda would have been justified in 1994, even if national 
interests were not at stake. 
Henry Shue supports this view and indirectly answers Tony Blair’s question “What 
of the murder distant from us, the injustice we cannot see, the pain we cannot witness but 
which we nonetheless know is out there?”31  Shue, adopting this liberal idea of foreign 
policy, suggests that the duty to help people geographically far away is no less than to 
people in the next country; they are both, after all, strangers.
32
  This then is the theory of 
“ethical universalism” or “cosmopolitanism” – the belief that humans are morally equal 
regardless of any communal membership.  As citizens of the world, the argument goes, our 
basic duty is to the welfare of humankind, not just to those within our own borders; the duty 
to the people of Rwanda is no different from the duty to protect people in London or Paris.  
Zanetti notes that for cosmopolitans it is morally unacceptable that some people, just 
because they are born in the “wrong” part of the world, have nearly no access to the 
resources necessary to survive.
33
  Equally it must to be morally unacceptable to ignore the 
mass slaughter of an ethnic group just because they live many thousands of miles away.   
 Why there should have been such an apparent shift in thinking immediately 
following the Cold War, is not entirely clear, though David Chandler summarises four 
possible explanations.
34
  Firstly, the move towards the prominence of human rights can be 
seen as a gradual shift starting in 1945, with intervening steps including the acceptance of 
                                                          
29 Michael Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p.108 
30 Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention,” p.75. 
31 Blair, A Journey, p.61. 
32 Quoted in Kroslak, The Responsibility of External Bystanders, p.103. 
33 Zanetti, “Global Justice: Is Intervention Desirable?” p.210. 
34 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto 
Press, 2006), pp.56-65. 
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the Genocide Convention in 1948, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1966 and the establishment of the UN Human Rights Committee in the 1970s.  Secondly, the 
world was simply a more dangerous place after the end of the Cold War and the end of the 
super-power standoff and liberalism was seen as a way of reducing the increased risk.  
Thirdly, Chandler suggests the CNN effect (discussed in more detail below) and a shift in 
normative values of a more human rights aware population drove policy makers to adopt a 
more humanitarian approach.  Chandler’s fourth, and his preferred explanation, is that the 
end of the Cold War increased the “capacity of Western Powers to politically legitimise 
greater intervention abroad”.35  Adopting a more ethical and humanitarian foreign policy, 
Chandler suggests, was one way for western powers to garner widespread domestic support.  
Whereas domestic policy is divisive and subject to party politics, Chandler suggests ethical 
foreign policy is a no lose policy for western governments; voters will not, he argues, oppose 
apparently genuine efforts to help those in need abroad even if the efforts fails.   
Regardless of the underlying cause of the shift, Dannreuther does hypothesize that 
the end of the Cold War did facilitate intervention.
36
  The collapse of the Soviet Union, for 
example, weakened the fear that intervention in distant conflicts could potentially escalate 
into super-power conflict; intervention in the Former Yugoslavia would for instance have 
been unthinkable during the Cold War, given the country’s strategically significant 
geographic position.  The collapse of the Soviet ideology also made the world more 
homogenous; the vast majority of countries by 1990 accepted capitalism and liberal 
democracy as the dominant political ideology, leading Francis Fukuyama to claim in 1989 
that this widespread adoption of liberalism marked “the end of history”.37    The end of the 
bi-polar US - Soviet politics of the Cold War, also reduced the likelihood of the UN Security 
Council veto being enacted by one of the Permanent Five; Dannreuther continues that this 
freed the UN from the straitjacket that had bound it for the period 1945 to 1989.  More than 
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36 Dannreuther, International Security, pp.146-8. 
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at any time, by 1992 in the aftermath of Operation Provide Comfort, the capability and 
willingness to intervene to protect human rights seems to have been established. 
Opposition to Intervention 
But the shift towards liberalism was not universally accepted – realism was far from 
dead when policy makers were making decisions about intervention in Rwanda in 1993 and 
1994.  As Roland Paris suggests, there has been in recent years “the emergence of what 
might be called a ‘hyper-critical’ school of scholars and commentators who view liberal 
peace building as fundamentally destructive or illegitimate.”38  One of the main arguments 
against intervention is the belief that intervention in fact does more harm than good.  As 
Roger Howard argues, “A ‘humanitarian war’, or any conflict justified on the grounds that it 
is in another’s best interest, is clearly oxymoronic because of the death and devastation that 
military intervention will inflict.”39  There is a fairly common belief, for example, that an 
unintended consequence of providing humanitarian aid to civilians in a war zone is that the 
conflict is prolonged.  As Tim Murithi points out, the distribution of humanitarian aid, such 
as food, water or medicine, confers power on the recipient, and if diverted to support the war 
effort actually sustains war.
40
    
Thomas Weiss presents three criticisms of intervention along this line.
41
  First, there 
is typically no willingness amongst interventionists to stay the course.  Certainly in Somalia 
and East Timor, after brief interest in the countries the internal community essentially 
withdrew leaving both to re-descend into chaos.  If there is no willingness at the outset to 
stay long enough to resolve the underlying issues, rather than just the humanitarian 
emergency, why start.  Secondly, Weiss asks if military intervention will always bring about 
an outcome better than other alternatives, such as sanctions or diplomacy.  Finally, Weiss 
suggests a purely economic judgement must be made of humanitarian intervention; do the 
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benefits outweigh the costs?  There are obvious difficulties of measuring a bottom line of 
humanitarianism (for example, what value is put on a life or, is the same value placed on the 
life of a western soldier as an African subsistence farmer) but this must be done if we can 
justify intervention rationally.  For example, Weiss suggests, we should be able to reach a 
conclusion to such questions as is it better to save 100 civilian lives at the expense of a 
western soldier or if it means a conflict is extended by a month.  
More academic, but equally significant, arguments against intervention include the 
point that intervention is justified on the grounds of protecting human rights, and yet this is a 
concept that is not universally accepted.  For Roger Howard the problem with such a 
justification is the fact that human rights are so poorly defined “as to be illusionary”.42  
Howard uses a rather philosophical argument that can be summarised as, human rights are 
supposed to be timeless and universal, yet they cannot have existed in medieval or 
prehistoric times when society was anarchic.  If we do not accept that such rights existed in 
these anarchic times, we must agree that they cannot exist in similar situations in modern 
times where no society exists, such as Somalia or the Sahara Desert (two regions in which 
intervention missions operated in the 1990s).
43
  For Howard, if there is no definitive 
agreement on what constitutes human rights and from what supreme authority they derive, 
military intervention cannot be justified on the grounds of defending these subjective rights.   
He concludes that “[humanitarian] interventionism is, to an important degree, really just a 
modern day reflection of colonial attitudes about the ‘superior’ and ‘civilised’ nations 
towards the backwards”.44  And Howard is not alone in this argument.  Philip Towle, for 
example, points out that “in a globalised world ... what seems self-evident in one country can 
be very different from what seems irrefutable somewhere else”.45  Or as Samuel Huntington 
argues, in the appropriately named The Clash of the Civilisations, not all people want to be 
like the west and share western values of democracy and human rights, or alternatively have 
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other versions of democracy and human rights.  He goes as far as to suggest “Western 
intervention in the affairs of other civilisations is probably the single most dangerous source 
of instability and potential global conflict in a multi-civilised world”.46   
For many then, the label humanitarian intervention is no more than a tool for 
powerful states to intervene in the affairs of the weak,
47
 a way of pursuing a realist, power 
driven foreign policy whilst assuming an air of morality.  So despite the shifting norm and 
the widening acceptance of humanitarian intervention in the developed countries of Europe 
and North America, there remains significant scepticism of intervention in the developing 
nations of Africa, Southern and Latin America and Asia.  With a history of colonisation, 
developing nations have a tendency to be naturally wary of western imperialism dressed up 
as humanitarian intervention.  David Rieff, writing of the massacres in the Darfur region of 
Sudan in the early years of the twenty-first century, for example, suggests that “[Whilst] in 
Europe and the United States, sending NATO forces to Darfur may seem like fulfilling the 
global moral responsibility to protect ... in much of the Muslim world, it is far likelier to be 
experienced as one more incursion of a Christian army into an Islamic land”.48  It was 
certainly apparent at the 2005 World Summit which discussed the ICISS report, that whilst 
there was almost universal support of the proposals amongst the European delegations, 
developing nations plus China and Russia, were certainly less enthusiastic.
49
  And it is not 
difficult to understand this objection to unwanted intervention; simply consider the hostile 
response of much of the UK media to EU involvement in the affairs of the UK, or President 
Clinton’s involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process.  The compromise position that 
seems to have been reached is a preference that if there is to be intervention on humanitarian 
grounds, it should be carried out by regional, rather than western, powers.
50
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A less ubiquitous argument against intervention is presented by Mohammed Ayoob, 
who argues that armed conflict was an essential ingredient of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century European state making, and that similar kinds of humanitarian disasters are the 
inevitable by-product of comparable processes at work in much of the Third World.
51
  There 
is some almost perverse logic to this argument when one recalls that the current national 
boundaries in Africa were mostly drawn up in the foreign ministries of Europe and that 
forty-four per-cent of African borders are straight lines that fail to reflect either geographical 
or ethnic realities.
52
  Only by allowing states to fail, boundaries to be redrawn and new 
political authorities to emerge, Jeffrey Herbts similarly argues, can African violence be 
solved.
53
  Reflecting an argument that was to be expressed by many during the Rwandan 
crisis, if there is to be long lasting peace in Africa, Africans themselves must find solutions 
to the problems and violence that seem endemic to the continent; and for Ayoob and Herbts, 
this will inevitably involve bloodshed, distasteful as this may be to the European and 
American public. 
Humanitarian Intervention – The Practice 
The academic debate on humanitarian intervention and sovereignty, crucial as it is, 
however masks the fact that whatever the arguments, great powers have a history of 
intervention and this flourished in the 1990s.   
However, despite the shift towards liberalism, the international community evidently 
does not always intervene in humanitarian emergencies.  For example, Weiss notes the lack 
of action in the Darfur region of Sudan, despite the fact that US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell described the events as genocide in September 2004, and despite the fact that the US 
Senate voted 422 to 0 in July 2004 that the Sudanese government was pursuing a strategy of 
genocide, and despite the fact that in September 2004 the EU Parliament described the 
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events as “tantamount to genocide”.54  The list of conflicts and countries experiencing severe 
abuses of human rights would extend far beyond the list of countries where the UN has 
intervened; for example, there have been no serious efforts at humanitarian intervention in 
the conflicts in the Niger Delta or the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia or the war in 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  In practice, given the typical response of non-intervention it 
is hard to predict when the international community will break with the norm and actually 
respond to breaches of human rights – there are certainly no hard and fast rules of what 
circumstances will trigger military intervention, on the other hand, as we will see, there do 
seem to be certain circumstances that make intervention highly unlikely 
Justifying Non-Intervention 
 As Nicholas Wheeler has pointed out, first of all there is no guarantee that when 
confronting a humanitarian emergency, states would agree that the just cause threshold has 
been crossed which would justify intervention.
55
 As the above quote from the EU Parliament 
about Darfur shows, what is and what is not genocide, or ethnic cleansing, or a mass abuse 
of human rights, can be made a subjective question – the belief that something either is or is 
not genocide, in the real world of diplomacy is a gross oversimplification of what is taken to 
be a rather subjective question.  Whilst the framers of The Genocide Convention most likely 
believed they had drafted a clear definition of genocide, it is evident that 60 years later 
governments still cannot definitively agree when something is genocide and therefore use 
terms such as “tantamount to genocide”.  Depending on the view taken, intervention can 
either be justified, or deemed unnecessary.  Even if the subjectivity could be removed there 
remains the get out clause of “nothing can be done”.  Thakur, for example, argues that 
intervention should only be considered an option when there are reasonable prospects of it 
being successful.
56
  This is possibly true in many instances of human rights abuses, but the 
argument also allows western governments to deny the value of intervening; this is Weiss’s 
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economic cost-benefit test being applied.  Finally, as many commentators suggest, despite 
the shift towards liberalism western governments remain primarily answerable to their 
domestic electorate.  As Dannreuther notes, “In the post-Cold War period, the humanitarian 
arguments for intervention need to convince generally inattentive, fickle and domestically 
orientated Western publics, whose sense of moral outrage does not always translate into 
acceptance of serious costs and sacrifices”.57    
The post-Cold War moral shift, then, does not mean that western states will 
automatically intervene in humanitarian emergencies.  There are clearly other factors 
involved in the decision making process of when and when not to intervene and the common 
view is that, in line with the realist argument, these are often heavily influenced by national 
interest and power.  However, one definite change is the fact that intervention is now more 
commonly couched in the language of human rights and morality, rather than the 
preservation of power.  The following quotes from Tony Blair illustrate this point nicely: 
speaking of intervention in Kosovo in 1999 “[Slobodan] Milosevic is determined to wipe a 
people from the face of the country.  NATO is determined to stop him”58 and “we cannot 
turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we 
still want to be secure”,59 or in 2000 on involvement in Sierra Leone, “when people say ‘run 
an ethical foreign policy’ I say Sierra Leone was an example of that, not an example of not 
doing it.  It is up on the high ground”.60  The rhetoric of peacekeeping and intervention has 
become more morality focused even if the motivation has not. 
When do States Intervene? 
If non-intervention is the norm, what then motivates the numerous examples of 
intervention that have occurred?  Certainly some work has been done to try to determine 
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what specifically it is that leads to a response to some humanitarian emergencies and not 
others.  This work is summarised below. 
Which states most commonly intervene? 
To understand why states intervene in humanitarian interventions, we perhaps first 
have to understand which states are most commonly involved in humanitarian interventions.  
The most comprehensive empirical study of involvement in UN missions was performed by 
Laura Neack, who concluded that “the most likely participants are states that benefit from 
the status quo, and aspiring ‘powers’ that seek to achieve some relative prestige within the 
status quo”.61  The top ten of countries involved in UN missions, is made up of what Neack 
describes as middle powers (Canada, Australia, and Italy, Ireland), the Scandinavian 
countries, (Norway, Finland Denmark) and the emerging powers (Brazil and India).  
Because of an unofficial convention that developed during the Cold War, the Permanent 
Five are not high up the list of those countries involved in peacekeeping in the period prior 
to 1990; only the US makes it into the top ten, and France and China do not even make the 
top thirty.  Neack therefore argues that involvement in peacekeeping missions is grounded 
entirely on serving national interest: 
The particular interests that have been served by UN peacekeeping are those of 
the Western states whose interests are served by the status quo and a few non-






However, Peter Jakobsen, has noted that in the post-Cold War period it has become 
more common for humanitarian intervention missions to be led by a Permanent Five 
member of the Security Council, usually the US.
63
  One could argue that this reflects a shift 
towards liberalism on the part of the Permanent Five, or at least the US, France and the UK.  
However, Jakobsen suggests, the more likely explanation is that it is only these few 
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countries that have the necessary resources to mount a meaningful humanitarian intervention 
mission.  As Richard Connaughton suggests, in practice there are only four world class 
armies capable of launching large, or even medium, scale missions independently: the US, 
France, India and the UK.
64
  In practice then, it is only the medium and great powers that 
have the capability to launch intervention missions, though they will often be supported by 
lesser powers.  But the resources of even the great powers are not limitless; as Weiss notes 
“military overstretch and prioritisation of strategic concerns is the sad reality”65 and prevents 
a robust response to all emergencies. 
National interest 
If there has to be prioritisation (and recall that in 1994 there were humanitarian 
crises in Yugoslavia, Angola, Somalia and Haiti as well as Rwanda), the widely held belief 
is that this prioritisation will generally be driven by the question of national interest rather 
than morality or the relative need of the victims – realism in practice.  As we saw above, 
Michael Smith argues that to suggest states participate in humanitarian actions for anything 
other than self-interest is delusional; states, he suggests, “only act when it is in their interests 
to do so and that therefore when they engage in humanitarian intervention they are really 
pursuing some other agenda”.66  Paul Diehl similarly asserts that it is national interest that 
determines where peacekeepers are sent; he points to the high number of peacekeeping 
missions to the oil rich Middle East as evidence.
67
   Fabrice Weissman likewise suggests that 
British involvement in Sierra Leone in 1999 achieved two objectives; first it was a face 
saving exercise that prevented UN failure, but secondly it enabled Tony Blair’s Labour 
government to trumpet its ethical foreign policy to the electorate.
68
  If this particular 
interpretation is true, here is an example of the foreign policy being led by the interests of 
the governing party rather than strict national interest.  
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As Neack suggests, national interest also includes intervening so as to maintain the 
status-quo.  Despite the apparent shift towards liberalism, most intervention continues to be 
justified on the grounds of minimising the threat to international peace and order and to 
therefore maintain the status-quo.  For example, the intervention in the Former Yugoslavia 
was justified by many on the grounds that the conflict posed a threat to peace in the wider 
Balkans region, was likely to generate a refugee crisis in Europe and risked an increase in 
criminal activity across Europe.  In the case of the intervention to protect Kurds in northern 
Iraq it is also apparent that of the ten member states of the Security Council voting in favour 
of the intervention, all justified the intervention on the grounds of maintaining peace in the 
region and reducing the risk to security of a refugee crisis (mainly of refugees entering 
Turkey).  Only France and the UK added concern for human rights, with France specifically 
noting that there was a responsibility to protect human rights as the Kurds’ situation was 
partially brought about by the intervention in Iraq during the Gulf War.
69
    
Turning specifically towards the Rwandan genocide, there is certainly a belief 
amongst some that the western governments did not intervene because there was no national 
interest at stake.  Romeo Dallaire says of the US, France and UK, “They tolerated the mass 
slaughter of the Tutsi people because it did not impinge on their narrowly defined national 
interests. Rwanda was clearly of no strategic value to these western nations – not 
geographically, politically or economically.”70  Anne Mackintosh shares this view:  
The short answer to the question why the international community failed to 
take decisive and timely action is that Rwanda did not matter.  A tiny, 
landlocked country with few natural resources, it was considered strategically 
and materially unimportant.  Unlike Kuwait, it does not produce oil and was 





With one eye clearly on the realist interpretation of foreign policy, Roger Howard, noting 
the same lack of national interest, however concludes that it was the correct decision for the 
western powers to not intervene, “the killings in Rwanda would not have justified armed 
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intervention by Britain, America or any other country whose national interests were not 
directly affected by what was happening.” 72   All three agree that in Rwanda national 
interests were not at stake and this delayed western involvement. 
 One problem with this idea that foreign policy is driven by national interest though 
is the fact that “national interest” is such a nebulous term that it is almost meaningless.73  
Despite the ubiquity of the term, commentators, politicians or journalists never define what 
they mean by national interest.  As Ian Budge notes, “it is a mistake to assume that there is a 
readily identifiable general British ‘national interest’ to be served by its foreign policy.  
Usually there are competing interests, one of which successfully asserts a claim to be the 
‘national interest’ while the others lose out.”74  And in many ways this in-definability is the 
reason for the term’s popularity.  It is a term that can be used without being defined and it is 
therefore a term that can be used to justify action or inaction.  Responding to any 
humanitarian emergency can easily be described as being either in or against the national 
interest – potentially suggesting that ultimately it is not national interest that determines 
whether the international community will intervene.  If, as Budge suggests, the national 
interest can be defined in many different ways, surely it is possible to justify (or equally 
deny) the need for intervention in almost any circumstance. 
Public opinion and the media 
Whilst the generally held view historically was that public opinion had limited 
influence on foreign policy, recent studies have indicated that the public do in fact have a 
measurable impact.
75
  Andy Storey notes that “with the end of the Cold War, Western 
governments are, for the most part, less interested in developing countries per se; the main 
impulse behind any action is more likely to be public relations rather than strategic 
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interest.”76  In this respect, foreign policy, like domestic policies, are driven by politicians 
seeking to gain advantage at the polls by enacting popular policies.
77
  The public, the 
argument goes, set a region of acceptability in foreign affairs and taking this into account 
political elites are either constrained or pushed towards action in response to international 
events.
78
   
Looking specifically at this question of public acceptance of intervention Bruce 
Jentleson and Rebecca Britton reached a three part conclusion: there is no direct relationship 
between a state’s vital interests and public support for intervention; it is overly simple to 
argue that the public opposes intervention with high stakes; and the public are more 
supportive of intervention when the political elite are united in support of military 
intervention.
79
  As evidence of this they point out that the majority of the American public 
initially supported President Bush’s intervention in Somalia in 1993 despite no obvious 
national interest and secondly that the majority of Americans supported intervention to 
prevent North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons despite the high likelihood of massive 
casualty rates in any such intervention.  Drawing on this research, Craig Frizzell also 
concluded that the public are more likely to support the use of military force when the 
objective is either to restrain the actions of a hostile state (for example the Gulf War in 1991) 
or to provide humanitarian relief (Somalia) and is likely to be unsupportive of the use of 
force to interfere in the internal affairs of another state.
80
  In a similar study, Alan Kay 
concluded that the American public were more likely to support military intervention when 
six conditions were met: a rogue leader ruled the state to be intervened in; the leader had 
committed heinous crimes; non-military efforts had been exhausted; the US had military 
allies; there was a visionary objective; and intervention came before the leader was too 
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  Kay in particular emphasises the need for there to be a villainous leader; “If a 
whole country, or leaderless mobs, or looting and pillaging ethnic factions are committing 
despicable acts, even genocide, but no leaders are known or can be identified ... a majority of 
Americans will not favor (sic) the use of force.”82 
Accepting the theory that public opinion can potentially influence foreign policy one 
has to ask what influences public opinion.  The answer to this question, evidence suggests, is 
the media.  As Knecht and Weatherford acknowledge “there is solid research evidence 
showing that national news coverage heavily influences citizens’ perceived salience of 
political issues”.83  Soroka agrees, noting the “remarkably powerful effect of media content 
on the salience of foreign affairs for the public”.84  Page et al also demonstrate that as well as 
highlighting issues as important the media are able to influence opinion, noting that news 
commentary from anchors, reporters in the field and special commentators has the most 
dramatic affect on the public.
85
  Therefore if one accepts that the public influences 
government and the media influence public opinion, one logically concludes that the media 
has the power to influence foreign policy. 
This theory that governments are forced to act, not out of either a liberal impulse or 
a realist national interest, but rather because they are responding to public pressure, 
stimulated by media coverage, has become known as the “CNN Effect”.  Geoffrey 
Robertson argues that greater exposure to the world, through CNN and other media 
channels, has rekindled “the potent mix of anger and compassion” behind the establishment 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which now produces a democratic demand 
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for something to be done every time a humanitarian emergency appears on western 
television screens.
86
  Jakobsen describes the CNN effect thus: 
 Television images of atrocities  journalists and opinion leaders criticise 
government policy in the media (TV, radio, newspapers)  the pressure on 




Certainly conventional wisdom holds that a government is unlikely to initiate an 
intervention without domestic support and therefore public opinion and media support is at 
least a highly significant or necessary factor in motivating intervention.  Mark Nelson, 
writing in The Wall Street Journal, in April 1991 for example suggested that John Major and 
George Bush launched Operation Provide Comfort on the back of a public “tidal wave of 
outrage” against Saddam Hussein’s treatment of the Kurds.88  Similarly one of Major’s 
senior advisors has been quoted as saying the prime minister was “panicked [into action] by 
newspaper headlines”.89   Most famously the US intervention in Somalia is held up as 
evidence of the power of the media; Bernard Cohen notes: 
Television has demonstrated its power to move governments.  By focussing 
daily on the starving children in Somalia ... TV mobilised the conscience of 
the nation’s public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of 





 However, Jakobsen’s study of the role played by the media in five separate 
interventions in the early 1990s
91
 concludes that the CNN effect alone is not sufficient to 
explain intervention.  Instead Jakobsen states that in cases of “traditional national interest” 
the government is not at all influenced by the media, rather they will intervene regardless of 
the level of media coverage and public support; however, in such cases the government will 
typically use the media to mobilise international and domestic support.
92
  In cases where 
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there is no traditional or obvious national interest, for example the US intervention in 
Somalia, Jakobsen argues that “the CNN effect [will] put the issue of intervention on the 
agenda but the decision whether or not to intervene [will be] ultimately determined by the 
perceived chance of success”.93  Similarly Jonathan Mermin suggests that in the specific 
case of Somalia, journalists focussed on the possibility of US intervention only after it had 
first been advocated in Washington.
94
  Robert DiPrizio supports this view; he suggests that 
the role of public opinion in George Bush’s decision to intervene in northern Iraq in 1991 
has been overstated.  The evidence is that public opinion possibly speeded up the decision 
making process, but Bush would have followed the same course of intervention regardless.
95
  
DiPrizio, Mermin and Jakobsen seem then to agree that whilst the media places an issue on 
the international agenda, media coverage does not automatically of itself lead to 
intervention.  Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page, having performed a statistical analysis 
of foreign policy making in the US, similarly conclude, “the public does not appear to exert 
substantial, consistent influence on the makers of foreign policy”.96  It appears that public 
opinion has the potential to be one influence but alone does not explain intervention, or 
indeed non-intervention. 
Chance of success 
For Jakobsen, neither traditional national interest nor the CNN effect are sufficient 
to explain why western governments have intervened in the post-Cold War period; a high 
chance of success, he argues, must also be present if intervention is to be justified.  He notes, 
“Intervention is highly unlikely unless the chances of success are perceived as good.”97  He 
continues, “once [a conflict] has [been] placed on the agenda, the perceived chances of 
success become the principle factor determining whether an enforcement operation will take 
place”.98  And it is at this point that we must make a distinction between cases where there is 
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a traditional national interest and those where there is none.  Jakobsen suggests that where a 
clear national interest exists the calculation of whether success is likely becomes more 
flexible; he demonstrates this by suggesting that countries are more willing to bear military 
casualties when there is a national interest than when no obvious interest is present.  A 
finding of national interest therefore sets the bar lower in the calculation of whether success 
is likely, making an enforcement action more likely.   
Certainly many authors point to this phenomenon in practice.  Mary Kaldor suggests 
this is what was seen in the case of Bosnia.  As the national interest was initially judged to 
be low, a high hurdle was set before intervention would be authorised; this, she argues, 
meant European countries, initially seeing no national interest and fearful of being dragged 
into the war and incurring causalities, provided only limited and ineffective peacekeeping, 
rather than more assertive humanitarian intervention.  Having acknowledged to themselves 
that they were not going to intervene in a meaningful way, Western governments, 
particularly France and the UK, looked to redefine the situation to justify their response; “the 
Serbs were too strong to attack”, the “Bosnians could not be helped”, “there was nothing we 
could do”.99  Yet as the crisis in Yugoslavia expanded it became apparent that it did threaten 
European interests, consequently the chance of success threshold was lowered; meaning 
troop contributing nations were willing to incur higher costs, both monetary and in terms of 
casualties and the operation was expanded.
100
  As the perceived threat to the national interest 
increased, the readiness to intervene similarly increased and the old excuses and risks were 
somewhat downgraded – despite nothing changing on the ground suddenly the chance of 
success was considered acceptable and peacekeeping expanded. 
Rieff’s work on Bosnia also illustrates that as with all decision making, the decision 
on whether to intervene in a humanitarian emergency is influenced by past experience; in the 
case of Bosnia the savagery of World War II influenced decision making.  As Towle 
describes this, “the participants in pre-war [or pre-intervention] debates are deeply 
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influenced by the shadows of past wars, some long gone and some more recent”.101  The 
calculation of whether a particular intervention will be successful will, Towle suggests, be 
largely shaped by similar missions in the past; in the case of Rwanda, the events in Somalia 
in 1993 were an obvious analogy.  Clearly when, based on past experience, states anticipate 
high costs of intervention (in terms of monetary cost, lives lost or the impact on other 
priorities) they naturally and instinctively become less inclined to launch any humanitarian 
intervention mission.  Conversely, the expectation that humanitarian missions can be 
achieved with relatively low costs but high benefits, makes intervention much more likely.  
International law 
Since 1945 the international community has codified numerous treaties covering 
human rights and humanitarian law; including, most pertinently to this thesis, The Genocide 
Convention.  There is then an argument that humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme 
human rights abuses such as occurred in Rwanda is, as Hazel Cameron for example 
suggests, an obligation under international law.
102
  Helen Fein notes that “the responsibility 
under international law to prevent genocide is clear, but it is not clear that it would be 
deemed right, permissible, or wise to intervene in the case of civil war or failed states”.103  
However, it can equally be argued that a state’s obligations under The Genocide Convention 
are far from clear.  Whilst signatories to The Genocide Convention pledge to “prevent”, 
“suppress” and “punish” genocide they do not pledge to intervene to “stop” it.  Nor do 
individual signatories pledge to actually intervene themselves; rather they agree to call on 
the UN to take action.  Even then the convention is only enacted when the events fall within 
the rather strict definition laid out in The Genocide Convention, and given the convention’s 
requirement to determine intent this is not necessarily straight forward.  If human rights 
abuses are not deemed to constitute genocide there is then no responsibility, or even 
automatic right under international law, to intervene. 
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Under international law, intervention is also only permitted if approved by the UN 
Security Council.  In practice this means that a majority of the 15 members must vote in 
favour of the resolution for intervention and none of the Permanent Five use their veto 
against the resolution.  Under the UN Charter the Security Council can approve two forms of 
intervention, either Chapter VI or Chapter VII.  Chapter VI relates to what has previously 
been called traditional peacekeeping and Chapter VII to humanitarian intervention.  Thomas 
Weiss and Cindy Collins describe the difference between the two as: “Chapter VI is 
theoretically impartial and neutral; Chapter VII makes a highly political statement regarding 
which belligerent is at fault and must be brought back into line by concentrated and coercive 
actions of the international community.”104   
That said there is at least one example of the Security Council being side stepped 
before a humanitarian intervention mission was launched and that is the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999.  Fearing a veto from Russia or China, the US, UK and France decided to 
launch an air campaign against the Serbian aggressors in Kosovo without UN approval.  It is 
also apparent that in 2002 President George W. Bush was willing to intervene in Iraq with or 
without explicit UN approval (which was ultimately obtained).
105
  These two examples seem 
to suggest that international law is not a major influence on humanitarian intervention.  The 
Genocide Convention and other treaties are written in such a way that they do not actually 
compel a response from any particular state, and in certain cases it is apparent that states are 
willing to ignore convention and to pursue their own interest with or without the support of 
the international law. 
Bureaucracy 
A further factor to be acknowledged when considering any government decision 
making, not just humanitarian intervention, is the role of the bureaucracy.  Whilst it is easy 
or convenient to speak of a “British” or “French” position regards an issue, as Graham 
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Allison suggests, “this simplification must not be allowed to conceal the fact that a 
government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely aligned organisations, each 
with a substantial life of its own”.106  There is then a school of thought that foreign policy is 
not coherently and rationally devised but rather is the output of a bureaucratic system.  By 
way of illustration former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, when speaking of another 
major foreign policy event, claimed in a 1973 lecture that “there is no such thing, in my 
view, as a Vietnam policy; there is a series of programs of individual agencies concerned 
with Vietnam”. 107  Allison calls this interpretation of foreign policy making the 
“Organisational Process Model”; it is, he emphasises, the processes and procedures of the 
organisations which make up government that effectively formulate foreign policy rather 
than an over arching rational conception of pursuing what is best for national interest. 
A number of scholars have identified significant weaknesses in the bureaucratic 
management system that so dominates government decision making.  First amongst these is 
that bureaucracy can actually impede the ability of the head of government to definitively 
influence policy.  As Weiss and Collins suggest in their study of intervention, 
“institutionalism argues that barriers in structures and [bureaucratic] processes may prevent 
or may facilitate state participation even if dominant political elites hold an opposing 
view”.108  In terms of decision making Margaret Takeda and Marilyn Helms continue that 
bureaucracy is a barrier to swift action.  In any bureaucracy there is a need for a great deal of 
time consuming knowledge sharing amongst experts, each with only a limited role within 
the system; there are a large number of individuals involved in the decision making process 
but each lacks the authority to act.  Instead the authority to make decision rests somewhere 
higher up the bureaucratic chain.  This creates three problems.  The first identified by 
Gordon Tullock is that as information is passed from individual to individual the content of 
the message becomes increasingly distorted.  The message reaching the decision maker is 
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then subject to a great deal of “noise”.109  Secondly, the decision maker will most likely be 
overloaded with information.  For example, as early as 1951, long before the advent of e-
mail and 24 hour news, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison recorded that “under present 
day conditions the burden on the Foreign Secretary is excessively heavy”, continuing that he 
often only got five hours sleep a night.
110
  There is also the problem of bureaucracy 
physically preventing information reaching the decision maker; in the US Henry Kissinger, 
for example, recalls his initial surprise that despite being a presidential advisor he would not 
have free access to President Kennedy; it was not until Kissinger was given the specific role 
of National Security Adviser, under President Nixon, that he realised how few people 
actually had direct access to the President.
111
  The assumption then that decision makers in a 
bureaucratic system make decisions in possession of the full facts is clearly not correct – as 
Tullock notes “in practice, high level officials frequently demonstrate publicly the most 
egregious ignorance concerning the area that they allegedly supervise.”112 
Bureaucracies also tend to become insular.  Takeda and Helms note the inability of 
bureaucracies to consider outside information, this also includes a disdain for accepting 
assistance from actors outside of the system.
113
  They record, for example, how after the 
Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 governments, including Thailand and Cambodia, were 
reluctant to work with western NGOs.  Christopher Coyne believes this can also be seen in 
government departments; he notes how ineffective the US State Department and the 
Pentagon were in working together in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.
114
  He calls this 
“organisational patriotism” whereby bureaucracies believe their organisation is superior to 
others.  Such parochialism can obviously be problematic when specifically looking at 
humanitarian intervention, which requires the involvement of various bodies.   
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Takeda and Helms also argue that bureaucracies do not deviate from a failing course 
of action.  Kissinger agrees with this suggestion that it is difficult to alter the direction of a 
bureaucracy: “Once the American decision making process has disgorged an answer it 
becomes technically very difficult to change the policy ... If one wishes to influence 
American foreign policy, the time to do so is in the formative period.”115  Allison identifies 
this phenomenon in his study of the Cuban missile crisis suggesting that bureaucracies 
operate with a bounded “repertoire” of processes.  Rather than rationally and systematically 
considering all responses to a crisis, a bureaucracy will adopt the first satisfactory response 
that they come across within the standard operating procedures that they work from; the 
effect of this is that bureaucracies tend to respond to a crisis in the same way that they 
responded to previous similar crises.  As Allison suggests “the best explanation of an 
organisation’s behaviour at t is t – 1; the best prediction of what will happen at t + 1 is t”.116   
Or as Takeda and Helms put it socialisation within a bureaucratic system leads individuals to 
hold a sense of loyalty “to the way things are done here”.117   
Race 
The final issue to discuss here is the argument that race influences the humanitarian 
intervention decision.  Certainly, with specific reference to the Rwandan genocide there have 
been suggestions by some, including Boutros-Ghali, that the West was willing to watch 
thousands of Africans be killed, yet they were quick to respond to the rich (read white) 
man’s crisis in Bosnia.118  The US particularly is accused of allowing its foreign policy to be 
influenced by race.  W.E.B. Du Bois for example, maintained that American:  
foreign policy ... [is] ... a mirror image of [her] domestic policy.  [Thus] a 
nation whose ... white citizens could not treat with equity, justice and equality, 
black neighbours and citizens living in the same ... nation could not develop a 
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foreign policy involving international relationships reflecting equality and 
justice with two-thirds of the people of the world who are of color (sic).
119
   
 
 
By way of example, Mark Ledwidge points to the US (and European) reluctance to become 
involved in the Italy-Ethiopia war of 1934; “for most whites in America, Ethiopia was a 
mysterious and faraway [and black] place for which it was not worth abandoning [the US’s] 
isolationist policies”.120 
One of the key issues in this field is the fact of racial stereotyping and the impact 
that this potentially has upon decision making.  For example, Michael Krenn highlights the 
shift in the treatment of Muslims following the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York.  
Following the attacks, Islam became conflated with terrorism, hate crimes against Muslims 
increased, hundreds of Arab-Americans were arrested and thousands of Muslims denied 
entry to the US on the suspicion that they were potential bombers.
121
  Specifically looking at 
Africa, it was Henry Morton Stanley who opened up Africa for the western general public in 
the late nineteenth century.  Stanley’s descriptions of a continent “still fixed deeply in 
barbarism” were to stick for many years in the western psyche.122  Similar views of a dark 
continent were also to influence the British Empire belief in the “white-man’s burden” to 
civilise the savages.  This image continued into the twentieth century with Hollywood 
portrayals, such as the Tarzan films, exaggerating to absurd levels the negative perceptions 
that most Americans and Europeans had of Africa – in Hollywood Africa was dark, 
dangerous and violent.
123
   
 This view of Africa, led to a belief in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the 
“immature and unsophisticated” Africans were unable to govern themselves.124  The belief in 
the “white-man’s burden”, namely the belief that whites had an obligation to govern and try 
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to develop black Africa, was particularly strong in the UK.  In the 1890s, Pears’ Soap even 
used the theme to advertise soap, encouraging white people to teach blacks how to wash 
themselves.  Although there was arguably a slight shift during the Cold War, when Western 
governments were forced to support African and Asian nations in the face of the Communist 
threat, the underlying, and perhaps unconscious, belief in racial difference remained.  For 
example, it is apparent throughout the Cold War period, certainly in the US, there was a 
preference for states in Africa with white governments.  Although this was justified on the 
grounds that they were more stable, friendly and anti-communist, turning the argument 
around suggests there was a view that black governments were unstable, hostile and easy 
prey to communism.   
There was still an underlying belief, Krenn suggests, that black Africa was culturally 
deficient compared to the West.
125
  As Peter Dahlgren has argued this has led to the 
developing world being portrayed as the bipolar opposite of the West: 
‘They’, the people of the Third World appear as unstable and prone to 
violence. Incessant glimpses of disorder and violence serve as a reminder that 
these societies continue to act out their essential character; they are virtually 
driven by violence. ‘We’ on the other hand the industrialised West, are 





It is certainly apparent that this negative view of the developing world, Africa in particular, 
is the dominant popular image in the UK.  Mike Wooldridge, the BBC world affairs 
correspondent, recalls that “the overwhelming image of 1990s Africa was that it remain[ed] 
a continent of mud huts and primitive lifestyles.”127  Similarly a VSO report of 2002 noted 
that “80% of the British public strongly associate the developing world with doom-laden 
images of famine, disaster and Western aid.”128  The report continued that the dominant 
news images of disaster, famine and war reinforce the “victim” image of the developing 
world.  The media, VSO claimed, also fails to create emotional points of connection between 
                                                          
125 Ibid, p.92. 
126  Peter Dahlgren, “The Third World on TV News: Western Ways of Seeing the ‘Other’,” in Television Coverage of 
International Affairs, ed William Adams (Norwood (NJ): Ablex, 1982), p.53. 
127 Mike Wooldridge, “Reporting Africa,” An Irish Quarterly Review. Vol. 84, No. 336 (1995), p.368. 
128 VSO, “The Live Aid Legacy: The Developing World Through British Eyes,” (2002). Frances Harding, “Africa and the 
Moving Image,” Journal of African Cultural Studies. Vol. 16, No.1 (2003) makes the same point. 
72 
 
the West and the developing world; combined with a “lack of personal connection [this] 
generates emotional distance, which generates disinterest.”129  All combined these factors 
have the effect of “othering” black Africa – in this image, Africans are different from “us”.  
The VSO report concluded with the assertion that this negative imaging of the developing 
world, which can be traced to colonial times,
130
 has had the effect of “dehumanising, 
distancing and devaluing the people [of the developing world]”.131  Clearly such strong 
public opinion and cultural framing is liable to influence foreign policy decision making. 
Lessons from the Field of Psychology 
An alternative approach to the question of why states intervene is to look at the work 
of psychologists and sociologists that have addressed the question of why individuals 
intervene in emergencies.  By examining the behaviour of individual bystanders it may be 
possible to build a better understanding of state intervention.  This is the approach adopted 
by Stanley Cohen, who argues that the response to atrocities is often the same at an 




 Altruism, meaning the promotion of the interests of others, is a subject that has 
perplexed philosophers for years.  Why are some people willing to help others, when to do 
so typically involves some cost to the altruist?  To understand what motivates some 
individuals to act altruistically potentially illuminates why some states are willing to provide 
aid or assistance on the international stage.  David Myers identifies that essentially the 
various theories of altruism can be synthesised into two general theories of motivation.  
Altruism, he suggests, is motivated either by self-interest or by empathy / moral duty
133
 - a 
split not too dissimilar to the realism versus liberalism debate. 
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Thomas Hobbes, writing in 1651, was one of the first to argue that altruism was 
more about egoism that selflessness.  Hobbes presented humans as motivated by self-
interest, constantly striving to satisfy their own selfish desires.  However, his natural laws 
recognised that humans had certain common interests that if met would maximise one’s own 
security.  The Hobbesian interpretation of altruism is therefore grounded on the principle of 
reciprocity; namely the anticipation that the beneficiary will one day return our good deed 
makes us sometimes act altruistically towards others. 
More recent authors have also argued that altruism is actually an egotistical act.  
Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, in the late nineteenth century wrote that help for others is 
merely a reflection of our own suffering.  Nietzsche uses as an example, the altruist who 
jumps into a lake to rescue a drowning victim.  For Nietzsche this apparently altruistic action 
is motivated by self interest, even if the rescuer is not conscious of that at the time.  We help 
the person in need, he suggests, in order to relieve ourselves of the feeling of pity for the 
victim.
134
  Jerzy Karlowski reaches the same conclusion for another reason.  He identified 
“endocentric altruism”, by which he meant altruism that is largely concerned with our own 




More recently psychologists have empirically demonstrated this theory of self-
interest by researching guilt as a catalyst for intervention.  Guilt is defined by Martin 
Hoffmann as “an intensively unpleasant feeling of disesteem for oneself that results from 
empathic feeling for someone in distress combined with awareness of being the cause of that 
distress.”136   As Bierhoff succinctly concludes “caused distress motivates compensation, 
which leads to more intervention than neutral witnessed distress”.137  As a simple every-day 
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example, E. Rawlings demonstrated that individuals are more likely to agree to donate blood 
if they felt they have somehow harmed the person making the request.
138
   Or at the state 
level, as we saw earlier, the French involvement in Operation Provide Comfort was partially 
justified on the grounds of righting a wrong done to the Iraqi Kurds as a result of the Gulf 
War. 
 However, E. Walster et al conclude that guilt does not necessarily lead to 
intervention.
139
  They accept that whilst a harm-doer will seek to alleviate their own feelings 
of discomfort this will not necessarily be by positively aiding the victim.  As an alternative 
the harm doer is just as likely to alleviate their suffering either through self-punishment (for 
example, by donating to a charity) or psychologically.  In this latter scenario, the harm-doer 
may derogate the victim (i.e. convince themselves that the victim deserves the harm), may 
deny responsibility (i.e. convince themselves that someone else was responsible for the 
harm) or may simply minimise the victim’s suffering (i.e. convince themselves that the harm 
was not too serious).  Melvin Lerner, continuing this line of research, even concluded that 
there is significant evidence that observers tend to ascribe responsibility to the victim for 
their suffering, thereby devaluing the victim’s suffering and easing their observer’s feelings 
of guilt.
140
  This is particularly the case where the cost of helping the victim is perceived to 
be high. 
Empathy 
The alternative view is that altruism is motivated out of empathy for the victim or a 
moral duty.  Just twenty years after Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf wrote “every man should 
promote the advantage of the other, so far as he conveniently can” and he accepted that this 
would involve some cost to oneself.
141
  In this interpretation an individual should help 
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another, for no other reason than they have a duty to so.  Christian Wolff, in 1738, continued 
this theme emphasising “the obligation to help those who are in need, insofar as one is 
capable”. 142   More recently Paul Miller has argued that the simple fact that we feel 
satisfaction when our children, friends or family succeed, or equally suffer when they do, is 
proof that empathy is the motivator for altruism.
143
  As Hans-Werner Bierhoff notes, under 
this view of altruism, any reward for the altruist is an unintended consequence; the ultimate 
goal of such intervention is to reduce the suffering of another person.
144
   
However, if we accept that it is empathy that leads to altruism we must also accept 
that the altruist adopts the perspective of the victim.  Therefore altruism must surely be more 
likely when the potential altruist can more easily empathise with the victim.  Bierhoff 
identifies three factors that significantly increase our ability to empathise with a victim.  
These are: that the observer has been in a similar position to the victim in the past; the 
observer is attached to the victim; and the observer is made to imagine what the victim’s 
situation must be like.
145
   Application of these criteria would then suggest that altruism is 
not equally applied; some victims are more likely to receive assistance than others.  These 
factors are particularly pertinent when exploring the response to crises in Africa, where the 
victims, with whom we have no connection, are in a situation of famine or war that very few 
westerners can begin to imagine. 
Failure to intervene 
As well as trying to explain why some people do intervene, social psychologists are 
also interested by the question of why people do not intervene as frequently as one might 
expect.  Although this literature is extensive, certain key and consistent principles emerge 
and these have come to be collectively known as the “bystander effect”.   
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Among the first to study the bystander effect were Bibb Latane and John Darley,
146
 
who identified that the presence of other bystanders greatly decreased the likelihood of 
intervention, and this was not simply a case that each bystander hoped that someone else 
would act.  They surmised that more subtle factors were influencing bystander behaviour.  
As the number of bystanders increased, any given bystander was less likely to notice the 
incident, less likely to interpret the incident as an emergency, and less likely to assume 
responsibility for taking action.   
In one of their many experiments, a subject was asked to wait in a room that 
gradually filled with smoke; it was noted that when alone the subject would respond much 
sooner than if other people were in the room.  The presence of others appeared to make the 
subjects less likely to even notice the emergency.  Latane and Darley also concluded that the 
presence of bystanders led to events being misinterpreted.  Subjects in the room with other 
people admitted that they interpreted the smoke as a problem with the air-conditioning, 
whereas those on their own feared a fire.  Latane and Darley suggest that many emergencies 
have this level of ambiguity and before a bystander will take action in such circumstances, 
they must first define the event as an emergency and decide that intervention is the proper 
course of action.
147
  In the course of making these decisions, it is likely that an individual 
bystander will be considerably influenced by the decisions he perceives other bystanders to 
be making.  In such cases, although the bystander at some level probably knows that some 
form of response is required they have a strong incentive to reinterpret the situation so as to 
persuade themselves that the emergency does not really exist.  Latane and Darley called this 
phenomenon of bystanders being influenced by the perceived calmness of others “pluralistic 
ignorance”.148 
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One thing that the Latane and Darley experiments demonstrated was that there is 
only one path that leads to a bystander intervention; they must notice the incident, must 
interpret it as an emergency and then assume personal responsibility to act.  At each stage in 
this decision making process, the presence of other bystanders is likely to divert a person 
down the route of not acting.
149
   It therefore appears to be not apathy that leads to non-
intervention, but a genuine (mis)interpretation of the situation that leads the bystander down 
one of the routes of non-intervention. 
Cost arousal 
Again looking at bystanders that do not intervene, Irvin and Jane Piliavin
150
 
concluded that the perceived cost to the bystander influences their response.  In field 
experiments they staged mock emergencies on underground trains in a number of US cities.  
In each experiment an actor would feign collapsing and bystanders’ responses were 
monitored.  The situation was varied such that the victim appeared to be either ill or drunk.  
The results clearly showed that bystanders were significantly more likely to intervene in 
cases where the actor appeared to be ill.  From this, Piliavin and Piliavin concluded that 
intervention is more likely when the perceived cost to the bystander is relatively low.  This 
conclusion has come to be known as the “cost-arousal model”.151  It hypothesizes that a 
bystander will choose the response that will most efficiently reduce their arousal (i.e. their 
feeling that they should intervene or their anticipated guilt if they don’t intervene) and in the 
process incur the fewest costs (in time, money, distress etc).    
Further experiments have also shown that the likelihood of bystander intervention is 
increased if the bystander actually witnesses the emergency – whereas Piliavin and Piliavin 
recorded their ill victim receiving help in 90% of their staged emergencies,
152
 Bierhoff 
recorded only 27% of bystanders stopping when then came across an apparent victim of a 
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bicycle accident that they did not witness.
153
   A further factor to come out of this bystander 
research is the aversion to help those dissimilar to ourselves.  As Stanley Cohen, suggests “It 
is quite abnormal to know or care very much about the problems of distant places”, implying 
that we are more disposed to care about those near us and like us.
154
  More empirically, 
Kuntsman and Ash found that white bystanders were more like to come to the aid of a white 
rather than a black victim.
155
  Drawing on the cost-arousal model, they suggested that the 
perceived cost of helping a victim of a different race is higher than helping a victim of the 
same race.  These findings all support the suggestion that the likelihood of empathetic 
altruism is increased when we have an emotional tie to the victim and it is easier to feel such 
emotion for those that are similar to ourselves. 
Defensive redefinition 
 Concluding that a not untypical response of a bystander to an emergency is to not 
intervene, S.H. Schwartz identified a factor he described as “defensive redefinition of the 
situation”.156  If a bystander decides that intervention is the morally correct thing to do in an 
emergency situation, yet they fail to act, they will redefine the situation in one of two ways.  
Either the bystander will deny the consequences of their actions, convincing himself that his 
response would not actually have the desired outcome; or, alternatively they will deny 
responsibility, in which case they will change their own perception of their capability to 
control what is happening to the victim.  In both cases the bystander is convinced that they 
are incapable of assisting the victim and therefore, although not necessarily in accordance 
with moral norms, it actually becomes right, in their own mind, for them to not intervene.  
Cohen calls this phenomenon “interpretative denial”.  He suggests that language plays a part 
in this process “by changing words, by euphemism, by using technical jargon, the observer 
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disputes the cognitive meaning given to an event and re-allocates it to another class of 
event”.157 
Applying these various findings back to our study of state intervention supports 
many of the factors discussed previously.  As suggested earlier for example, states who do 
not want to intervene will redefine the humanitarian emergency, either arguing that there is 
no emergency or that nothing can be done; as we will see both of these arguments were used 
in the case of Rwanda.  Or as suggested with regard involvement in Yugoslavia, the cost 
arousal model could be used to explain why intervention stepped up when the perceived cost 
of action decreased.   
The UK and Humanitarian Intervention 
Twentieth century politics in the UK was dominated by the Conservative Party 
which between 1922 and 1997 was in government for 56 years.  A review of Britain’s 
foreign policy in the twentieth century then is in many ways a review of Conservative (or 
Tory) foreign policy; this is particularly true of 1994 when the Conservatives had been in 
government for fifteen years.  How then can we define Conservative foreign policy? 
 For Michael Clarke there is no debate, “Attempts to analyse British external 
relations cannot avoid defining them in essentially Realist terms”.158  The Conservative Party 
in the post-war period differentiated itself from the opposition by continually reiterating its 
commitment to defence and the need to preserve and protect the national interest.  Clarke 
continues that during the Cold War: 
 [Britain’s] approach to security can be fully understood in Realist terms: 
Britain responds through NATO to direct threats to its own security in Europe; 
it responds to indirect threats elsewhere by contributing to defence and 
peacekeeping operations around the world; and it helps to uphold the milieu of 
the Western world order through the visible presence of its military 
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This is a foreign and defence policy grounded on the idea of promoting national interest; a 
national interest that was focussed on maintaining the status quo of western domination in 
the global sphere.  Harold Macmillan summed up this view of foreign policy in his first 
speech as prime minister in 1957, “We are a great world power and intend to remain so”.160 
 For the Conservatives national interest has also meant promoting global trade for the 
benefit of British business.  Margaret Thatcher, for example, records in her autobiography 
the efforts that she went to to open the Japanese market to Scottish whisky producers and to 
open up Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan to British imports.  She also records how she tried 
to build trade relations with Indonesia despite “serious human rights abuses” in the 
country.
161
  Similarly during the 1980s the Conservative government deployed three Royal 
Navy vessels in the Arabian Gulf, not in any way to influence the war between Iran and Iraq 
or to come to the aid of civilians caught up in the fighting, but instead to keep the 
commercial shipping lanes open.  As John Coles notes, under Thatcher, it was clear that the 
top two priorities of foreign policy were firstly safeguarding the country’s security and 
secondly promoting its prosperity.
162
  The approach to the developing world was also largely 
driven by trade.  Conservative MP Enoch Powell, for example, opposed aid to the former 
British colonies on moral and economic grounds, “the former colonies should rather adopt 
the free market in order to advance economically”163 and Margaret Thatcher stated that 
“what the developing world needed more than aid was trade”.164   
In the 1970s to 1990s Conservative foreign policy was also based on the 
fundamental belief in the primacy of the sovereign state.  Peter Dorey for example, records 
that the “objection to Britain joining a single European currency, and being bound by a 
Central European Bank, was that sovereignty would be fundamentally eroded”. 165   The 
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image of Margaret Thatcher standing up to foreign powers to defend British interest was one 
she was keen to present to the media in the 1980s
166
 and one that Douglas Hurd recalls as 
being accurate.  He recounts how on being appointed Foreign Secretary, Thatcher instructed 
him, “You won’t let the Europeans get away with too much will you Douglas?”167  It was 
not just British sovereignty however that the Conservative government was keen to protect.  
In her memoirs Thatcher records her anger at the US invasion of Grenada in 1983; she 
opposed the unnecessary intervention “in the affairs of a small, independent nation, however 
unattractive its regime”. 168   Her condemnation of the American action was clear in a 
statement she made on the BBC World Service, “We in western countries use our force to 
defend our way of life.  We do not use it to walk into other people’s countries, independent 
sovereign territories.”169  The 1991 Gulf War was also justified as war to defend sovereignty.  
Douglas Hurd recalls: 
 No-one doubted Saddam Hussein was a wicked man who had done terrible 
things to his own people and to others.  It would be better if he went ... But we 
were not going to war to rid the world of an evil rule.  We were acting very 





The consistent theme that is evident in Conservative foreign policy is the promotion 
of national interest; which encompasses promoting trade, defending sovereignty and 
protecting the UK’s place in the international community.  During the periods of 
Conservative government at least, this promotion of national interest evidently trumped 
morality; as prime minister, Thatcher was prepared to build a relationship with Indonesia 
despite the human rights abuses in the country, opposed the deportation of General Pinochet 
to Spain despite the allegations of state sponsored abuse and opposed the establishment of a 
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European Court of Human Rights as it would enable “scandalous abuses of the asylum 
system”.171  Conservative foreign policy was realism in practice. 
In contrast the perception in the post-war era is that Labour advocated a more moral 
foreign policy than the Conservative party, a foreign policy more driven by ideas than 
interests.  However, despite the appearance of liberalism, as Stuart Croft suggests, “Labour 
fail[ed] to deliver on its promises in foreign policy”.172   For example, Croft highlights 
Labour’s shift to the right under Neil Kinnock before the 1987 election as he deliberately 
disassociated the party from CND having realised that former leader Michael Foot’s 
opposition to nuclear weapons made Labour unelectable.
173
  Nor did Labour’s more liberal 
constituency make them more inclined to support intervention; Harold Wilson for example, 
was unwilling to deploy British troop to the Congo during the civil war of 1960 to 1966 and 
supported the Nigerian government in their civil war of 1967 to 1970 despite public 
sympathy for the Biafran rebels forced into a state of famine.  Despite the more pacifist 
nature of many within the party, Labour did however support the Conservative government’s 
deployment of British troops to the Falklands in 1982 and to Kuwait in 1991, both of which 
were military actions justified in terms of defending national interest and preserving 
international order.  For the majority of the Cold War period Labour, whilst clearly 
representing a more liberal membership, pursued a foreign policy not too dissimilar from 
that of the Conservative party, very much based on the defence and promotion of national 
interests.  It was only once John Smith became leader of the party in 1992 that Labour 
evidently became more inclined to support intervention; Smith for example, called for more 
troops to be sent to Bosnia in February 1994.
174
  This continued under Tony Blair once 
Labour came into power in 1997.  However, as both Stuart Croft and Caroline Kennedy 
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note, even under Blair morality was only part of Labour’s foreign policy it was never the 
core; that always remained the realist promotion of national interests.
175
  
Britain’s Involvement in Peacekeeping 
In the years prior to 1994 Britain had not been one of the leading contributors to 
humanitarian missions in terms of troops deployed – of the 32 UN peacekeeping missions 
that came before UNAMIR, British troops were deployed in only seven.
176
  However, the 
military was not idle; in the second half of the twentieth century the British military was 
deployed overseas on numerous occasions, seeing active service in Malaya, Korea, Kenya, 
Oman, The Falklands and Kuwait.  What connects these deployments is that they were 
actions in defence of sovereignty.  The operations in Oman, Malaya and Korea were 
mounted against rebel insurrections; the Korean War was fought to defend the Republic of 
Korea from communism; and both The Falklands and Gulf Wars were fought to reverse acts 
of aggression.  In this period the military was predominantly a Clausewitzian instrument of 
the government’s realist foreign policy. 
However, there were two examples in the early 1990s of the Conservative 
government authorising intervention on what can be seen as humanitarian grounds; the first 
was Operation Provide Comfort, the 1991 deployment of troops to northern Iraq to protect 
the Kurdish population and the second the participation in the UN missions to the Former 
Yugoslavia.  The 1991 Kurdish uprising against the government of Saddam Hussein resulted 
in an Iraqi military response.  Fearing a massacre similar to the Anfal campaign
177
 millions 
of Kurds fled towards the Turkish border.  Initially the western world did little in response, 
but in early April Douglas Hurd announced a change in international policy, one that had 
been driven by the personal intervention of John Major.  Hurd announced that the 
“restrictions imposed by the UN Charter could no longer be allowed to block the 
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amelioration of mass suffering of the Kurdish population”. 178  The response was a 
deployment of a joint US, French and British task force to northern Iraq to establish a 
Kurdish safe haven.  However, whilst the means of this particular deployment can be seen as 
essentially humanitarian, it is not as certain that the ends were humanitarian.  Rather the 
mission appears to have been largely motivated by more realist factors.  As Piers Robinson 
notes:  
the sequence of events, the close contact between President Ozal of Turkey 
and [President George] Bush, the stated objectives of the intervention, plus 
most of the anecdotal evidence all indicate that the intervention decision was 
grounded in geo-strategic concerns regarding the vast number of unwanted 





Operation Provide Comfort then can be seen more as a mission to protect a NATO ally than 
necessarily to alleviate the suffering of Kurds. 
The second of these deployments was to the Former Yugoslavia.  British troops 
were deployed in the Balkans region, first as part of an EU peacekeeping force, then as part 
of the UN peacekeeping mission and also as part of the NATO peace enforcement mission in 
Kosovo.
180
  The build up of British troops in the Balkans was incremental and not 
universally accepted within the government or the media.  Hurd records how “My 
colleagues in government and all parties in the Commons were, with individual exceptions, 
sceptical of the need for even the limited intervention we undertook.”181  The crisis in the 
Balkans though did lead many to intellectually and morally question existing foreign policy 
thinking – how far could the international community legitimately intervene in a civil war, 
should they intervene proactively on the side of one of the belligerents, should they accept 
the territorial gains achieved through violence if it brought the war to an earlier end?  Whilst 
there were clearly national interests in ensuring that the conflict did not spread further, the 
                                                          
178 Mark Stuart, Douglas Hurd, the Public Servant: An Authorised Biography (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1998), 
p.279. 
179 Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of news, foreign policy and intervention (London: Routledge, 2002), p.71. 
180 There are numerous books that thoroughly cover the British deployment in the Balkans. These include: Brendan Simms, 
Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin, 2002); David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and 
the Failure of the West, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); and Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, (London: Pan, 
2002). 
181 Hurd, Memoirs, p.492. 
85 
 
deployments to the Former Yugoslavia certainly were motivated by humanitarianism more 
than previous missions.  Yet it was this humanitarianism that made the mission so 
controversial. 
It is evident then that despite the prominence of realism in British foreign policy 
there was a slight shift in the early 1990s, when intervention became more acceptable.  
Certainly though there was no revolution in British foreign policy; humanitarian intervention 
had not suddenly become a widely accepted principle.  Intervention was still rare and 
evidently still largely motivated by national interest rather than morality; as Hurd states in 
his memoirs “The doctrine of humanitarian intervention will never be universal; it will 
always depend on time, place and circumstances”.182  The conclusion therefore seems to be 
that amongst the Conservative government there was a reluctant acceptance of humanitarian 
intervention when it was aligned with national interest – realism not liberalism. 
Summary 
We are left then, with two apparently mutually exclusive schools of thought.  Firstly 
that intervention, either at a state or individual level, is motivated by self-interest; or 
alternatively, intervention is motivated by some higher moral obligation or altruism.  Yet 
despite the rhetoric of morality, altruism, or liberalism the more commonly held view is that 
at a state level foreign policy practice, and therefore intervention, seems to be dominated by 
a realist ideology, that emphasises both the sacrosanct nature of national borders and also the 
fact that foreign policy is, and should be, motivated primarily by national interest.  
Philosophy, psychology and empirical data from historians all seem to suggest that we are 
unrealistic if we expect state intervention to be motivated by anything else.   
However, the specific case of the UK and Rwanda allows us to test this dominant 
view.  The fact that the UK initially appeared unwilling to intervene in Rwanda and then 
eventually deployed troops provides us with an opportunity to explore what motivated the 
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two decisions and to understand what, if anything, changed when the decision was taken to 
deploy the troops.  The remainder of this thesis focuses on the various factors that influenced 
decision making throughout the crisis – was the national interest considered, how was the 
crisis portrayed in the media, did race influence the decision, did the UK government 
defensively redefine the crisis?  By understanding the factors that influenced the UK in 
1994, we can add to our understanding of intervention and potentially conclude if either 




THE IGNORANT BYSTANDER? 
THE PERIOD to 21 APRIL 1994 
 
 “Rwanda was the classic small country far away of which we knew and wished to 
know nothing ... The country was poor, overcrowded, French speaking and offered no 
obvious attractions to us.”1  Edward Clay, Britain’s non-resident Ambassador to Rwanda 
wrote these words in 1995, recalling Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 characterisation of 
Czechoslovakia, and succinctly summing up the UK’s attitude towards Rwanda before the 
genocide.  As a country, Rwanda could never be said to have been at the top of Britain’s 
foreign policy priority list – it probably did not even make the top 100.  In the decades 
before the genocide Britain’s relations with, and interest in, Rwanda had variously been 
described by the FCO as “minimal”, “tenuous” and “insignificant”.2  As “insignificant” as 
Rwanda may have been though, the UK’s position on the UN Security Council meant that in 
1993 and 1994 the UK was forced, at least momentarily, to pay some attention to the small 
country far away. 
This chapter explores the period up to 21 April, when the decision was taken to 
withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR.
3
  First the chapter reviews domestic interest in the crisis, by 
exploring media coverage, NGO response and parliamentary debate.  It then moves on to 
consider government intelligence on what was happening in Rwanda before considering the 
official response.  For ease the sections are broken down into rough chronological periods: 
pre-1990; the civil war period from October 1990 to October 1993; the deployment of 
UNAMIR from October 1993 to early April 1994; and then the first two weeks of the 
genocide from 7 to 21 April.  The chapter concludes by addressing the question of whether 
more could have been done in this period, specifically looking at whether at this stage 
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anyone in the UK recognised the events in Rwanda as genocide.  It also addresses the 
accusation that the UK was closer to the RPF than has been publicly acknowledged. 
The Media, Parliament and Public Response 
 Although Britain had been keen to “acquire” Rwanda in the carving up of Africa at 
the 1885 Berlin Conference, once the country had been claimed by Germany, there was little 
interest shown in the country again.  Other than a short question in 1926, relating to the 
Belgian right to demand native work under the League of Nations’ mandate, Rwanda was 
not mentioned in the House of Commons until Jeremy Thorpe, Liberal MP for North Devon, 
asked the Foreign Secretary: 
Whether he will instruct the British delegation at the United Nations to raise 
immediately, in the Security Council, as a threat to peace, the killing of 
members of the Tutsi tribe by the Rwanda Republican Government, as a 






This was February 1964 and Thorpe was referring to President Kayibanda’s forceful 
response to the first incursion of the Tutsi diaspora from Uganda.  In response Peter Thomas, 
Minister of State at the FCO, agreed that the events in Rwanda did constitute genocide.  
Despite this assertion the government of the day did not believe that the UN Security 
Council was the “appropriate forum for this matter”.  Instead Thomas confirmed that 
although the situation was less than clear, the FCO had expressed their concern to the UN 
Secretary General and hoped that Rwanda’s neighbours could exert some influence over 
Kayibanda.
5
   After this brief show of interest in the affairs of Rwanda, the country slipped 
from the view of the House of Commons for the next thirty years.  A review of Hansard 
from 1964 to 1990 simply shows Rwanda being listed as one of the many countries to 
receive British aid and one of many countries with a refugee crisis. 
                                                          




 Media coverage of Rwanda was no more comprehensive.  Lucy Jarosz suggests that 
Africa is the “dark continent” only in that the media leaves its readers in the dark; this was 
certainly the case over Rwanda.
6
  Throughout the 1980s any media coverage of Rwanda 
invariably focussed on Dian Fossey,
7
 AIDs, or the impact on East Africa generally of falling 
coffee prices.  More frequently Rwanda was mentioned as the neighbour of Burundi or 
Uganda, both of which experienced terrible civil wars.  Rwanda did not even make it onto 
the back pages of the newspapers; in 1987 a couple listed Rwanda as one of the countries in 
Group D of the football World Cup qualifiers - they did not make the finals!  The only times 
Rwanda received anything more than passing coverage was when it was suggested as a 
destination for a trekking holiday to view the native mountain gorillas.  However, even then 
such articles highlighted the remoteness of Rwanda from Britain and the difficulties facing 
any British tourist.   In 1990, for example, Sheila Hayman wrote in The Independent: 
Rwanda used to be Belgian, so you have to fly Sabena, from Brussels; your 
passport has to make two Brussels trips, as there is no nearer consulate to issue 
a visa.  Arranging all these practicalities and fixing up, via fax, a personalised 
itinerary with Rwanda Explorations Ltd - one office in the capital Kigali - took 





In this period the gorillas were clearly the media stars of Rwanda; gorilla stories appeared in 
travel sections, letters to the editors, film reviews and also in a number of news articles; for 
example, forest fires which threatened the gorillas’ territories in July 1990 were widely 
reported.  As well as the infrequency of Rwanda’s appearances in the press the other notable 
fact is that almost without exception any articles mentioning Rwanda were filed by 
journalists in Kenya, Uganda, or at a desk in London; British journalists did not venture into 
Rwanda before 1990.   
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The Civil War Period – Still no Interest 
 The outbreak of civil war in October 1990 did not fundamentally change the level of 
interest in Rwanda either in the media or in Parliament.  It took until January 1993 for the 
first question on the situation in Rwanda to be tabled in the House of Commons.  In response 
to a question about what the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was doing to aid 
Rwandan refugees, Minister of State Mark Lennox-Boyd confirmed that the UK was doing 
nothing bilaterally.
9
  Similarly two months later Lennox-Boyd confirmed that the UK 
government had made no direct representation to the government of Rwanda over human 
rights abuses in the country, though the EC had made a statement on behalf of its member 
states.
10
  Lennox-Boyd however did continue to suggest that although there was no British 
diplomatic mission in Kigali, the FCO had regular “consultations with EC partners and other 
western countries who have resident representations in Rwanda”.11  Presumably, this meant 
France, Belgium and the US, who all not only had representation in Rwanda, but also had 
observer status at the peace talks in Arusha. 
 However, a statement by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in April 1993 
demonstrates that the government was not completely ignorant of the crisis in Rwanda.  In a 
debate on ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Hurd acknowledged the “atrocious killings, on a much 
larger scale” that were happening in Rwanda; however, at the same time he also referred to 
on-going crises in Cambodia, Angola, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Sudan.
12
  He noted that 
whilst there were numerous humanitarian crises in the world, it was only Bosnia that was 
being widely reported in the British press; he suggested “We [meaning the British public] 
are deeply moved and angered by what has been happening in Bosnia.  Why?  Because it is 
carried day by day and night by night in our newspapers and on our television.”  He 
concluded: 
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Anger and horror are not enough as a basis for decisions.  It is a British 
interest to make a reasoned contribution towards a more orderly and decent 
world.  But it is not a British interest, and it would only be a pretence, to 
suppose that we can intervene and sort out every tragedy which captures 
people's attention and sympathy.  I have never found the phrase ‘something 
must be done’ to be a phrase which carries any conviction in places such as 
the House or the Government where people have to take decisions ... 
Decisions cannot be based either on false analogies or on a desire to achieve 





There was a clear indication in Hurd’s speech that the government’s view was that, contrary 
to the arguments of proponents of the CNN effect such as Bernard Cohen, British 
intervention would not simply be motivated by headlines and that Britain did not have the 
capacity to intervene in all crises.  The intervention in Bosnia was justified, Hurd argued, on 
the grounds that as a European crisis it was relatively local to the UK, but also on the 
grounds that there was a belief that intervention would achieve something:  
From my slight knowledge of the former Yugoslavia, I do not believe that 
hatred and killing are inevitable, somehow irredeemably logged in the history 
books as something that has to happen.  That is not the history of the former 
Yugoslavia.  The killing and hatred will come to an end - perhaps not soon, 





In this one relatively short speech, we have an accurate expression of the government’s view 
of humanitarian intervention and evidence that Peter Jakobsen is perhaps correct to argue 
that the perceived likelihood of success is a, if not the, prime motivator of intervention.
15
 
 The civil war in Rwanda received as little attention in the media as it did in 
Parliament.  The initial RPF invasion in October 1990 was fairly extensively covered, with 
articles appearing in all of the broadsheets.  But it was not until 8 October that the first report 
was actually written by a journalist in Rwanda; for the first week all reports were filed from 
Paris, Brussels or Uganda.
16
  Although at this stage no newspapers spoke of a threat of 
genocide, some reports did recall the horror of previous violence in the country.  For 
example, Catherine Watson writing in The Independent informed readers that the 1959 
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revolution was “a brutal revolt: according to one account the Hutu literally cut their tall and 
elegant Tutsi masters down to size by chopping off their legs at the knee”.17  However, it is 
noticeable that much of the reporting, especially in The Times, focussed not on the actual 
hostilities, but on the French and Belgian efforts to evacuate European nationals.  Similarly 
ITN only reported the outbreak of war once and even then the focus was on the arrival of 
French and Belgian troops in Kigali.
18
 
 Within a fortnight of the invasion though, media interest in Rwanda had again 
waned.  Reporting of the civil war, or Rwanda more generally, again became sporadic and 
cursory.  As Greg Philo argues, as is typical of reporting Africa, the absence of large scale 
conflict or a pressing humanitarian disaster meant that the media attention shifted 
elsewhere;
19
 only The Guardian and The Independent reported the 1990/91 peace 
negotiations.  What limited attention there was on Rwanda, once again, shifted back to 
concern for the gorillas.
20
  Matthew Parris, of The Times, noting the lack of public interest in 
both the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan civil war provided one, slightly tongue in 
cheek, explanation:  
When it comes to interesting the British public in Yugoslavia's constituent 
republics, the main problem is that they have no internationally known 
football teams ... In Rwanda and Burundi the Hutu and the Tutsi have been 
slaughtering each other relentlessly for years without engaging our interest ... 
But none commands the notice that Cameroon will be due, should anything go 





Flippant as it may seem, Parris highlighted the complete lack of public awareness of 
Rwanda; whilst the British public was aware of Cameroon’s footballers, Rwanda had never 
registered in the conscience of the British public or political elite.   
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Whilst there was a steady trickle of newspaper coverage of the crisis throughout 
1992/93, it was almost exclusively in the broadsheet press, and then more particularly in 
what can be described as the more liberally minded press: The Guardian and The 
Independent.  However, as Michael Clarke points out, whilst broadsheets dedicate about 40 
per cent to foreign news, the mid range tabloids dedicate only 15 per cent and the so called 
“red-tops” only five per cent.22  It is therefore no surprise that Rwanda, at this point just 
another guerrilla war in Africa, received such little attention in the popular press; it had not, 
as Lindsey Hilsum suggests, crossed the threshold of significance that would have seen it 
covered in the tabloids.
23
  It is also true to suggest that it would first be entirely possible to 
miss the coverage (articles were often short and relegated to deep inside the newspapers) or 
second to underestimate the severity of the crisis – by June 1992, The Guardian was again 
suggesting Rwanda as a tourist destination.
24
  The press also highlighted that the situation in 
Rwanda was not particularly unique.  Richard Dowden, writing in The Independent noted 
that the end of the Cold War and western calls for democracy were opening up “old 
divisions and local disputes” across Africa, before cataloguing crises in Nigeria, Mali, 
Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Congo.
25
  As The Guardian recorded on 
New Year’s Eve 1992, “large parts of the globe remain plagued by conflict”; of the 25 
conflicts listed in the article, the war in Rwanda was considered the one with most hope of 
being resolved.
26
  The sheer number of potential world crises meant that Rwanda was, as 
Peter Sharp reported on the ITN lunchtime news in May 1993, “virtually unreported” and 
“overshadowed by Bosnia and Somalia”.27 
If the media and parliament were not particularly aware of the situation in Rwanda 
at least some NGOs were.  In 1992 Oxfam commissioned a report on the Rwandan refugees; 
the author warned that “the ... region remains potentially extremely unstable, and ... unless 
                                                          
22 Clarke, British External Policy Making, p.139. 
23 Lindsey Hilsum, “Reporting Rwanda: The Media and the Aid Agencies,” in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide edited by 
Allan Thompson, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), p.176. 
24 Michael Woods, “Travel: Rwanda,” The Guardian, 27 June 1992, p.25. 
25 Richard Dowden, “Africa’s Uneasy Walk to Freedom,” The Independent. 3 February 1992, p.12. 
26 Anon, “The End of History,” The Guardian, 31 December 1992, p.16. 
27 ITN Archives, “Rwanda: Civil War Refugees,” 16 May 1993.   
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serious work is done on all fronts to tackle the ... problems of the region ... the potential for 
further explosive conflict is considerable”. 28   In a second report a year later, Oxfam’s 
representative in Kigali wrote “Rwanda stands on the brink of an unchartered abyss of 
anarchy and violence, and there are all too many historical, ethnic, economic, and political 
pressures that are likely to push it over the edge.”29  Oxfam recorded that at this time no-one 
was interested in the story; in fact they had to employ the, not unusual, tactic of funding 
journalists’ visits to Rwanda just to generate some coverage of the country’s problems.30  
Yet despite these warnings, even Oxfam was not predicting genocide; Anne Mackintosh, at 
the time Oxfam’s representative in Rwanda, states that, whilst she foresaw the resumption of 




Whilst not explicitly predicting genocide, Amnesty International also attempted to 
highlight the increasing ethnic tension in Rwanda in the period from the outbreak of civil 
war right up to the genocide.  For example, on 21 February 1991 an Amnesty statement 
noted “The media in Rwanda is reported to have been advocating revenge and violence 
against the Tutsi.  Hutu vigilantes have been involved in violent attacks on Tutsi.”32  A year 
later they informed members that “since the guerrilla war started in October 1990 several 
thousand Tutsi have been killed by Hutu vigilantes and members of the security forces.”33  
Amnesty recorded this growing ethnic tension throughout 1992 and into 1993, making it 
clear to anyone who read their reports that violence against Tutsi was becoming almost 
institutionalised in Rwanda in this period.  As a result, Amnesty called on the UN to agree a 
more robust mandate for UNAMIR in December 1993; noting the tension in Burundi and the 
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p.470. 
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fragility of the situation in Rwanda, they called on the UN to specifically include protection 
of human rights in the mandate for UNAMIR.
34
  This was ignored by the UN. 
 The UN Security Council discussions on a possible peacekeeping mission for 
Rwanda and the subsequent deployment of UNAMIR largely went unnoticed in the UK; not 
a single question was raised in Parliament relating to the proposed mission.  In fact in the six 
month period from October 1993 to April 1994, which was to prove pivotal on the road to 
genocide, only two questions were asked in Parliament regarding affairs in Rwanda.
35
  
Neither focussed on whether Britain should be doing more or even whether the international 
peacekeeping force should be reinforced or more proactive.   
Deliberations on the deployment of UN troops to Rwanda were similarly absent 
from the press.  In October 1993, rather than Rwanda, the press was more focussed on the 
coup in neighbouring Burundi, which like Rwanda had a volatile ethnic mix of Hutu and 
Tutsi.  Whilst the situation in Rwanda looked relatively calm to outsiders, the assassination 
of the President of Burundi and the subsequent violence looked to be the real story in the 
region.  In a headline that could have been recycled only a few months later with only the 
country changed, Mark Huband wrote “Burundi Bloodbath Runs its Course as West Looks 
On”.36  However, despite the violence in Burundi no-one in the media warned of the risk of 
Rwanda igniting in similar fashion.  George Alagiah for example reported from Burundi for 
the BBC and whilst he admits that given editorial policies it would have been unusual for a 
BBC journalist to make public statements about possible violence, he suggests that no 
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The Genocide Begins: Rwanda Becomes Headline News 
 The shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane finally made Rwanda, literally, headline 
news.  Both The Herald and The Evening Standard led on 7 April with news of the 
assassination of both the Rwandan President and there were two articles in The Times that 
day.
38
  The press, despite previous disinterest in Rwanda, were also quick to highlight the 
risk of violence reigniting.  The Times, for example, told its readers that “UN officials 
expressed fears of an eruption of tribal violence.  Past genocides in the strife-torn central 
African states have resulted in tens of thousands of deaths.”39  The Evening Standard, going 
to print later in the day as it does, was able to report that violence had already broken out in 
Kigali.  The paper also quoted the German Ambassador to Rwanda, who had reported that 
the homes of two German families living in Kigali had been damaged by mortar fire – this 
was the first indication that the story, in the UK press at least, was going to be more about 
the threat to westerners than the deaths of thousands of Rwandans. 
 In the following fortnight four consistent themes characterised the coverage in the 
media.  Firstly, the focus on the threat to westerners in Rwanda continued.  The Times 
reported a “bloodbath in Kigali” and that several Belgian citizens had been killed in the 
fighting;
40
 similarly, The Evening Standard began their coverage by reporting that 90 British 
citizens were at risk in the “war-torn” country.41  By the following day, The Times was 
reporting that “expatriates huddled in their homes, too fearful to venture out” and that 
“foreigners waited anxiously for news of evacuation”.42  The Herald and The Guardian both 
reported on their front pages that the US embassy in Kigali was under attack and that a 
French expatriate couple had been killed in their home.
43
  All of the newspapers dramatically 
reported that French and Belgian paratroopers were “rac[ing] to evacuate westerners from 
                                                          
38 Presumably the news of the crash came in too late for The Independent and The Guardian.  Despite previous interest in 
Rwanda, The Guardian did not report the crash on 7 April and The Independent only had a 29 word report on page 12. 
39 Anon, “Two African Presidents Assassinated,” The Times, 7 April 1994.  
40 Anon, “Rwanda to Halt Attacks on Peacekeepers,” The Times, 8 April 1994. 
41 Chris Adamsom, “The Brutal Struggle in the Dreamland for Tourists,” The Evening Standard, 8 April 1994, p.5.  Again 
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42 James Landale and Lucy Berrington, “Foreigners Await Rescue from Rwandan Ordeal,” The Times, 8 April 1994.  
43 Anon, “Bloodbath in Rwanda,” The Herald, 9 April 1994, p.1.  Lyndsey Hilsum, “Thousands Massacred in Rwanda,” The 
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Rwanda”.44  Similarly the television news concentrated on the plight of westerners; on four 
consecutive nights, beginning 9 April, ITN’s coverage of Rwanda focused on the evacuation 
of expatriates.
45
  Though this is not to say the threat to the locals was ignored completely; on 
10 April Scotland on Sunday informed its readers that the Rwandan mountain gorillas were 
in danger as US zoologists that had been observing them had been evacuated!
46
 
The second theme that the newspapers focussed on was the fact that such violence 
had happened before; the press seemed almost resigned to the fact that tribal violence in 
Rwanda was the norm and should be expected – and accepted.  For John Palmer, in The 
Guardian, there was a “traditional enmity” between Hutu and Tutsi which explained the 
violence.
47
  Robert Block writing in The Independent began an article: 
Since independence from Belgium in 1962, their histories [Rwanda and 
Burundi’s] - inexorably intertwined - have been marked by ethnic hatred and 
tribal violence. Atrocities are so commonplace that a news magazine once 
remarked: ‘Another week, another 300 massacred in Burundi.’ The 






Similarly The Herald noted, “Events in Rwanda and Burundi are extremely ugly. They are 
also acutely depressing, for although the latest incidents have a certain malign individuality 
the reality is that they fit a persistent pattern which now stretches back 30 years.”49  The 
Sunday Times similarly reported that Rwanda had the African “continent’s most savage 
history” continuing that, “the cycle of violence is the result of xenophobia, paranoia and 
geography”.50  The tone of the article was to suggest that this cycle could not be broken.  
This theme came out even stronger on ITN’s coverage.  On 9 April for example John Draper 
reported on the ten o’clock news “There is little hope of peace”51 and the following night 
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“The rival Hutu and Tutsi factions have been in conflict for decades”.52  The ITN coverage 
really did assume there was no hope for Rwanda. 
 The third factor obvious in the press reports is the misinterpretation and confusion of 
events on the ground.  The media’s initial response was to describe the violence in Kigali as 
“anarchy”,53 “random”,54 or “chaos”.55  Such descriptions ignored the highly orchestrated 
nature of the killings.  Whilst some reports identified that the Tutsi were the main victims of 
the violence, there was no underlying recognition that this was an organised attempt to 
destroy the Tutsi population, which was being centrally directed by the government using 
pre-prepared lists of targets.  The witness accounts coming out of Rwanda were also 
confused; the press therefore reported variously that the fighting was between FAR and the 
RPF, was the Presidential Guard responding violently to the death of the President, or was 
being led by civilian militias.  The BBC’s Mark Doyle recalls: 
 I have to admit that during the first few days I, like others, got the story 
terribly wrong.  Down on the ground, up-close – if you could get close enough 
safely enough – it did look like chaos.  I said so.  I used the word chaos.  What 
I could clearly see in the first few days was the shooting war between the RPF 






Because of this, the situation was typically interpreted as a resumption of the civil war, 
rather than as the outbreak of genocide.  In this period, for example, words such as “soldier”, 
“war”, “troops” or “fighting” were three times more prevalent in the press coverage than 
“refugee”, “child”, “civilian” or “victim”.  Not until 12 April did Catherine Bond 
acknowledge in The Times “Although it is impossible for outsiders to identify who is 
murdering who, most of the killing is probably not random but carried out along ethnic and 
political lines.”57  The confusion was also evident on 9 April when a number of papers 
reported a supposed ceasefire between the army and the RPF, quoting UN Security Council 
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President, Colin Keating, as saying the situation in the country was improving.
58
  Yet the 
following day the possibility of “full scale war” was again being reported.59  Certainly the 
reporting concentrated on the war element of the crisis, with most articles reporting the 
movement of the rebel forces from the north and battles between the RPF and FAR.  With 
only a handful of journalists in the country, it is apparent that the news reaching the UK was 
patchy, often second-hand and sometimes contradictory.    
The fourth theme is fairly typical of reporting Africa, and is the press’ tendency to 
illustrate the violence as tribal and savage, with all the connotations that that cliché 
embodies.  The Hutu militia, The Independent told us were armed “with machetes and 
sharpened bamboo spears”,60 the Glasgow Herald wrote of an “orgy of tribal bloodletting”,61 
and The Evening Standard said that “Rwanda with its beautiful, steaming rainforests ... [had] 
a savage history of inter-tribal warfare”.62  ITN, having described the situation as “madness”, 
“tribal slaughter” and “savagery”, even quoted one expatriate as describing Rwandans as 
like “animals ... They kill each other worse than animals.”63  The media representation of the 
crisis was straight out of Tarzan or Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, it was stereotypical 
Africa where savages killed each other all the time.  The media intensified this tribal framing 
by failing to make the coverage at all personal.  At no point were the Rwandan victims given 
names and at no point did the press interview Rwandans; rather they fell back on convenient 
labels of “a Tutsi” or “a Hutu” and as is fairly typical of reporting of Africa took their quotes 
from aid workers, nuns, the UN or fleeing expats;
64
 anyone as long as they were not 
Rwandan or black.   
Although the newspapers might not have accurately reported the crisis or the fact 
that it was Tutsi and opposition politicians that were being deliberately and systematically 
killed, they did graphically report the horror of what was happening.  Mark Huband for 
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example wrote in The Guardian, “In the centre of Kigali, drunken soldiers and gangs of 
youths brandishing machetes manned roadblocks on streets where piles of mutilated corpses 
lay”.65  Catherine Bond, also in Kigali, wrote “Rwandan soldiers bayoneted to death two 
patients at Kigali's central hospital on Monday amid the dying ... At the back of the hospital 
compound about 40 bodies were piled high, rotting in the drizzle.”66  The newspapers also 
were reporting the magnitude of the killings; with the benefit of hindsight they may have 
been under reporting the extent of the crisis at this early stage, but the numbers involved 
were still staggering.  The Guardian reported at least 15,000 killed on 12 April,
67
 on the 
same day The Daily Mail reported up to 20,000 dead,
68
 a figure which was repeated on the 
front page of The Independent the next day.
69
  It was also fairly clear in many of the reports 
a week or more after the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane that the dead were not 
victims of war but were deliberately targeted civilians.  For example, The Daily Mail 
reported on 16 April, “A bloodthirsty mob slaughtered 650 children in a massacre in a 
church in Rwanda, it emerged last night”. 70   Although no papers were yet talking of 
genocide, it was apparent from the press, but only to those who were following the coverage 
closely, that there were two crises in Rwanda – a resumption of the conventional civil war 
and secondly a targeted effort to persecute Tutsi civilians.  In fact on 14 April the Channel 
Four news explicitly acknowledged that “Beside the battle, tribal slaughter goes on with tens 
of thousands dead”.71   
Despite the graphic images there was hardly any suggestion in the press that the 
international community should be doing something; Jakobsen’s description of the 
mechanics of the CNN effect moving from images of atrocities to media condemnation of 
                                                          
65 Mark Huband “French Lead Flight from Rwanda,” The Guardian, 11 April 1994, p.1. 
66 Catherine Bond, “Rebels Advance as Kigali Slaughter Goes On,” The Times, 12 April 1994.  
67 Mark Huband “UN Troops Stand by and Watch Carnage,” The Guardian, 12 April 1994, p.22. 
68 Tony Halpin, “Caught in the Crossfire,” The Daily Mail, 12 April 1994, p.14. 
69 Anon, “Amid Stench of Death, Government Flees as Rebels Close in,” The Independent, 13 April 1994, p.1. 
70 Anon, “Massacre as 650 Children Killed in Church,” The Daily Mail, 16 April 1994, p.2. 
71 ITN Archives, “Belgian Troops to Withdraw,” 14 April 1994. 
101 
 
government inaction does not appear to have been correct in this case.
72
  In an editorial of 11 
April The Times, for example, concluded: 
The anarchy in Rwanda would seem to provide a classic case for armed 
international intervention.  There is a precedent in Somalia.  But the analogy is 
flawed.  There is no method in Rwanda's madness.  It will not be easy for the 
United Nations to act as fireman: a number of fires rage and it is not clear who 
fans the flames.  Which parties would be asked to cease fire against whom?  A 
‘classical’ peacekeeping operation could not be mounted at least not without 
long and careful preparation ... France and Belgium have flown in troops to 
evacuate foreign nationals.  But they cannot cure Rwanda's blood frenzy.  It is 





On the same day The Independent similarly suggested, “The slaughter of Belgian members 
of a United Nations force only highlights the helplessness of the international community.  
In any attempt to rank the world's trouble spots according to their potential to benefit from 
outside help, Rwanda must rank low.” 74   The Herald, although cautioning against 
reinforcing UNAMIR, did go slightly further by suggesting a potential role for the OAU in 
peacekeeping.
75
  Having emphasised the history of violence in Rwanda and by framing it as 
tribal savagery the media seemed to convince themselves of the hopelessness of the 
international community in this particular conflict; from the outset most of the press was 
suggesting that it was up to Rwandans, or wider Africa, to solve the crisis.   
In these first few days only The Guardian suggested that it was wrong of the west to 
accept the inevitability of violence and to avoid becoming involved; instead in a leading 
article the paper called for a more “serious UN peacekeeping effort”.76  Later it condemned 
the UN for failing to instruct UNAMIR to intervene, noting “UNAMIR's weakness and the 
UN's moral failure as it leaves Rwandan staff to the mercy of marauding soldiers have once 
more battered its image”.77  Whilst most of the print media was clearly beginning to angle on 
the urgent need to evacuate westerners and the threat to the UN peacekeepers, The Guardian 
was alone in suggesting, to quote Douglas Hurd, “that something should be done”, and even 
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then not very vigorously and from deep inside the paper rather than loudly from the front 
page.   
This malaise was similarly reflected in the letters pages.  In the period from 7 to 21 
April there were only thirteen readers’ letters published in the broadsheet press.  Of course 
newspaper editors have the power to decide which letters they print and therefore this may 
not be an accurate reflection of the number of letters actually written; but it must be assumed 
that if there had been a deluge of readers’ letters, editors would have felt compelled to 
publish more.  Of the thirteen, only three called for more rigorous UN involvement; one of 
those was from Oxfam and a second from ActionAid.  Whilst two argued that, based on the 
experience of Bosnia, the international community were right to keep out of Rwanda, most 
letters simply did not address the issue of intervention; instead they focussed on the causes 
of the conflict, the FCO’s [mis]management of the evacuation of British citizens or called 
for Rwandans in the UK to be granted asylum.    
If letters to the editor can be taken as a barometer of public interest, however blunt, 
the public was certainly more interested in, or aware of, the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia 
than the events in Rwanda, with letters about Bosnia outnumbering those on Rwanda three 
to one.
78
  There were in fact more letters mourning the death of the American rock-singer 
Kurt Cobain (of Nirvana fame) or about censorship of violent videos.
79
  The evidence of 
letters sent to newspapers seems then to support the claim that the public learn the relative 
importance of issues through the amount of news coverage those issues receive in the 
media.
80
  The lack of coverage of Rwanda, relative to Bosnia, seemed to lead the public to 
conclude Rwanda was a less important issue or at least a crisis for which little could be 
done.   
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Government Intelligence  
In the same way that the media and parliament ignored Rwanda before 1990, the 
FCO also had a marked lack of interest in the country.  In a memo responding to the non-
resident Ambassador’s annual report of 1968 one FCO official wrote: “Admirable though it 
[the annual review] is, both its length and detail are, I submit, greater than Her Majesty’s 
Government’s very minor interest in Rwanda warrants.”81  The fact that there was no British 
ambassador resident in Rwanda meant that intelligence of the country was minimal and FCO 
documents suggest that, at most, diplomatic staff would visit the country once, maybe twice, 
a year.  In 1977, the non-resident Ambassador highlighted that not being present in the 
country meant that “one cannot get the ‘feel’ that comes to any reasonably intelligent 
resident”.  He continued that mail between Kinshasa82 and Rwanda could take as long as a 
year to be delivered, making communication with the country very difficult.
83
  The lack of 
intelligence on the country was highlighted by a short report produced by the FCO African 
Section Research Department in 1977:  
We have little knowledge of Rwanda in the Research Department.  The 
country has no newspapers and we have no post there.  Therefore one can only 
guess from the absence of bad news that the country is peaceful and stable at 





It is no surprise that there was an apparent disinterest in Rwanda in this period.  
There is clear evidence that in the post-independence period, from an FCO perspective at 
least, Africa could be divided into two categories; those countries which had formerly been 
part of the British Empire, and were now members of the Commonwealth, and those 
countries that were Francophone.
85
  Whilst the UK had diplomatic representation (i.e. a High 
Commissioner) in all Commonwealth countries in 1990, diplomatic relations in seventeen of 
the twenty-six Francophone countries were on a non-resident basis.  The bilateral aid figures 
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show a similar situation.  In 1988, for example, British bilateral aid, on a per capita basis, 
averaged £4.79 to Commonwealth countries and only £0.12 to Francophone countries.
86
  
The figures show the same story between 1989 and 1991.  As a Francophone country, 
Rwanda fell into this second tier of African countries – there was no British embassy and it 
was low down on the list of African aid recipients.  As an aside, in 1965 the Rwandan 
government had enquired about the possibility of joining the Commonwealth, mainly with 
the aim of improving relations with its Commonwealth neighbours, Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanzania.  The response of the Commonwealth Relations Office was fairly dismissive, 
noting that there was no British tradition in Rwanda and they “use[d] a different language”; 
instead Rwanda was encouraged to “mend fences” with its Anglophone neighbours.87 
The Civil War Period – Bilateral Relations Unchanged 
Following the outbreak of civil war in October 1990 there appears to have been little 
change in the relationship between Rwanda and the UK.  By this time it was the British High 
Commission in Kampala (Uganda), rather than the Embassy in Zaire, that nominally covered 
Rwanda; but still visits to the country were rare.  As the annual report for 1990 made clear 
“there was little in way of bilateral relations”.88  In terms of trade as well, contact was 
minimal, as Table 1 shows.  Bilateral aid was also minimal, at around £400,000 in 1989/90 
and 1990/91, falling to only £200,000 in 1991/92, and was focussed predominantly on the 
funding of two English language teachers, who left the country after the October invasion.
89
   
Table 1: UK Trade with Rwanda (1990 – 1994) 
 UK Imports from 
Rwanda (£000) 
UK Exports to 
Rwanda (£000) 
1990 2,128 1,915 
1991 2,193 2,333 
1992 2,582 1,552 
1993 1,892 3,337 
1994 1,666 2,542 
Source: Overseas Trade Statistics, HM Revenue & Customs 
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 Between May 1991 and February 1994, the UK did not have an ambassador who 
had presented credentials to the Rwandan government; therefore visits to the country were 
even rarer than usual.  The High Commission in Uganda did maintain telephone contact with 
the few British expats who lived in the country (mainly missionaries), but there is no record 
of what intelligence these calls generated, if any.
90
  There was also an honorary consul 
resident in the country - Tony Woods the owner of a coffee plantation in the country (and 
also Leyton Orient Football Club in the UK).  But despite these small efforts the absence of 
an accredited ambassador combined with the continuing fighting along the Uganda/Rwanda 
border, which made travel between the countries less safe and certainly less easy, meant that 
there was very little firsthand experience or knowledge of the country.  The infrequency of 
travel between the two countries is illustrated by the fact that when making his first visit to 
Rwanda in February 1994 Edward Clay depended on a photocopy of the relevant page of 
The Lonely Planet travel guide to East Africa – Clay did not even have the guide to 
Rwanda!
91
   
 But despite the rarity of visits to Rwanda it is apparent that there was some 
awareness of the violence in Rwanda.  Following a private visit to Rwanda in 1992 an 
official from the British Embassy in The Hague wrote a report of what he had witnessed: 
“Many of the Tutsi villages are now in ruins; huts have been burned and their corrugated 
iron roofs stolen. More seriously, hundreds of Tutsi had been killed, often in extremely 
grisly ways”.92  The report also alluded to the incidents that British expats were witnessing 
and presumably feeding back to the High Commission in Uganda during phone 
conversations.  However, it is not clear to whom this report was circulated and if it had any 
impact on its readers; we can perhaps assume, as Tullock would suggest, this intelligence 
became lost in the bureaucracy of the FCO.
93
  Overall the intelligence of what was 
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happening in Rwanda in 1990 to 1993 seems to have been as limited as it was in the 1960s 
to 1980s. 
Intelligence from Uganda 
Whilst links with Rwanda were weak and there was limited direct intelligence in this 
period, Britain’s relationship with, and presence in, neighbouring Uganda was strong.  This 
leads to the inevitable question of how much intelligence the UK had on Rwanda through its 
presence in Uganda.  There is some evidence of direct contact between the RPF and the 
High Commission in Kampala but this appears to have been minimal and came only after the 
October invasion.  On 27 November 1990 two representatives of the RPF visited the High 
Commission and met with the First Secretary and the Defence Attaché.  The record of the 
meeting, as sent to the FCO and copied to the MOD and Cabinet Office, indicates that this 
was the first meeting between the parties.  The discussions covered the RPF’s thinking on 
the historical background to the invasion and their objectives, which were said to be to 
achieve a peaceful settlement with President Habyarimana.  However, there is a suggestion 
that the RPF’s relationship with the UK was not that close; the confidential memorandum 
recorded, for example, that:  
They [the RPF representatives] assured us that they could find adequate 
volunteers, funds and logistical support to continue fighting in Rwanda for a 
considerable time ... [But] they would not be drawn on their sources of 





Whilst the First Secretary suggested that there were benefits in maintaining low level contact 
with the RPF, given their future “potential importance in Rwanda”,95 no pledges or promises 
of support or aid were given to the two representatives.   
The First Secretary met with the two representatives again on 6 December 1990 (the 
Military Attaché is not recorded as having attended this second meeting), this time to discuss 
the results of negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda.  In response to 
                                                          




the question of the UK’s attitude towards the conflict, the First Secretary records his 
response as: 
 We had no close historical connections with Rwanda and could not see 
anything that we could usefully do at the moment.  In any case, Rwanda was 





This second meeting so soon after the first though worried the FCO back in London: 
 Given that two meetings took place within 10 days we believe there is a risk 
that RPF may draw the wrong conclusion about the extent of our interest and 
willingness to become involved in the conflict (not withstanding Smith’s clear 
statement of our position at the second meeting).  We therefore think it wiser 
if you were to decline any early request for a third meeting and let several 





Throughout 1991 and 1992 the FCO continued to monitor the on-going attempts at peace 
negotiations both through the High Commission in Kampala and also the High Commission 
in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), which commented on the discussions being held at Arusha.  
However, the infrequency of the memos sent back to London, and the nature of the 
conversations with RPF representatives, suggests that the conflict was not viewed with any 
high priority, even amongst the High Commission staff in Kampala let alone FCO officials 
in Whitehall.   
 Finally in this period, it could be suggested that the High Commission in Kampala 
should have been aware of the potential for the refugee problem in the south of the country 
to lead to violence in Rwanda.  However, whilst it is the case that the High Commission was 
aware of a refugee problem in southern Uganda, this was only one of many internal issues 
facing the government of Uganda.  In the years before the RPF invasion there was also 
fighting in the north and east of Uganda, which caused refugee problems at least as 
significant as the problem of the Rwandans in the south.  After October 1990 the High 
Commission acknowledged that something needed to be done about the refugees camped in 
the south, but before then Rwandan refugees do not seem to have been a major cause for 
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concern.  Nor is there any evidence that the officials from Kampala visited the refugee 
camps or discussed the issue of Rwandan refugees with the Ugandan government. 
UNAMIR Deployed: Some First Hand Intelligence 
The deployment of UNAMIR from October 1993 onwards did not alter the nature of 
the relationship between the UK and Rwanda – it remained a country of limited interest to 
the British, but soon after UNAMIR deployed Edward Clay made his first visit to Rwanda.  
Recording his visit of February 1994, Clay wrote to the FCO, “The accreditation to Kigali of 
the first British ambassador for nearly three years may have raised hopes about closer British 
involvement in and aid to Rwanda.  I hope I dispelled these.”98  The accreditation of an 
ambassador however did mean that London received some eye witness intelligence on the 
country, the first for a while. 
Clay visited Rwanda from 22 to 25 February; in that three day visit he saw for 
himself what was happening in Rwanda and his observations were fed back to London in 
two reports.    He began the first of these: 
 Political impasse continues in Rwanda.  Most serious danger-point last week 
now passed, but tension remains high.  Habyarimana both the key and a major 
impediment to implementation of the Arusha Accords.  No other options than 





   
Whilst the emphasis of the reports was on the political situation Clay could not avoid 
mentioning the intermittent violence which by this point was spreading across the country.  
The report emphasized the ubiquity of road blocks and soldiers across the country and 
recorded that during his visit “individual killings, allegedly mostly Tutsi, numbered between 
30 and 50 dead”.100  However, he continued “it would be dangerous and unwise to try to 
ascribe responsibility for these killings”.  The overriding message coming out of these two 
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reports, presumably the first received in London for a number of years, was that the 
resumption of civil war looked likely; Clay went as far as to suggest that an RPF statement 
of 23 February, attacking Habyarimana, amounted to a declaration of war.  He recorded that 
there was limited hope of a peace settlement and that the return of Tutsi refugees to Rwanda 
was unrealistic.  The only option available to the international community, he repeated, was 
to keep the pressure on both sides to implement the Arusha Accords; however, in the 
meantime he suggested “it would be useful to get firm confirmation that the Belgians would 
be responsible for evacuating our citizens, if it came to that.”101 
 A final source of intelligence that was allegedly available to the British officials at 
the UN were the communications between the UN’s Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and General Dallaire in Kigali.  Although these cables were supposed to 
be private and not shared with Security Council members, Linda Melvern claims that the UK 
mission had access to them and was therefore more informed about the impending crisis 
than has been publicly acknowledged.
102
  However, David Hannay, Britain’s ambassador to 
the UN, categorically denies that he ever saw the correspondence, but accepts that other 
officials may have without his knowledge.
103
  It would seem odd though if the British 
mission had access to the cables that they would not be shared with the Permanent 
Representative.  Nor is there any public evidence that the cables or even their contents were 
fed back to Whitehall; none of the correspondence between London and New York, released 
under FoI, make reference to anything that appears to have come from Dallaire’s cables.  
One senior FCO official based in London at the time, but who was in regular contact with 
Hannay, certainly makes it clear that they never saw any of Dallaire’s correspondence, 
stating that they were not even aware of the existence of the infamous “genocide fax” until a 
number of years later.
104
  Interestingly the Czech Ambassador to the Security Council in 
1994, Karel Kovanda, claims that Dallaire’s cables were shared with the US, France and 
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Belgium; he makes no mention of the UK.
105
  It is not, however, beyond the realms of 
imagination that the cables could have been intercepted by the British Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6) or leaked to a British official either by a UN official or someone in the US 
mission who allegedly had access to the cables – such claims are at the believable end of 
espionage conspiracy theories.   
 If we accept for a moment that the UK did have access to Dallaire’s cables, Melvern 
claims that they would have read “increasingly desperate warnings of an impending 
calamity”.106  Certainly Dallaire claims that throughout this period he sent “very detailed 
sitreps, special incident reports and periodic and military assessments”.107  Of the Dallaire 
cables the one that has become the most infamous is the so called “Genocide Fax” of 11 
January.  In brief, in this cable Dallaire told how UNAMIR had been approached by a Hutu 
informant who claimed that a massacre of Tutsi was being planned and that the militia in 
Kigali had the capacity to kill over 1,000 civilians in twenty minutes.  Dallaire finished by 
asking for permission to raid an arms depot in Kigali identified by the informant.  The cable 
has been named the “Genocide Fax” as it allegedly foretold the genocide that broke out three 
months later.  However, the importance of this cable, in terms of British intelligence, must 
not be overstated for two reasons.  First, it did not predict genocide.  It claimed that the Hutu 
were training militias who could carry out attacks on Tutsi civilians in Kigali - this is not the 
same as genocide, the systematic and intentional attempt to kill an entire ethnic group.  
Secondly, in breach of all UN etiquette Dallaire sent this cable directly to General Maurice 
Baril, a fellow Canadian and the military adviser to DPKO, rather than to the civilian DPKO 
staff as would be usual.
108
   Even if the FCO did have access to routine cables, and it seems 
unlikely it did, it is  even less likely that they would have seen this one sent in an unusual 
manner as it was.  Karel Kovanda, one of the more forceful advocates of intervention on the 
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The Genocide Begins: Border with Uganda Closes 
 The morning after Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, Clay sent a report to 
London; its contents appear to have shaped the British response, certainly for the next few 
weeks: 
 The situation in Kigali meantime appears to be calm.  We have spoken to our 
honorary consul. He and Kanyarushoke [the Rwandan Ambassador to 
Uganda] both spoke of there having been some prolonged periods of shooting. 
But Kanyarushoke believes this was the Presidential Guard reacting 





The memo suggested that rather than responding to an outbreak of violence against civilians 
the priority for all parties was to move urgently towards the swearing in of the transitional 
government as agreed at Arusha.  The Clay memo of 7 April therefore focused on the 
political problems and highlighted the need for a political solution, led by the Rwandans 
themselves.  From this point on the High Commission in Uganda ceased to be an effective 
source of information - the border between Uganda and Rwanda was closed and the only 
British official left in the country, honorary consul Tony Wood was unable to provide any 
valuable intelligence.  Wood was evacuated on 12 April, after having been “under siege in 
the capital with just two watchmen and parrots for company”111 and despite his best efforts 
was unable to communicate effectively with the outside world because of the failure of 
Kigali’s telephone system.112  By 13 April, the High Commission was completely reliant on 
the unarmed observers of the UN observer mission, UNOMUR, which patrolled the Uganda/ 
Rwanda border for any information; as Clay recognised on 12 April in a memo to London, 
“These sitreps are very indirect and necessarily out of date”.113  The FCO was now reliant on 
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third party sources for its intelligence on what was happening in Rwanda; this appears to 
have come from the media, from allied countries (especially Belgium) and from the UN 
Secretariat. 
The Government Response 
 As noted above, the British government simply did not respond to the outbreak of 
civil war in 1990.  In fact the government had no practical involvement in the crisis until it 
was brought to the attention of the UN Security Council in 1993.  In this period up to 21 
April the Security Council made two key decisions relating to the crisis; first the decision to 
deploy a UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) and then secondly the decision, taken at the 
end of April 1994, to partially withdraw UNAMIR, leaving only a rump in Kigali to 
facilitate, what proved to be unsuccessful, ceasefire negotiations.  Other than a limited role 
in the evacuation of British expats in April, Britain’s involvement in these two UN Security 
Council resolutions was the extent of the official involvement in the crisis in this period. 
Britain’s Role in the Decision to Deploy UNAMIR 
 On 22 June 1993 the Security Council approved the establishment of the United 
Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) which was tasked with observing 
the Uganda/Rwanda border to ensure no military aid, intended for the RPF, crossed it.
114
  
UNAMIR was then established by Resolution 872 on 5 October.  The UK’s role in the 
debates surrounding these two missions appears to have been minimal. 
 David Hannay records a distinct lack of enthusiasm amongst Security Council 
members for the proposed peacekeeping mission in September 1993, suggesting that some 
members (not named) believed the mission “had been landed on the UN’s doorstep without 
adequate preparation or consideration”.115  The Arusha Accords had after all only been 
signed in August and UNAMIR was approved and deployed by the end of October; Dallaire 
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notes that this compares well to other UN missions which typically took six months or more 
from mandate to deployment;
116
 in the case of MINURSO (the UN Mission to Western 
Sahara in 1991) for example only a handful of observers were on the ground with limited 
logistical support five months after the mission was approved.
117
   To approve and launch a 
mission as quickly as UNAMIR was therefore unprecedented.  Hannay continues, however, 
that it was pressure from the French, as well as support from other African nations, that 
pushed through the resolution and eventually compelled the Security Council to authorise 
the mission.  In an interview with the author, Hannay stated: 
The French had got themselves trapped [in Rwanda].  They wanted their troops 
out, but did not want the Habyarimana regime to collapse ... Undoubtedly it was 
the French who pushed for UNAMIR ... We went along with the original 
decision with some reluctance but we supported our French allies.
118
   
 
 
A US report on the draft wording of Resolution 872 similarly makes the point that it was the 
French pushing hardest for a mandate for a UN force.
119
  In fact the French insistence on the 
need for a peacekeeping mission became so intense that one ambassador to the Security 
Council remembers it “becoming a standing joke in the Council”.120   
 Despite the suggestions that the UK opposed the mission because of cost 
considerations there is no publicly available evidence to support such a claim.  Rather 
UNAMIR was kept small for three reasons.  Karel Kovanda records that:  
UNAMIR was not very big, and its members were lightly armed; their 
mandate was rather weak.  All this followed from the view of the UN 
Secretariat (with which the Security Council agreed at the time) that the 
toughest part was to get the parties to actually reach an agreement; putting it 
into effect was not expected to be too much of a problem.
121
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The mandate was therefore based on the assumption of consensus between the two warring 
parties; there was no provision for protecting civilians in the mandate, or deploying a heavily 
armed UN force, as this was not deemed to be necessary.  As one FCO official close to the 
debates suggests, Rwanda was viewed as a potentially model peacekeeping mission; there 
was a generally accepted peace settlement and a plan on how to achieve this.
122
  The size of 
the mission was in fact similar to UN observer missions launched in the early 1990s; the 
authorised strength of UNAMIR was 2,500, which compares favourably to the UN Mission 
for the Referendum in Western Sahara (2,500), UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 
(1,000), UN Observer Group in Central America (1,000) and UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer 
Mission (1,200).
123
   Whilst UNAMIR was mandated to do more than observe, a force of 
2,500 seemed sufficient given the size of the country.  However, as with many other UN 
missions the force never actually got up to authorised size and suffered from poor logistical 
support.
124
  It is only with the benefit of hindsight though that the force sent to Rwanda looks 
inadequate. 
The second reason for UNAMIR’s size was the fact that there was genuine concern 
amongst Security Council members, particularly the UK, New Zealand and Russia, about 
UN overstretch.  There had been a rapid expansion in the number of UN missions and the 
number of troops deployed.  As Norrie MacQueen highlights in this period, the UN was 
already heavily committed in Bosnia and Somalia and was also under pressure from the US 
to authorise a mission to Haiti and from Russia to authorise a mission to Georgia.
125
  Some 
Security Council members, Hannay suggests the UK included, were therefore sincerely 
asking whether the UN infrastructure was adequate to cope with this expansion.  For 
example, at the time DPKO was not staffed on a 24 hour basis.  A CIA briefing paper, 
prepared on 1 October 1993, reflected this concern, “The international relief system, already 
under severe strain, faces burgeoning demands in the future.  The resources of the US and 
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other donors will be spread more thinly and donors will have to be more selective about 
which crises it addresses.”126  For this reason the automatic approval of a mission, however 
worthy, was not guaranteed. 
The third reason related to fears for the safety of UN personnel.  Resolution 872 was 
issued only days after “the battle of Mogadishu” in which 18 US Rangers were killed, and 
after 24 Pakistani soldiers had been killed also in Somalia in June 1993.   The UK, US and 
Russia in particular showed real concern about the potential risk to UN troops being 
deployed; Russia and the UK therefore insisted on a reference to UN Security Council 
Resolution 868 being made in the Rwanda resolution.  Conscious of a number of attacks on 
UN peacekeepers, 868, which had been passed on 29 September 1993, essentially implied 
that UN troops would be withdrawn from any mission where their safety could not be 
ensured.
127
  Despite claims that the two warring parties in Rwanda were supportive of a UN 
mission, the British contingent at the UN was cautious and demanded wording in the 
resolution that allowed for the review of the mission’s performance.  If there was no sign of 
progress or of a threat to the UN peacekeepers the British, from the outset, wanted the right 
to withdraw the mission. 
By the time of the 5 April debate on renewing the mandate, whilst the UN 
Secretariat recommended the maximum extension of six months, Security Council members 
were not keen to grant this; the US for example, made it clear that they wanted the extension 
to be as short as possible; their opening suggestion was one month.
128
  Since October, reports 
to the Security Council had emphasised the lack of progress in implementing the Arusha 
Accords; consequently, Hannay recalls a real “feeling of impatience” amongst Security 
Council members.
129
  The Council eventually compromised on an extension of the mandate 
to 29 July; however, it agreed that UNAMIR should be withdrawn after six weeks if further 
progress had not been made in the implementation of the Accords and Hannay’s speech to 
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the Council during this debate suggests the UK supported this.  Again this decision was not 
led by concerns over cost, but rather from a belief that UNAMIR was not achieving its 
objectives.  Even at this stage, there was a general belief that the crisis could only be solved, 
long term, by the Rwandans themselves. 
Britain Opposes Withdrawal of UNAMIR  
 On 21 April Security Council Resolution 912 was published.  Through it the 
Security Council members declared that they were “appalled at the large scale violence in 
Rwanda” and “deeply concerned by the continuing fighting, looting, banditry and 
breakdown of law and order, particularly in Kigali”.130  Yet whilst they “condemned” the 
violence against Rwandan civilians, they “strongly condemned” (emphasis added) the 
violence against UNAMIR, which was a breach of “international humanitarian law”.  The 
outrage against the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers and ongoing mortar attacks on the 
UN headquarters in Kigali was one of the main factors that led to the decision to withdraw a 
large section of UNAMIR, and the UK was instrumental in the making of this decision.  
 The Security Council’s first response to the renewed violence was to issue a 
Presidential Statement on 7 April, which expressed concern about the loss of life amongst 
civilians, opposition politicians and particularly the UN peacekeepers.  It called on the 
Secretary General to collect all available information and report to the Council as soon as 
possible.
131
  This report was formally made on 20 April, but in the meantime the Security 
Council had been presented with two other pieces of information.  On 13 April the Belgian 
Permanent Representative wrote to the Security Council, informing the Council of 
Belgium’s decision to withdraw its troops from UNAMIR.  The letter argued that with 
“widespread massacres” and “chaos” in the country, the implementation of the Accords was 
seriously jeopardised and therefore Belgium called for the entire UNAMIR operation to be 
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  Then on 14 April, following an official complaint from the UK that the 
Secretariat was not providing the Council with sufficient information, the officials from the 
DPKO suggested to the Security Council that there were two possible options for UNAMIR; 
either withdraw immediately and fully, or alternatively leave UNAMIR in Rwanda for three 
weeks longer to determine whether there was any prospect of a ceasefire.  If we assume that 
the UK had access to Dallaire’s cables back to the DPKO, as discussed above, the UK may 
also have seen a cable dated 19 April which argued against the withdrawal of UNAMIR: 
 The consequences of withdrawal by UNAMIR will definitely have an adverse 
affect [sic] on the morale of the civilian population, especially the refugees, 
who will feel that we are deserting them.  However, in actual fact, there is little 
that we are doing at the present time except providing security, some food and 






Even if the UK mission did not see this cable, it seems likely that based on the information 
they did have, they also concluded that UNAMIR was achieving little.  It was not therefore a 
surprise that on 20 April the Secretary General presented three options to the Security 
Council; increase UNAMIR and strengthen the mandate, reduce the force to circa 250 
personnel focussed on achieving a ceasefire, or withdraw completely.
134
  In fact Hannay had 
informally suggested the very same options to the Security Council in a discussion on the 
escalating violence over a week earlier. 
The Security Council was not initially unanimous on the eventual decision to 
partially withdraw UNAMIR.  On 13 April Nigeria presented a draft resolution to the 
Council on behalf of the Non-Aligned Caucus advocating a strengthening of UNAMIR.  
However, the loudest, and most powerful, voice on the Council, that of the US, was calling 
for a full and immediate withdrawal.  With violence flaring up across the country and the 
death of the Belgian peacekeepers the Clinton Administration immediately foresaw another 
Somalia.  Viewing the events in Rwanda through a Somali lens the fear of another 
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Mogadishu terrified American decision makers.  Combining this with the apparent lack of 
hope of achieving a ceasefire, the State Department concluded that UNAMIR was achieving 
nothing other than endangering the lives of the peacekeepers, it must therefore be 
withdrawn.  Instructions were sent to the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, on 
15 April:  
Department has considered the prospect of additional wide scale conflict and 
violence in Rwanda, and the threat ... to remaining foreign civilian and 
military personnel ... Taking these factors into account Department believes 
that there is insufficient justification to retain a UN peacekeeping presence in 
Rwanda and that the international community must give highest priority to 





With no peace to keep and the violence increasing, the White House saw the inevitable 
failure of UNAMIR as a threat to the reputation of UN peacekeeping.  Another failed 
mission, so soon after failure in Somalia, would, they suggested, be fatal to the concept of 
UN peacekeeping.   
 The British on the other hand, whilst not supporting the reinforcement of UNAMIR 
or maintenance of the status quo, did not support full withdrawal.  The UN Secretariat 
recorded that the UK responded to Nigeria’s preference for Option One, reinforcement of 
UNAMIR, by stating that the option “was not feasible because of the lessons drawn from 
Somalia that conditions on the ground could evolve rapidly and dangerously”. 136  
Intelligence from Belgium was also likely to have informed this decision.  As well as the 
letter sent to the Security Council which warned that there was no chance of a ceasefire, the 
Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes had telephoned Hurd directly to explain why Belgium 
was withdrawing its troops.
137
  Hurd does not record the content of this call, but we can 
safely assume that having made the decision to withdraw, Claes would have been keen to 
paint as dark a picture as possible of the situation in Rwanda, so as to lessen any criticism of 
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its decision.  Karel Kovanda recalls that a similar call was made to the Czech Foreign 
Ministry in Prague, and confirms that Claes did very much argue for the full withdrawal of 
UNAMIR.
138
  The British also appear to have been realistic about the likely success of 
option one.  David Hannay, for example, recalls that there were “quite compelling” military 
arguments against launching a full Chapter VII peace enforcement mission; these included 
the fact that the UN did not control Kigali airport, the only rapid route of access into 
Rwanda, and that “in the aftermath of the debacle in Mogadishu” there were no willing troop 
contributing nations.
139
  Support of the “reinforce and strengthen” option would, at this time 
have, realistically, been futile; even if the Security Council had overridden the US 
objections, there was simply no country willing to provide troops.  For these reasons the UK 
rejected option one. 
 However, whilst the UK did not support efforts to reinforce UNAMIR, it is clear 
that the British, unlike the US, opposed the option of full withdrawal.  Whereas the US 
delegation at the Security Council argued that anything short of full withdrawal risked the 
reputation of the UN, the British maintained that a full withdrawal would instead highlight 
the impotence of UN peacekeeping.  In direct contradiction to the US view, Hannay 
therefore argued at the Security Council that to withdraw completely would harm the 
reputation of the UN and would actually worsen the situation on the ground.  Hannay recalls 
how he was approached by Madeleine Albright before the vote on Resolution 912: 
 In the margins of the first consultation I was approached by Madeleine 
Albright.  She said her instructions were to propose the immediate withdrawal 
of the peacekeeping force, its whole rationale and mandate having been 
invalidated.  What did I think?  I said I thought that would really not do. The 
peacekeeping force might not be able to carry on with its original mandate, but 
it might be able to perform some humanitarian tasks and to save lives.  The 
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Despite not fully appreciating the situation in Rwanda, the British appreciated that UNAMIR 
was doing key, if limited, work in protecting civilians in a handful of sites across Kigali and 
that more significantly UNAMIR was uniquely placed to negotiate between the warring 
parties.  Already the British view appears to have been that the only way to stop the violence 
was by the two sides implementing the Arusha Accords and this was more likely with a UN 
presence in the country; this of course reflected the message that the FCO had received from 
Edward Clay on 7 April.  In New York, the British view won out.  Albright, bypassing the 
State Department, phoned a senior official at the National Security Council: “I first asked 
them for more flexible instructions, then yelled into the phone, demanding them”. 141  
Albright eventually voted in favour of a partial, rather than full and immediate, withdrawal.  
Mark Curtis’ suggestion that the British mission to the UN is little more than a puppet of the 
US seems, in this case at least, to not hold up to the evidence.
142
 
The Ignorant Bystander? 
 Having reviewed the press coverage and the government response, we turn now to a 
discussion of three questions that inform the debate on British responsibility.  These are: did 
the UK support the RPF in the war; in this period was the UK aware of the “genocide”; and 
could the UK have done more to prevent or stop the genocide?  These three questions 
directly address Daniela Kroslak’s considerations of responsibility discussed earlier: how 
much did the bystander know, were they involved and what capabilities did they have to 
intervene? 
Support for the RPF 
Claims that the UK and US were more closely aligned with the RPF than publicly 
acknowledged have been present from the time of the crisis itself and recently have been 
revisited by Hazel Cameron.
143
  Cameron suggests that in October 1990 “the order for 
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aggression against [Rwanda] was made with the full knowledge and approval of the British 
intelligence services” and that “the evidence available to date infers a degree of complicity 
in the crimogenic [sic] behaviour of the guerrilla force of the RPF until 1994”.144  This 
general theory is based on two underlying assumptions: firstly the RPF was dependent upon 
the government of Uganda and secondly that the UK and US both had a strong presence in 
Uganda and must therefore have been close to the Anglophone RPF.  Throughout the crisis 
many in the French political elite, including President Mitterrand, also believed that the RPF 
invasion of Rwanda was an Anglo-Saxon plot to evict France from Africa – a proxy war 
between client armies, the RPF supported by Britain and America, the FAR by France.
145
  It 
was not just the French who thought this though; Adelman claims that the Canadian Foreign 
Minister visited the FCO in 1992, to confront Britain over Uganda’s support of the RPF.  
Clearly the Canadians also believed that the UK had some degree of influence over Uganda 
and therefore the RPF.
146
   
In terms of actual evidence, a key plank of this argument is the fact that Major Paul 
Kagame the leader of the RPA, as well as other RPA commanders, received training from 
the British and American militaries prior to 1990.
147
  However, as prior to the 1990 invasion 
these men were senior officers in the Ugandan army that is not a surprise.
148
  The MOD, for 
example, ran a number of Junior Command and Staff courses for the Ugandan army in Jinja 
in south Uganda in the late 1980s – one course was even running at the time of the 1990 
invasion.
149
  Additionally seven members of the Ugandan army attended courses at the 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the British army’s officer training college, prior to 1990 
and one attended army staff college in the UK.
150
  Although there are no records of who 
attended these various courses, it is seems feasible, given the senior positions they held in 
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the Ugandan military, that amongst the trainees were a number of Rwandans who would 
later held positions in the RPF.  As Lt. Colonel Mike Wharmby, the officer who commanded 
British troops deployed to Rwanda in July 1994, noted “RPF soldiers and officers held 
themselves and behaved in a manner which demonstrated their professionalism and 
suggested they had received training from western militaries.”151   
However, there is no suggestion that the UK viewed this training as being provided 
to a rebel army; rather correspondence between Kampala and London shows that the training 
provided to the Ugandan army was seen as a way of strengthening the relationship between 
Uganda and the UK.  For example, MOD records do not show any ethnic Rwandans as 
having been at Sandhurst; whilst some of the seven officers trained in the UK may have 
actually been exiled Rwandans, they were recorded as being Ugandan and the training was 
made available in their capacity as members of the Ugandan army not in their capacity as 
members of a rebel army.  Despite Hazel Cameron and Alaine Destexhe’s attempts to 
portray the relationship between the UK and the RPF as sinister, this was training being 
provided to an allied government with historic links to the UK and it fitted into a perfectly 
normal pattern of providing training to Commonwealth armies; it was not training being 
deliberately provided to a rebel army.  It is also apparent that it was not just the British and 
US who were providing training to the Ugandan army; in 1989 there were military training 
teams from Libya, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and Tanzania in the country and 
Ugandans also travelled to India, Cuba and Zimbabwe for training.
152
 
A number of inferences with regard to Britain’s role in Uganda can also be drawn 
from declassified US intelligence documents.  The CIA, drawing on information from the 
Defence Intelligence Agency, which is known to have had agents in Uganda throughout the 
1990 to 1994 period, stated as early as 5 October 1990 that FAR had “foreign support”, yet 
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at this early stage there was no mention of foreign support for the RPF.
153
   However, by 12 
December 1990 the CIA was suggesting that “Libya may have provided financial and 
military support to ethnic Tutsi rebels who invaded Rwanda from Uganda in early 
October”.154  Given the fact that the British government was at this time accusing Colonel 
Gaddafi of supporting international terrorism, including the IRA in Northern Ireland, and of 
having planned the Lockerbie bombing, it seems highly unlikely that they would have 
supported a rebel group which appears to have had links with Libya.  In none of the CIA 
documents released, many of which were at the time top secret and restricted to US eyes 
only, does the intelligence agency suggest that the UK had any role in the conflict.  This is 
despite fairly blunt assessments of the French, Belgian and Ugandan involvement in the 
crisis.   
Nor can the claim that the British supported the RPF be accepted blindly without 
testing the motivation of any alleged support.  As noted above Britain really had no interest 
– economic, historic, cultural or strategic – in Rwanda in 1990; in fact both the FCO and 
Cabinet Office had previously been very hostile to the idea of Rwanda joining the 
Commonwealth, which would have brought the two countries closer.  Why then would the 
British support the invasion of a country that had nothing to offer?  A possible explanation, 
given the UK’s close relationship with the Ugandan government, would be to ease the 
refugee crisis in southern Uganda.  However, this explanation cannot be accepted for three 
reasons.  Firstly, the easiest way to solve the refugee crisis would have been through 
diplomatic channels; yet there is no evidence of the British supporting this.  Secondly, it 
would have been obvious to anyone that a Tutsi invasion of Rwanda threatened to unsettle 
the whole region (especially Burundi); certainly a regional war raged for a number of years 
after the events of 1994.  Why would the UK risk sparking a regional war just to resolve a 
relatively minor refugee problem in which it had shown no previous interest?  And finally, 
the British government was clearly sensitive about its relationship with the government of 
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Uganda.  In this period there was an embargo on selling lethal equipment to Uganda and in 
1991 an approach from the Ugandan government to provide military training to game 
rangers was rejected “on the grounds that it might be seen as UK connivance in the training 
of guerrillas”.155  With such evident caution, it would be hard to accept that the British 
government knowingly supported the RPF. 
The conspiracy theory also ignores the above evidence that the High Commission 
staff in Uganda had only a very tentative relationship with the RPF.  The FCO also claim 
that no requests for aid, equipment, assistance or arms were ever received from the RPF;
156
 
in fact all photographs of RPF soldiers show them carrying Kalashnikov rifles and wearing 
distinctive East German army camouflage clothing, items more likely to have been 
purchased on the black market than supplied by the British.
157
  The theory also ignores all of 
the above evidence of ignorance of Rwanda amongst FCO staff.  It is of course impossible to 
completely rule out a claim that a small element of MI6, perhaps a single agent, was more 
closely aligned to the RPF than we will ever know; but even if this were the case this is not 
indicative of official support of the rebels.  Suggestions that the British military or 
intelligence agencies in Uganda were deliberately and malevolently aligned with the RPF 
are not convincing – this was not, as President Mitterrand might have thought, a proxy war 
between Britain and France fought out between the RPF and the Rwandan government. 
Finally and most significantly, even if one does accept the rather circumstantial 
evidence of high level British support, it must never be forgotten that the RPF did not carry 
out the genocide; the genocide was perpetrated by the Rwandan government.  Even, if 
against the evidence, we accept for a moment that the British provided aid to the RPF and 
trained its soldiers and that MI6 agents worked with Paul Kagame, those facts in no way 
incriminate the British government in the perpetration of genocide.  The RPF, like the wider 
world, was shocked by the genocide and certainly did not intend the invasion to trigger such 
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wide spread killing.  Cameron’s suggestion then that the British government was complicit 
in the genocide because of its close relationship with the RPF seems difficult to sustain. 
What Genocide? 
 Before 21 April no-one in the British political elite had publicly described the events 
in Rwanda as genocide, but in this period could, or should, the government have been more 
aware of what was happening?  In terms of determining when the government became aware 
that the events constituted genocide there are two relevant factors that have to be considered.  
Firstly, Rwanda as a country was not important from a British perspective; it would have 
therefore been especially hard for events in the “small country far away” to register with 
British decision makers.  Secondly, the intelligence that the British had was not sufficient to 
lead anyone to firstly predict the genocide before it began, or to identify it once it had 
broken out. 
Although many would argue being busy, or focussed elsewhere, does not absolve an 
individual or a government from their responsibility to intervene in an emergency, it is a 
factor that pragmatically must be acknowledged.  Clearly in this period the growing crisis in 
Rwanda was only one of a multitude of international crises.  As Madeleine Albright records 
in her memoirs what, with the benefit of hindsight can, be seen as warnings of impending 
genocide:  
had to compete for attention against an avalanche of other information from 
crisis spots around the globe.  At the time, there were clashes or extreme 
tensions in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Angola, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Sudan, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well 






In addition to this long list of international crises which were all competing for 
attention and limited resources, the British government faced a number of significant 
domestic issues all more significant and more urgent than the growing crisis in Rwanda – as 
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Michael Heseltine states in his autobiography, in spring and summer 1994 “the 
government’s problems” including leadership rumours and euro scepticism “continued 
unabated”.159  For example, in an interview with Anthony Seldon, John Major recalled that 
he was spending at least 15 per cent of his time on Irish affairs (in February 1994 Gerry 
Adams, the leader of the IRA had been granted a visa to visit the US and in March the IRA 
attacked Heathrow airport).
160
  Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, and the 
MOD were focussed on firstly the deployment in Bosnia, where an additional 900 British 
troops were sent in March 1994, and secondly on the preparation of the Frontline First 
Defence Review which was published in the second half of 1994.
161
  At the FCO, Hurd was 
dealing not only with the crisis in Bosnia and the impact this was having on Anglo-
American relations, but also with the highly controversial debates over the new voting 
methodology to be adopted by the soon to be enlarged European Union.  Hurd, and the other 
FCO ministers, obviously were also expected to travel extensively making it even harder to 
keep up to date with the fast moving events in Rwanda; at the time Habyarimana’s plane 
was shot down, for example, Hurd was on a five day tour of Brazil and the Falklands.
162
 
As well as these specific issues that were monopolising ministers’ attention it is 
apparent that the Foreign Secretary particularly faces a huge workload that means in practice 
they personally cannot focus on every international issue.  During his brief spell as Foreign 
Secretary John Major revealed to his eventual successor Douglas Hurd: 
I can’t do this job as it should be done, it is impossible.  There’s a world full of 
150 countries, always exploding into bits and pieces, there are boxes full of 






Whilst wading through what former Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe believed was four 
tonnes of paperwork per year, 
164
 it is easy to see how a Foreign Secretary could miss, or pay 
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scant attention, to a crisis in a remote central African country, unless it was specifically 
brought to his attention.  That said, as John Dickie explains there are over 3,000 members of 
staff at the FCO in London, responsible for monitoring the world and briefing the Foreign 
Secretary accordingly.
165
  However, despite these legions of civil servants, Dickie 
acknowledges the sheer scale of information flowing into the FCO makes it impossible to 
keep ministers keep fully informed of all international issues.
166
  It is therefore necessary for 
civil servants to filter the most important information to arrive on ministers’ desks.  It seems 
that FCO staff did not have the intelligence available to them to adjudge Rwanda a crisis 
worthy of significant ministerial attention.  As Hurd’s autobiography makes it clear in the 
period before the genocide civil servants did not bring Rwanda to his attention; with Hurd 
unaware of the severity of the developing crisis it is no surprise that he did not support 
strengthening UNAMIR.   
The second key point here is that whilst Rwanda experts looking back at the events 
of 1990 to 1994, in isolation and with the benefit of hindsight, see ample evidence of the 
brewing genocide, an outsider seeing the same evidence in real time and alongside other 
issues would most likely not have reached the same conclusion.  For the British the evidence 
was much less obvious than critics now suggest.  Baroness Lynda Chalker, FCO minister 
with responsibility for Africa, openly admits that prior to 1992 she personally knew nothing 
of Rwanda; only two years after the outbreak of civil war did she really become aware of the 
issues affecting the country.
167
  As she points out there was very little British aid going into 
the country, there were very few reports coming out, there were very few British NGOs in 
the country and even Ugandan contacts knew little of what was happening in the French 
speaking country.  She describes FCO contact with Rwandans as “minimal, occasional and 
accidental almost”.168  Chalker recalls that prior to 1994, whenever anyone spoke to her of 
Rwanda it was invariably about the gorillas.
169
  Furthermore, as Michael Barnett points out it 
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was junior desk officers at the various foreign ministries, who had probably never visited 
Rwanda and were also responsible for monitoring other Central African countries, that were 
seeing the intelligence on Rwanda, not anthropologists or historians with an expert 
knowledge of the country.  That these junior officials missed some of the evidence of an 
impending genocide or failed to bring it to the attention of their overly busy superiors is, 
Barnett suggests, no surprise.
170
  For the UK this is certainly the case; for example, just one 
diplomat monitored all the intelligence relating to Africa that came to the mission at the UN 
in New York.
171
  Christopher Meyer, who would eventually rise to the rank of Britain’s 
ambassador to Washington, also recalls that his first role in the FCO, after only one month’s 
training was monitoring “French speaking African countries plus Liberia”172 a formidable 
task for anyone let alone someone straight out of university.  So once the crisis developed 
this vacuum of intelligence was filled, by necessity, by three sources, the media, Britain’s 
European allies, namely France and Belgium, and the UN Secretariat. 
In terms of dependence on the media, Rifkind openly admits that “essentially what 
we knew [of Rwanda] was what we read in the newspapers like everyone else”.173  It is 
alleged that Hurd was briefed on the crisis by civil servants whose only source of 
information was CNN.  Whilst Chalker denies this, she accepts that CNN was one of a few 
good sources available to the FCO.
174
  The reliance on the media meant that the crisis did not 
receive the government attention that it merited.  Someone dependent upon the media for 
intelligence in this period would not have foreseen genocide; media coverage was not 
sufficiently comprehensive or accurate enough to have reached that conclusion.  Then once 
the genocide did erupt, for the first two weeks at least the press interpreted the killings as 
simply the resumption of a vicious tribal based civil war.  Without further intelligence, or a 
more thorough understanding of the history of Rwanda, one would not have read into the 
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media coverage of April 1994 that genocide was actually happening.  The press themselves 
did not even use this word. 
The other key sources for British decision makers were the French and Belgian 
governments and the Security Council.  As the old colonial power and the new great-power 
sponsor, Belgium and France respectively, were seen by the FCO as having responsibility 
for Rwanda.  One FCO official told Linda Melvern “We tended to believe what the French 
were telling us”. 175   Rifkind concurs, agreeing that given Rwanda’s history the UK 
government “would [have] naturally look[ed] to the French for a lead”.176  Yet whilst these 
two countries probably had more intelligence than anyone on what was actually happening 
in Rwanda even they failed to anticipate the genocide.  The Belgian Senate, in a report on 
the Rwandan crisis, concluded for example that whilst the Belgian civilian and military 
authorities had large amounts of information, this was not shared amongst interested parties 
and consequently any potential warning signs were missed.
177
  Then within a couple of days 
of the genocide beginning, both the French and Belgian governments were widely and 
publicly advocating the need for UNAMIR to withdraw.  In the first days of the genocide the 
two countries had troops on the ground and both described the situation as anarchy.  Both 
governments spoke of the ferocity of the renewed fighting – the Belgians to justify their 
withdrawal from UNAMIR and the French to justify their on-going support of the Rwandan 
government.  Both had a self interest in presenting the crisis as civil war rather than 
genocide and the British appear to have trusted that conclusion. 
Similarly those present at Security Council debates highlight that prior to 7 April 
there was no suggestion that genocide was on the horizon.  Colin Keating, New Zealand’s 
representative in New York, recalls that in this period the intelligence placed in front of the 
Security Council did not suggest any possibility of genocide.  In a 1999 radio interview he 
recalled, “I think really the information suggested that there was banditry, that there was 
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ongoing sporadic fighting, but it was more in the character of skirmishes related to the civil 
war rather than any suggestion that the civil population as a whole was at risk”.178  Even 
after the genocide had broken out, the debate and focus at the UN remained on the war rather 
than the genocide.  Albright recalls: 
As I look back at my records of the meetings that first week, I am struck by the 
lack of information about the killing that had begun against unarmed Rwandan 
civilians, as opposed to the fighting between Hutu and Tutsi militias ... oral 
summaries provided to the Security Council lacked detail and failed to convey 





The Security Council, directed by Boutros-Ghali, like the French, the Belgians and the 
media was concentrating on the war not genocide. 
Whilst many commentators who focus their studies on Rwanda express 
astonishment that governments across the world failed to foresee the genocide, it is easy to 
see how in this crowded environment intelligence was missed and how the crisis was 
misinterpreted by most, for the first two weeks at least, as renewed civil war rather than 
genocide.  Clay’s suggestion in March 1994, that the FCO should approach the Belgian 
government to discuss the plans for evacuating British civilians from Rwanda was not some 
Nostradamic prediction of genocide but rather a warning of the likelihood of renewed civil 
war.  Once the violence began in April the British saw what they expected – a civil war; and 
all their other intelligence sources told them the same.  The British government could not 
realistically have known of the genocide before 21 April. 
What Could the UK Have Done? 
 The final question to address in this chapter is what the UK could actually have done 
in this period that would have mitigated the killing; or as the Genocide Convention describes 
it to “prevent” and “suppress” the genocide.  Once the genocide had begun essentially there 
were two options that the UK could have pursued that would potentially have had a 
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significant impact: deploy British troops unilaterally or secondly push the Security Council 
to authorise the reinforcement of UNAMIR. 
 In the first days of the genocide Dallaire suggested to New York that with 5,000 
troops he could stop the genocide.  Whilst theoretically, the British could have deployed 
troops unilaterally this was never an option for numerous reasons.  Firstly, as discussed 
above, in this period the British government was not aware that the crisis was genocide but 
instead believed it to be civil war; the British had not intervened militarily in any previous 
African civil war and there was no reason why they would in April 1994.  First it would be 
dangerous to deploy troops into a civil war environment and secondly as we have seen the 
fundamental belief in state sovereignty would have inclined the Conservative government to 
avoid becoming involved in the domestic affairs of another state.  Added to this, as we have 
seen, for historical reasons the British felt the responsibility for Rwanda rested with France 
and Belgium; if anyone should intervene it should be them not the British.   
Technically, also it would have been difficult for the British to intervene; unlike the 
French and the Belgians the UK had no troops already in Africa and when British troops did 
eventually deploy to Rwanda in July they were dependent upon US transport planes to move 
soldiers and equipment.  In October 1993, the UK also had expressed concerns about the 
safety of UN peacekeepers; the murder of the Belgian soldiers so early in the genocide 
would simply have heightened those fears.  Even if the British government had been fully 
aware of what was happening in Rwanda and had decided to send a peace enforcement 
mission to the country, the British army was not in a position to deploy sufficient numbers of 
well armed and, given the murder of the Belgians, well protected frontline troops quickly 
enough to Rwanda to stop the killing in this first fortnight.
180
   It was for these reasons that 
Hurd records in his memoirs “It never occurred to us to send combatant troops to Rwanda to 
stop the killing.  I record this as a bleak fact”.181 
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Alternatively in early April Britain could have attempted to have UNAMIR 
strengthened.  If the British had pursued this option they certainly would have faced an 
uphill struggle to convince other Security Council members to support a strengthening of the 
mission; US reluctance to support the mission has already been noted.   But the UK would 
also have been aware that China, always hesitant to allow the international community to 
interfere in what it saw as domestic issues, would have almost certainly have opposed a 
Chapter VII mission and potentially would have used its veto.  A CIA paper from August 
1993 also suggests that Russia was threatening to use its veto “because of budget constraints 
and concerns about over extending UN peacekeeping efforts”.182  If there was a threat of the 
veto being wielded in August 1993 it seems even more likely that the veto would have been 
used to oppose a significant increase in UNAMIR’s size and budget in April 1994.  It seems 
highly likely that one of the Permanent Five would then have vetoed an effort in April to 
launch a Chapter VII mission.  Therefore, even if Britain had supported this option it 
probably would not have been approved by the full Security Council.   
This option is also based on the erroneous belief that supporting the reinforcement 
of UNAMIR would actually have achieved anything.  As we have seen within days of the 
genocide beginning the Belgian contingent was withdrawn, quickly followed by the 
Bangladeshi element, leaving only a Ghanaian battalion in Rwanda alongside Dallaire’s 
headquarters force.  Over 4,000 troops would then have had to be found to bring UNAMIR 
up to the level Dallaire suggested was necessary.  Boutros-Ghali has given evidence that in 
the two weeks up to 21 April he tried to find governments willing to contribute troops to 
UNAMIR to no avail.
183
  British support for strengthening UNAMIR would have been futile 
as there were no troops to deploy. 
 If there was little opportunity to have done much immediately after the genocide 
broke out, there was potentially scope to have to done more to prevent the genocide before 
April 1994.  There was opportunity in October 1993 to have approved a larger peacekeeping 
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force and then again in February when the Belgian government proposed reinforcing 
UNAMIR.  Rather than only approving what Hannay called “a pretty exiguous force (three 
small battalions to be provided by Belgium, Bangladesh and Ghana)”184 the UK could have 
argued for a larger force.  Again though, such a suggestion is made with knowledge of 
subsequent events, rather than being a realistic option that presented itself at the time.  When 
they made the decision to support UNAMIR, Security Council members were already 
concerned about UN overstretch, they were concerned about the safety of UN peacekeepers 
and they were being told, by France and the two warring parties, that only a small force was 
required; as we have seen UNAMIR was viewed by many on the Security Council as a 
model mission.  There was no need for Britain to argue for a bigger force, at the time such 
an argument made no sense. 
Much of the existing literature also suggests that having seen the growing evidence 
of imminent genocide the Security Council should have authorised an increase in 
UNAMIR’s size and a strengthening of its mandate.  From a UK perspective this argument 
must be dismissed for two reasons.  As has been discussed in this chapter, the British 
government did not have or fully appreciate that intelligence; whilst the British may have 
been cautious about the resumption of civil war, they did not predict the genocide.  
Secondly, as Adelman and Suhrke suggest “policy makers who are continuously faced with 
actual crises are disinclined to pay attention to hypothetical ones, even though experience 
tells us that prevention is better than cure”.185  So whilst there may have been evidence of the 
potential for impending genocide, there was, for example, already evidence of a 
humanitarian crisis actually happening in Bosnia and consequently Bosnia received more 
attention.  The British were focussed on existing crises, rather than worrying about potential 
ones.  One can argue whether this is a sensible way for the government to operate, but this 
was (is) the reality. 
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 From a British perspective then the first two weeks of the genocide were generally 
characterised by confusion and misunderstanding.  Rwanda was a country with which the 
UK had very few links: trade was minimal, there were no historic links and Rwandans spoke 
French.  Other than mountain gorillas, Rwanda was absent from the minds of media, 
parliament and government.  Even the minister at the FCO with responsibility for Africa 
admits that she knew little of the country.  It was as Edward Clay so rightly suggested a 
“small country far away of which we knew little”.  It is not therefore a surprise that the FCO 
and journalists did not understand the history of Rwanda and failed to spot first the risk of 
massive human rights abuses and then actual genocide.  The British, media and government, 
concentrated on the civil war because that is what they expected.  In this period British 
people, even foreign policy experts, did not recognise the genocide that was happening and 
consequently failed to respond to it.  Instead the government and the media could only 
respond by calling for both sides, the RPF and FAR, to return to the negotiating table and 





THE UNINTERESTED BYSTANDER? 
22 APRIL to 30 JUNE 1994 
 
Having agreed to partially withdraw UNAMIR, the world eventually began to 
recognise the killings in Rwanda as more than the anarchic by-product of civil war; by early 
May it was apparent that what was happening in Rwanda was a massive humanitarian crisis 
and genocide.  Yet despite this, there was no immediate practical response to the crisis; only 
in mid-May did the Security Council agree to reinforce UNAMIR but no new troops 
appeared in theatre.  Eventually in late June, France unilaterally declared that it would send 
troops to Rwanda and the Security Council somewhat reluctantly ratified this mission.  It 
was nearly three months since the killing had started and the first effective military force 
was only just arriving in Rwanda. 
This chapter reviews the period from 22 April, the day after the Security Council 
agreed to withdraw most of UNAMIR, to 30 June, a week after the French deployment.  
Following the format of the previous chapter it begins by looking at media coverage, before 
moving on to look at Parliament’s response.  The chapter then explores the work of NGOs 
and finally the government response.  These subsections are broken down roughly 
chronologically covering first the period to 16 May, when the Security Council approved 
Resolution 918 authorising UNAMIR II; then the period to 19 June when France announced 
that it would send a mission to Rwanda; and, finally the first days of French deployment to 
30 June.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the level of interest in the genocide and 
again questions what more the British government could have done. 
Media Coverage 
Although a few newspapers reported Oxfam and Christian Aid’s concerns about 
UNAMIR’s withdrawal, generally the media seemed content to suggest that once expatriates 
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had been evacuated there was nothing more the international community could do to stem 
what newspapers called the “orgy” of ethnic violence.  However, over the ten week period 
covered by this chapter a change in media coverage can be identified.  Having to this point 
shown only passing interest in the crisis, during May and June the media started to question 
the international response. 
 In the week immediately following the withdrawal of UNAMIR there is no evidence 
of the media responding to or criticising the Security Council’s decision.  James Bones, in 
The Times, told readers that there “was no end in sight to the wholesale slaughter”.1  He did 
not question a UN official’s statement that he quoted, which suggested UNAMIR should not 
be left at risk in Rwanda when there was nothing that the force could meaningfully do.  
Similarly on 23 April The Independent front page included an article saying that the decision 
to withdraw UNAMIR had been condemned by Oxfam, but the paper itself made no further 
comment on the decision.
2
  On 24 April, The Sunday Mail briefly reported ceasefire 
negotiations taking place in Tanzania, without even referring to the UN decision, let alone 
suggesting it was wrong.
3
   On the same day The Sunday Times ran a shocking article that 
vividly recorded the horrors of Kigali:  
 On the outskirts of the city the stream of refugees grew to a tide.  Dozens of 
bodies lay piled up on the roadside.  One twitched.  In front of us, a uniformed 
man lifted his machete.  We heard the skull crack.  In three hours we saw 





Yet despite the graphic nature of this report it did not even pause to consider how the world 
should have been responding.  In fact the title of the article “White South Africa Watches 
Rwandan Bloodbath with Dread” implied firstly that Rwanda was less significant than the 
first post-apartheid elections in South Africa that were due to be held on 27 April and also 
suggested that once power was passed to blacks in South Africa, there would inevitably be 
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an outbreak of racially motivated violence – the suggestion, in line with the findings of Peter 
Dahlgren and VSO,
5
 being that black Africans were naturally disposed towards violence. 
As was the case in the first days of the genocide, it was only The Guardian and The 
Observer that questioned the Security Council’s response.  On 24 April Mark Huband wrote: 
Clearly there is little desire on the UN's part to stand up to such killers. 
Consequently it has insisted on portraying the slaughter as an armed conflict 
between the two sides in Rwanda's civil war ... To stop the slaughter the UN 





Two days later in a parliamentary sketch reporting Kim Howells’ House of Commons 
question to Douglas Hurd on whether there was one law for Europeans (referring to British 
involvement in Bosnia) and another for Africans, Simon Hoggart suggested that the FCO’s 
view was in fact “[Y]es.  Rwandans are thousands of miles away.  Nobody you know has 
ever been on holiday to Rwanda.  And Rwandans don't look like us.”7  On 1 May The 
Observer condemned the decision to withdraw UNAMIR, suggesting that the reduced force 
was not sufficient to count the bodies let alone save lives.
8
  However, whilst critical of the 
UN’s failure to respond robustly, neither newspaper called for British intervention. 
 Hoggart’s article though was only one of a number that by late April questioned the 
difference in response to the Bosnian and Rwandan crises: Cameron Doudo called on 
Boutros-Ghali to resign and expose the “racism of the Security Council”;9   Victoria Brittain 
spoke of “double standards at the UN”;10 and, an Observer leading article concluded “when 
it comes to blacks, the white-dominated world doesn’t want to know”.11  Yet whilst some 
newspapers identified the apparent differences in the level of interest, the media itself still 
showed much more interest in Bosnia; for example, in the period 23 April to 17 May a 
keyword search of The Guardian and The Observer identifies 92 references to Bosnia and 
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6 Murk Huband, “UN Leaves Rwanda in Grip of Killers,” The Observer, 24 April 1994, p.16. 
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138 
 
only 55 to Rwanda; in The Times and Sunday Times the ratio was even more skewed 
towards Bosnia at 96 to 36.
12
  As one reader’s letter to The Herald noted “It would appear 
that the fate of local people does not matter to either the UN or the media because they are 
black”.13   
 At the end of April the crisis developed in a way that generated a new burst of media 
coverage but distracted the media from the actual genocide.  On 29 April over 250,000 
Rwandan refugees fled into Tanzania in what The Times described as the largest “exodus the 
UN has ever had to handle”.14  Whilst having been slow to call for action over the genocide 
the media was quick to call for a response to mthis new refugee crisis.  The Independent, The 
Observer, The Herald and The Guardian all called on the international community to 
provide at least emergency food, shelter and water to the refugees.  Of course much of this 
increased coverage can be explained by the fact that whilst Rwanda remained unsafe and 
effectively closed off to journalists, reporters could quite easily travel to Tanzania; Tom 
Walker even described “planes crowded with journalists” arriving at the refugee camps.15 
 On 2 May The Times described the events in Rwanda as “genocide”, making it the 
first paper to do so;
16
  The Guardian then used the word three days later in an article by 
Lindsey Hilsum.
17
  With this recognition that events in Rwanda constituted genocide, 
combined with the refugee driven increase in media attention, finally there were suggestions 
in the media that something should be done.   However, there was no consensus on what that 
something should be.  The Independent said that “the UN must not turn its face from the 
crisis”;18 and, The Herald commented “If there is to be intervention in Rwanda it would be 
best under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity”.19  The Guardian suggested that 
military intervention was unlikely to be successful, but continued “Yet non-intervention 
                                                          
12 Author’s review using LexisNexis database. 
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does not mean doing nothing.  Diplomatic efforts at mediation must accelerate; and, above 
all, we must rally to the help of the quarter million refugees who have crowded into 
Tanzania.”20  By 12 May The Independent had changed its view on intervention “If the 
moral case for intervention looks overwhelming, so do the practical difficulties”.21  Like 
others in the media, The Independent acknowledged the various practical obstacles that 
stood in the way of any intervention, cataloguing the difficulty of finding troops, US 
reticence to become involved, the opposition of the warring parties and logistical hurdles.  
Some in the media even questioned what a new mission could achieve; for example, Sam 
Kiley wrote in The Times “Look at the statistics, there were about two million Tutsi in 
Rwanda, some 80,000 have fled, a few thousand remain in camps. Where are the rest? Is 
there any point in coming when there is almost none left to save?”22   
However, as we will see below, by this time (early May) the Security Council was 
already reviewing the decision to withdraw UNAMIR.  The debates that were being played 
out in the media were the same ones that were also being held in New York; mirroring the 
different views seen in the press, some on the Security Council, Nigeria for example, 
advocated a more robust response, others were cautious and some, the US in particular, 
doubted what the UN could achieve.  In fact it is evident that much of the media debate was 
actually just reflecting the discussions at the UN.  Such a conclusion is of course in line with 
Jonathan Mermin and Piers Robinson’s findings on Somalia,23 that the media does not lead 
foreign policy discussion but rather draws on official sources such as the FCO, US State 
Department, defence ministries and the UN, for their foreign news. 
The Media Fails to Awaken Interest 
 The Security Council’s decision on 16 May to increase UNAMIR’s size to 5,500 
(known as UNAMIR II) received a mixed response in the press, interestingly though no 
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newspaper particularly celebrated the decision.  Having catalogued the problems facing any 
intervention only days before, The Times, Independent, and Guardian all focussed on, and 
criticised, the US’s reluctance to support the resolution.  The Independent called the debate 
one of the “most shameful debates” in the UN’s history before claiming that Rwandans were 
dying because “the US messed up in Somalia”.24  Reflecting the generally held sentiment, 
that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was by 1994 the world’s only 
remaining superpower and therefore was to take the lead in what President Bush had called 
the “New World Order”, The Independent article concluded: “If the United Nations is 
blocked from acting on Rwanda because Congress is picking over a few nickels and dimes 
for peace-keeping, what right has America to claim global leadership?”  The Guardian was 
similarly critical, noting that “the impact of the resolution was blunted by intense lobbying 
from the US”.25  The article rather accurately predicted that: 
Despite a Security Council vote to send in the force to protect refugees and 
help deliver desperately needed aid, a hard-line stance by Washington has 
effectively ensured that the UN contingent will only dribble in over the 
coming weeks and months. 
 
 
The Times was a little less critical; James Bone in New York explained that the US had 
simply announced that they would not support the deployment until the mandate was clear 
and agreement had been reached with the warring parties.
26
  The Times instead proposed an 
alternative plan “The UN should be concentrating its military effort on border sanctuaries 
[rather than deploying into Rwanda]”.27  It was this very plan that was to become known as 
the “outside-in” plan and was for a period the option favoured by the US. 
 Whilst interest in the UNAMIR II plan soon all but disappeared from the press, 
changes on the ground, as well as the fact that Nelson Mandela had been inaugurated as 
President of South Africa and journalists were now free to cover other African stories, meant 
that by late May more journalists were reporting directly from Rwanda (albeit the border 
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regions controlled by the RPF) and they appear to have been keen to shock.  Rather than 
analysing or trying to explain the civil war and genocide, as is fairly typical of reporting of 
the global south the media focused on the grotesque nature of the killings.  The following 
extracts were not unusual: “Next to a dead sow, bloated to bursting point, lay a woman.  Her 
legs were splayed, her skirt pulled above her waist.  Her throat had been slit”;28  “[the 
woman] said ‘I lost my child.  When I refused to kill, the government soldiers banged a gun 
on my child's head and she died.’”;29 “Many victims had their feet cut off and were left to 
die slowly.  Pregnant women, still alive, slit open.  Men tied, their genitals cut off and 
stuffed into their mouths”.30   
 One particularly gruesome aspect of the crisis that was widely reported was the 
washing up of corpses on the Ugandan shores of Lake Victoria.  The scenes described, as 
this example from The Sunday Times shows, were almost perversely voyeuristic: 
 Swarms of flies gathered around the corpse, which was turning white after 
weeks in the river.  The flesh appeared to have the same texture as raw 
chicken and was almost the same colour.  The man's hair and flesh had come 
off his skull, exposing his cream-coloured cranium.  The lips on his face were 





The following day The Guardian ran a similar story describing how some of the corpses 
“had their hands bound behind their backs.  Others had been shot or had limbs or their heads 
chopped off”.32  The Independent put the story on the front page, The Daily Record and The 
Herald both ran the story and even The Daily Mail had a short article (though only on page 
15).  Television images, despite being carefully edited, were also fairly graphic.  A Lindsay 
Taylor report for Channel 4 news whilst shot from a distance clearly showed bodies and 
mutilated limbs, bleached white by their time in the water, being removed from the lake.
33
  
Taylor though, like many of the newspaper reporters, focussed his report not on the cause of 
the bodies in the lake, but the consequence.  Only in the last few seconds of the four minute 
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report did Taylor acknowledge that the risk of typhoid spreading to the Ugandan 
communities that depended on lake water and fish was, when compared to the massacres in 
Rwanda, “relatively minor”.34 
 As more journalists arrived in Rwanda and neighbouring Tanzania, suddenly more 
articles about the work of British NGOs began to appear in the press.  Such stories, as James 
Dawes points out, served both the media and NGOs.
35
  From a media perspective NGO 
stories gave a British angle to the otherwise quite foreign crisis, and also made it easier for 
the journalist to get a story in the first place; after all it required less effort to quote an 
English speaking nurse than to try to interview a Kinyarwandan speaking Rwandan.  The 
NGOs also benefited, in terms of image and recognition, through heightened coverage and 
awareness of the crisis.  Such reports are therefore fairly common in the reporting of news 
from Africa.  The Sunday Times ran the first such article; entitled “Momma Humanity” it 
followed a Scottish nurse, Sheila Wilson, who managed a Red Cross refugee camp in 
Tanzania.
36
  The article though completely failed to link the horror of the genocide with the 
unfolding refugee crisis, the fact that one million people had been killed was ignored.  
Wilson, for example, was quoted as saying, “I was surprised the people were not in more of 
a bad state, some were traumatised and had sore feet.”37  To concentrate on the refugees’ 
blisters whilst failing to even mention the on-going slaughter illustrates the nature of the 
media coverage throughout the crisis; namely it was much easier to fall back on cliché and 
stereotype, in this case white nurse helps black African orphan, than to try to understand 
what was actually happening in Rwanda.  It was, to coin a phrase used by the BBC reporter 
George Alagiah, “template reporting”.38 
 The Evening Standard in fact reviewed the media coverage in an article of 25 May 
entitled “Do we not care about Rwanda’s killing fields?  Or has Fleet Street’s indifference to 
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African genocide denied us the full, horrific story?”39  It is of course ironic that The Evening 
Standard had itself run only a handful of articles about Rwanda and this particular exposé 
was relegated to page 45.  The article however did highlight the poor standard of reporting 
of the genocide.  The first failing identified was that the press initially failed to send big 
name reporters to cover the crisis; whilst Martin Bell, John Simpson and Kate Adie all 
reported from Yugoslavia,
40
 coverage of the genocide was initially left to early career 
journalists or to Reuters.  The failure to send big name reporters meant that the public did 
not automatically consider the crisis to be that significant.  The second issue raised was that 
the media focus was on shocking rather than explaining.  The continuous stream of massacre 
stories and pictures of corpses significantly outnumbered analysis of the crisis or Rwandan 
history and certainly discussions on how the crisis could be brought to a halt.  As Philip 
Gourevitch recorded, in the press “you had a faceless, anonymous mass of Africans.  And 
what do Africans do in the press?  They die of miserable things”.41  The impact of this style 
of coverage, The Evening Standard argued, was that “the press failed to awaken our 
interest”;42 Rwanda was, they suggested, viewed as just another African crisis that the west 
could do nothing about. 
Media Response to France’s Operation Turquoise 
 The launch of France’s Operation Turquoise generated another of the sporadic 
surges of media interest in the crisis; on the 21 June for example, The Independent alone ran 
five separate articles on Rwanda and a further four two days later, including the front page.  
The response to the French mission though was almost universal condemnation; and whilst 
US support of the mission was reported, the opposition of the RPF, aid agencies and some 
members of the Security Council received more attention. 
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 France’s historical involvement in Rwanda, particularly its support for President 
Habyarimana, and its supplying of weapons were the prime reasons that most of the press 
opposed Turquoise.  The Independent for example charged “No country is less well placed 
for such a mission” before continuing “The French should think hard before sending troops 
to Rwanda ... a French intervention is likely to do more harm than good.”43  The Times 
agreed with this last sentiment.  One consequence of the French deployment was that 
UNAMIR was forced to withdraw any French speaking troops that remained in the force for 
fear of antagonising the RPF; The Times therefore pointed out that whilst French troops 
offered security only in the largely Hutu western third of Rwanda, Tutsi in Kigali were now 
being protected by a smaller UNAMIR force.
44
  Noting this same issue, The Guardian 
concluded “the right strategy is to despatch a mainly African force, with strong logistical 
support from Europe and North America ... For French troops to barge in from eastern Zaire 
would only compound the disaster.”45 
 It was not just France’s previous involvement in Rwanda and the impact on 
UNAMIR though that led to criticism of the mission.  The majority of the print media 
accused President Mitterrand of opportunism.  In an article entitled “The Unofficial Motives 
Behind a Perilous Plan” The Scotsman questioned whether this was genuinely a 
humanitarian mission.  It continued to suggest that the mission was as much driven by a 
French desire to “cut a dash on the world scene” and to show “French speaking Africa that it 
had not been abandoned” than genuine humanitarian concern for Rwanda.46  As Asteris 
Huliaras argues, in the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 
more powerful neighbour with the reunification of Germany, France’s historic feeling of self 
grandeur and status was being undermined.  Flexing its muscles in Africa, where France had 
historical links, was then a way of demonstrating its position as a great power.
47
  The 
Guardian suggested that Mitterrand launched Turquoise to score a “public relations coup”; it 
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was a demonstration to the French public of France’s unique power to intervene in African 
crises.
48
  In a similar vein The Times acknowledged rather cynically on the first day of the 
mission “tonight's television screens will at last bring good news, footage of Tutsi infants 
cradled in the arms of French soldiers.”49  Overall the press was not impressed by France, 
seeing the whole operation as foolhardy, hypocritical and politically motivated.  Only The 
Herald called the mission “worthy”; whilst recognising the issues surrounding the mission, it 
concluded that if no-one else is willing, France should at least be allowed to “try” to save 
lives – not an overly ringing endorsement.50 
Parliament 
 Having been largely silent on the issue of Rwanda throughout the civil war period 
and into the first three weeks of the genocide, Parliament started to show some interest in the 
crisis from the end of April.  Even so, a search of Hansard shows that despite being 
recognised by Foreign Secretary Hurd as the “worst tragedy in the world in terms of quantity 
of suffering”51 Rwanda still did not command a huge amount of attention.  For example, in 
May 1994 “Rwanda” is recorded 65 times in Hansard; this falls somewhat short of the 112 
mentions of “Bosnia” in the same month, demonstrating the continued dominance of this 
European crisis from a British foreign policy perspective.   
 Kim Howells (Lab, Pontypridd), at FCO questions on 25 April, was the first to 
question the government’s response to the crisis.  Referring to the decision to reduce the 
number of peacekeepers and highlighting the issue of race, he asked, “Is there one level of 
compassion for our European friends in Bosnia and another for black Africans?”52  Brian 
Donohoe (Lab, Cunninghame South) continued this line of questioning, asking “when will 
the Government put pressure on the United Nations to bring back its troops to prevent 
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further slaughter?” 53   Hurd’s response was to reiterate the conclusion of the Security 
Council’s debates that nothing could be done; “I am not sure how” he responded “either 
honourable Gentleman supposes that maintaining a United Nations force on the original 
scale will help assuage these horrors.”54  In the final question on the crisis at this session, 
Hurd received support from his colleague James Lester (Con, Broxtowe) who suggested that 
the only viable response was for the government to support the OAU in reaching a 
negotiated settlement.  Hurd agreed.
55
 
 Over the next week Labour MPs tabled a few more questions on the response to the 
crisis.  Though it is notable that there was no suggestion whatsoever that the UK should 
actually be involved in Rwanda; instead, the Labour Party thought it was for the UN and the 
OAU to do something.  For example, Tony Worthington (Lab, Clydebank), an MP with a 
significant interest in Africa and development,
56
 asked whether the government would 
propose to the Security Council a strengthening of the UNAMIR mandate.
57
  Similarly, in 
the only statement from the Labour front bench in this period, John Reid, opposition 
spokesman on defence, said during a debate on the British army: 
 Earlier today I saw ... television pictures of what is happening in Rwanda.  I 
was staggered by those photographs.  I am also slightly staggered by the 
apparent indifference in the west to what is going on in Rwanda.  I do not 
suggest that there is a racial element, but I and my party believe that the 
appalling slaughter of innocent people in Rwanda must be stopped.  We 
believe that the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity need to 






In the same debate Calum MacDonald (Lab, Western Isles) agreed, but was even blunter 
laying the responsibility for Rwanda squarely in the hands of Africa.  He continued that 
Bosnia was a problem for the Europeans and Rwanda one for Africans; in direct opposition 
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to the conclusion of cosmopolitan thinkers, MacDonald suggested that those countries 
nearest trouble spots “obviously had much greater” interest in intervening than those far 
away.
59
   
 The opposition though was not especially vocal in publicly holding the government 
to account over their response to the crisis.  In the weeks up to 16 May Labour asked only 
four questions in the House, including one at Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs), and only 
18 written questions were tabled (17 by Tony Worthington).  The Liberal Democrats, who in 
1994 had 20 MPs, asked only two written questions.  Behind the scenes however, Labour 
were somewhat more active.  At a meeting of the Shadow Cabinet on 4 May, Tom Clarke, 
Shadow Minister for Development, informed his colleagues, that he “was strongly pressing 
the ODA for more decisive action to help with the humanitarian crisis on the borders of 
Rwanda”.60  Jack Cunningham, Shadow Foreign Secretary, at the same meeting expressed 
his disappointment that, despite Labour’s requests, the Speaker of the House of Commons 
had refused permission for a Private Notice Question (PNQ) to be raised.
61
   
 Members of the Shadow Cabinet also wrote to their opposite numbers in 
government.  On 4 May, in an obviously co-ordinated move, Tom Clarke wrote to Baroness 
Chalker, Jack Cunningham to Douglas Hurd and David Clark to Malcolm Rifkind, all called 
for more action.  In his letter to Hurd, Cunningham wrote “I am writing to urge you most 
strongly to support the initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, who is 
seeking to establish a significant UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda.” 62   Cunningham 
continued by contrasting how Europe was responding to the events in Yugoslavia whilst 
seeming to show little concern for “the future well-being of black African citizens”.  David 
Clark, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, wrote to Malcolm Rifkind a second time on 
17 May.  In this letter, Clark set out Labour’s position: 
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 Labour believes that the situation in Rwanda is just as much a challenge to the 
authority of the UN as the situation in Bosnia.  We must ensure that the 
international community acts to stop mass murder wherever it occurs.  Above 






Recalling how the RAF had assisted in the humanitarian crises in Ethiopia and Northern 
Iraq, Clark continued to suggest that the government should agree Labour’s “proposals to 
provide military advice to help end the killing” (emphasis added).64  In a subsequent letter 
Clark clarified that he had not meant to suggest that British troops should actually be 
deployed to Rwanda, given the “substantial contribution” they were already making to UN 
operations in Bosnia, but rather should make “expertise and equipment” available to the 
UN.
65
   
Some Limited Parliamentary Debate 
 Parliamentary pressure did not increase significantly in the four weeks to 19 June; in 
the period 28 written questions were tabled in the House of Commons, of which 16 were 
from Labour’s Tony Worthington and a further nine were from Ieuan Wyn Jones (Plaid 
Cmyru, Ynys Môn).  There was though the first debate on the crisis and a number of 
Rwanda related questions were raised at the monthly FCO questions.  One would perhaps 
have expected more interest in the issue given that the NGO Africa Rights “presented to a 
large gathering” of MPs its analysis of the situation in Rwanda, which concluded that the 
violence was orchestrated and state sponsored.
66
 
 The first opportunity to properly debate Rwanda came on 24 May, when 
Worthington raised the issue in an adjournment debate.  At 11.42pm, in front of a nearly 
empty House of Commons, Worthington noted how little interest the House had shown in 
Rwanda before moving on to be, in his words, “very critical” of a number of people.  He 
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began by claiming that racism was affecting the response; “It is inconceivable” he suggested 
“that an atrocity in which half a million white people had died would not have been 
extensively debated in the House.”67  He then criticised the media for its continued portrayal 
of the crisis as “tribal” before moving on to “condemn the members of the United Nations 
Security Council for their inactivity and ineptitude”, suggesting that as the UK sat as a 
permanent member of the Council it must “share in the blame”.  He continued by 
questioning why having described the crisis as “genocide” the government had not called for 
the provisions of the Genocide Convention to be enacted.  (Worthington was incorrect here; 
no minister had actually described the events as genocide.  Mark Lennox-Boyd in a written 
response of 23 May had said “No representations have been made to the Rwandan 
government about genocide”; this was the first use of the word “genocide” by a minister, but 
was certainly not acceptance that genocide was occurring in Rwanda.)
68
  This was the 
fiercest condemnation of the government’s response to date and the only one that openly 
criticised the government for its inaction.  Yet it must be put in perspective: this censure 
came from a lone Labour backbencher known for his interest in Africa; was played out to 
less than a dozen MPs; and, was not reported in the press.  This was not the sort of debate 
that would lead the government to alter course. 
 The crisis received more attention at the monthly questions to the Foreign Secretary 
which came on 15 June.  During this session eight questions related to Rwanda (split five 
from Labour and three from Tories), none called on the UK to do any more than put pressure 
on the UN to accelerate its response to the crisis.  For example, referring to UNAMIR II 
Glenda Jackson (Lab, Hampstead) asked “Does [the Minister] not agree that ... the 
Government should be bringing pressure to bear to ensure that the 5,500 troops are deployed 
immediately”69 and Jack Cunningham asked “Is not the response of the United Nations in 
the face of this horrendous tragedy deplorably slow?”70  Similar sentiments were expressed 
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by Labour in the House of Lords, where Lord Judd asked of Baroness Chalker “does the 
Minister agree that it is essential that the 5,500 troops should be sent to Rwanda as soon as 
possible?”71   
 Labour’s Shadow Cabinet also continued to express concern about what was 
happening in Rwanda.  At one meeting, on 25 May, Tom Clarke reminded his colleagues of 
the need to reschedule a parliamentary debate on overseas aid, which would also focus on 
the situation in Rwanda (such a debate had been scheduled for 18 May, but had been 
cancelled following the sudden death of Labour leader John Smith on 12 May).
72
  In the 
same meeting Cunningham informed the Shadow Cabinet that the Speaker continued to turn 
down his requests for either a PNQ or a government statement on Rwanda; he accused the 
Speaker of “colossal misjudgement” in refusing these requests.73  Cunningham continued 
that he was angered to hear Tony Worthington accuse the Shadow Cabinet of doing nothing 
on Rwanda given his, and Tom Clarke’s, efforts to get some form of debate.  It was 
therefore agreed that the Shadow Cabinet would issue a statement on Rwanda, calling for a 
speedier response.  The discussion also reinforced the publicly stated sentiment that UK 
troops (or combat troops at least) should not be considered; David Clark suggested that a 
further 5,000 British soldiers would soon be needed for Bosnia and Margaret Beckett (acting 
party leader) confirmed that during a conversation she had had with President Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, he had expressed a desire that any further UN troops for Rwanda should be 
Africans.  At the next Shadow Cabinet meeting (15 June) the committee was again briefed 
on the situation in Rwanda by Tom Clarke; this time Rwanda appeared as a separate agenda 
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Labour’s Suspicion of Operation Turquoise 
On 22 June the Opposition Day debate focused on overseas aid.  Tom Clarke began 
the debate by noting the government’s “failure to respond adequately to emergencies such as 
the current holocaust in Rwanda”.75  He went on to describe the crisis as a “genocidal war”, 
before saying that it was “disgraceful that Britain agreed to the withdrawal of most of the 
United Nations force”.  For Clarke, Britain and the wider international community lacked 
the political, not the military, will to bring the crisis to an end; “If only we had a fraction of 
the will which we saw in the Gulf War and the Falklands, the British people could hold their 
heads up high.”76 
 Clarke then moved on to specifically speak about the French mission.  “[L]et me 
make it plain”, he began, “on behalf of the Opposition that we regard the French initiative as 
being fraught with difficulty, if only because there are clearly grave questions about their 
neutrality in Africa”.77  He continued: 
What we require now ... is not the dispatch of troops from Western Europe; 
we need full logistical support for the African troops by the United Nations 
and a more substantial British contribution to humanitarian aid ... We want the 
United Nations' impact to be effective, worthwhile and supported by Great 





This was Labour saying quite categorically that they believed genocide was taking place and 
that the British government should be doing something practical in response; and this 
response should not simply be supporting the misguided proposed French mission.  
 Over the next few days a number of written questions also related to the French 
deployment, though still most of these came from Tony Worthington, the only backbench 
MP who showed prolonged interest in the crisis.  On the 28 June for example, Worthington 
asked whether Britain had been asked to provide troops to Operation Turquoise and how the 
                                                          






European Union had responded to the French initiative;
79
 two days later he asked if the 
Foreign Secretary had imposed any conditions on British support for the mission and 
whether the government thought France was suitable to lead the mission.
80
  Like Tom 
Clarke, Worthington clearly did not support Operation Turquoise. 
The final mention of Rwanda in Parliament in this period came at PMQs on 30 June.  
David Alton (Lib Dem, Liverpool Mossley Hill) mindful of the role John Major had played 
in convincing world leaders to deploy troops to northern Iraq in 1991, in what became 
Operation Provide Comfort, asked “is there not some personal initiative [the Prime Minister] 
could take to ensure that the 5,000 troops promised by the United Nations one and half 
months ago are now all deployed”.81  The Prime Minister expressed “horror and revulsion” 
at the images coming from Rwanda, and stated that he supported the efforts of the UN, but 
promised no personal action.   
The Work of British NGOs 
British NGOs were fairly active in this period, operating both in the countries 
neighbouring Rwanda to alleviate the refugee crisis and also in the UK to raise 
parliamentary and public awareness of the on-going killing.  In this period though, due to the 
continual violence there was little that could actually be done in Rwanda itself. 
 In terms of lobbying, Amnesty International, ActionAid, Oxfam, Christian Aid, 
Survival International and Africa Aid all made efforts to raise politicians’ awareness of the 
crisis by giving statements and interviews to the media and also by contacting politicians 
directly.  The NGOs were the first to publicly call the killing “genocide” and were certainly 
less focussed on the civil war element of the crisis than either the media or government.  For 
example, in a press statement of 26 April Amnesty wrote, “The international community 
misunderstands the cause of the killing.  They are not solely ethnic.  There is a campaign to 
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eliminate any Hutu who are opposed to the campaign and to exterminate all Tutsi.” 82  
Similarly in a lengthy interview given to The Independent after being evacuated back to the 
UK, Anne Mackintosh, Oxfam’s country co-ordinator for Rwanda, explained that the media 
misunderstood the situation,  
It is not nearly as simple or as mindless as tribal fighting.  It is not neighbour 
turning on neighbour for no reason.  It is elements of the presidential guard 
and the Rwandan army and hardline politicians - the people who stood to lose 
from the peace agreement - hanging on for grim death.
83
   
 
 
The NGO Africa Aid also briefed MPs, including Tony Worthington, at a meeting in the 
House of Commons.  Despite these, and similar efforts from other NGOs, for a number of 
weeks the British establishment however continued to call the events in Rwanda civil war or 
tribal. 
 As well as trying to educate the public, media and politicians about what was 
actually happening in Rwanda, the NGOs also lobbied for action.  Amnesty International 
was at the forefront of these demands as the following press releases show: 3 May “Amnesty 
is urging the UN Security Council to immediately expand the capacity of UNAMIR to 
protect human rights”; and, 26 May, “Amnesty welcomes the meeting of the UN Human 
Rights Commission, but calls for stronger action”.84  Oxfam also campaigned for a more 
robust response.  On 3 May David Bryer, an Oxfam director, led a delegation of officials 
from Britain’s leading NGOs to Downing Street to protest at the lack of international 
response to the genocide; and, on 19 May Brendan Gormley, Oxfam’s Africa Director, 
wrote to The Independent calling on the government to support the urgent deployment of 
UNAMIR II troops, whilst also noting the need to agree a ceasefire.
85
  The Times, which 
reported the Downing Street meeting, also suggests that Bryer accused the government of 
double standards like many others comparing the response to Bosnia and Rwanda, 
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concluding that without urgent action up to half a million Tutsi faced death.
86
  Alex de Waal 
and Rayika Omaar, however, are critical of the NGOs lobbying.  They highlight that the 
lobbying was preoccupied with the despatch of UN troops, something that was never going 
to be achieved quickly.  NGOs, such as Oxfam, they continue, did not express outrage at 
what was happening in Rwanda, or name the individuals alleged to be leading the genocide, 
or demand diplomatic measures such as economic sanctions.  In this respect, they conclude, 
NGOs had a mistaken priority and did nothing to stop the slaughter.
87
 
However, the onset of the refugee crisis somewhat altered the priority of most 
NGOs.  Whilst human rights focussed groups, such as Amnesty and African Rights, 
continued to lobby for action, other groups turned their focus towards the crisis in Tanzania.  
As de Waal argues, “at the end of the day, relief organisations will always make charitable 
works their priority”. 88   Certainly the NGOs’ efforts to trigger a response were more 
effective in relation to the refugee crisis than the genocide; in this period the British 
government for example allocated a fairly significant amount of aid to Rwanda through 
British NGOs.  On 21 April Mark Lennox-Boyd informed Parliament that £820,000 of 
emergency aid had been committed to the “victims of the conflict in Rwanda”.89  This 
amount gradually increased as the crisis continued; by 9 May over £1.1 million of 
humanitarian assistance had been provided, a further £2 million was then made available in 
the first week of May,
90
 by 24 May the figure was “more than £4.5 million”91 and by the end 
of June the figure was approximately £11 million.
92
  Most of this funding was channelled 
through British NGOs, but did also include the donation of emergency food and equipment; 
for example, two mobile grinding mills were donated to the World Food Programme for the 
production of maize flour.
93
   The government, through the ODA, also provided a steel 
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bailey bridge to improve access between the refugee camp at Benaco in Tanzania and the 




 Whilst it is obviously hard to quantify whether the level of aid was sufficient, and it 
is of course easy to argue that any amount of aid is never enough, one comparative figure 
shows that the UK was a key donor to the aid fund.  When on 9 May it was announced in 
Parliament that £1.1 million had already been provided and a further £2 million made 
available to NGOs, it was noted that “Other EU countries and the European Commission 
have announced nearly £2 million of assistance so far”.95  Based on this figure, British aid 
outweighed that of the rest of Europe combined in the first month of the crisis.  It is also 
apparent that without ODA support the operation of the refugee camps would have been less 
successful; ODA funding of the airbridge, the bailey bridge and various logistical experts, if 
nothing else significantly contributed to the operation of the camps in Tanzania and enabled 
relief efforts to operate. 
 As well as government funding, the British public were encouraged to donate to the 
crisis.  Initially individual NGOs, including the British Red Cross and Oxfam, ran their own 
appeals.  Then on 13 May the Disasters Emergency Committee (the umbrella organisation 
that brings together Britain’s leading NGOs) launched a Rwanda appeal that in the first two 
weeks generated over £2 million.
96
  By 16 June, and following a television appeal fronted by 
Helen Mirren and Michael Palin, the DEC had raised £4.25 million, four times the amount 
raised by a similar appeal for Yugoslavia earlier in the year.
97
  Ultimately the DEC appeal 
would raise £37 million before it closed in early 1995; making it the DEC’s fourth most 
successful appeal of all time.
98
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The government and public funding was used predominantly in the refugee camps in 
countries neighbouring Rwanda, particularly Tanzania in this period.  The DEC funding paid 
for much of the infrastructure at the Benaco refugee camp, including the Red Cross shipping 
over 38 tonnes of medical equipment to the camp,
99
 Oxfam managing the water supply to the 
camp and Care International managing the warehousing and distribution of aid equipment 
and food.
100
  As well as the work in Tanzania, British NGOs were active in other 
neighbouring countries.  Save the Children Fund for example received government funding 
to assist with the clearing and burying of the bodies that washed up on the shores of Lake 
Victoria and in late June Care UK set up an office in Bukavu (Zaire) to prepare for an 
anticipated inflow of refugees (this area would eventually receive over 300,000 Hutu 
refugees).
101
  British NGOs were certainly responsive to the crisis in Rwanda.  But it has to 
be noted that throughout this period their main emphasis was on responding to the refugee 
crisis; partly because much of Rwanda remained inaccessible given the fighting, but also 
because NGOs were prepared and resourced to respond to such crises.  Whilst the NGOs 
were resourced and quick to provide food, sanitation, water and shelter to refugees in 
Tanzania, there was little they could do to ease or prevent the massacres in Rwanda.  
The Government’s Response 
In the days and weeks after the decision to withdraw UNAMIR the government 
continued to focus on the civil war element of the crisis rather than the genocide.  The crisis 
was described by the FCO Minister Mark Lennox-Boyd as a “horrific and tragic civil war” 
on 9 May
102
 and by the Prime Minister as a “bitter civil war” on 17 May.103  As long as the 
crisis was perceived to be civil war the government’s response was to recall how the 
international community had responded to previous civil wars, look to others to manage the 
situation and, as we have seen, to donate aid. 
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Priority is for a Ceasefire  
As responses to parliamentary questions demonstrated, the government continued to 
believe in late April and early May that the crisis would only be brought to an end by the 
warring parties returning to the negotiating table.  Mark Lennox-Boyd said on 20 April “The 
priority for the moment is to establish a ceasefire”104 and again on 21 April “The first priority 
is to try to bring about a ceasefire”.105   The UN’s successes in bringing to an end civil wars 
in Mozambique and Namibia through diplomatic means “proved” to the FCO that diplomacy 
rather than intervention was the most likely way of ending the killing in Rwanda.  Recent 
experience also confirmed to the FCO that UN troops intervening directly was not the 
solution; the deaths of Pakistani and American troops in Somalia in 1993 had certainly 
shown the risk of UN forces being dragged into a civil war.  In one parliamentary answer, 
Hurd also drew on the UN’s experiences in Angola earlier in 1994, where peacekeeping 
troops had also been withdrawn from a ceasefire monitoring mission once widespread 
hostilities resumed.
106
  As Graham Allison would suggest, the British government appeared 
to have drawn on its experience of previous crises to determine the response to the current 
crisis; when the FCO looked through its “repertoire of processes” it determined that the 
standard response to civil war was to call for a ceasefire and this was the line it pursued for 
the first six weeks of the genocide.
107
 
If experience suggested that the first priority was to achieve a ceasefire other 
parliamentary answers show who the government believed was responsible for trying to 
broker this:  Alastair Goodlad on 5 May “We support the United Nations’ efforts to promote 
a ceasefire”; 108   Lennox-Boyd “We also stressed the importance of retaining a United 
Nations presence in theatre to support ... their efforts to secure a ceasefire”;109 Douglas Hogg 
“The United Nations Secretary General is still pursuing diplomatic efforts aimed at securing 
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a ceasefire” (emphasis added).110  As far as the FCO were concerned, the responsibility for 
responding to Rwanda rested with the UN Secretary General, not the UK.  Consequently the 
government’s response in this period was far from proactive.  
Security Council Resolution 918 
 Whilst in London the government continued to speak publicly of the need for a 
ceasefire, the Security Council, on the advice of the Secretary General, was considering 
reversing the decision to withdraw UNAMIR.  In a report of 13 May, Boutros-Ghali 
proposed the deployment of an enlarged UN force – UNAMIR II.  The report envisaged a 
force of approximately 5,500 troops, tasked with providing safe conditions for displaced 
persons, providing security to humanitarian organisations and monitoring Rwanda’s 
borders.
111
  Notably at this stage Boutros-Ghali made no suggestion that this mission was 
dependent upon a ceasefire.  Whilst he conceded the long-term need for a return to the 
principles of the Arusha Accords, the report called for there to be “no delay” in the 
deployment and for the Security Council to consider what “measures it can take before a 
ceasefire is achieved”.112 
 However, by the time Resolution 918 was actually agreed late on 16 May
113
 it is 
clear that the Security Council had moved to a position of requiring a ceasefire to be in place 
at least before the bulk of UNAMIR II deployed.  After the standard preamble, the 
Resolution’s action points began “[the Security Council] demands that all parties to the 
conflict immediately cease hostilities, agree to a ceasefire, and bring to an end the mindless 
violence.”114  It continued “the Secretary-General [is requested] to report as soon as possible 
on the next phase of UNAMIR’s deployment, including inter-alia, on the cooperation of the 
parties [and] progress towards a ceasefire”.115  Here was an indication that the Security 
Council would only agree to the deployment with a ceasefire in place and with consent from 
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the warring parties.  The specific use of the word “mindless” also suggests that the Security 
Council still did not recognise the incredibly orchestrated nature of the killing. 
There is evidence that the UK supported these pre-conditions and was probably 
instrumental in having them included in the mandate.   In his formal statement given after 
the adoption of Resolution 918, David Hannay called on the UN to “not lose sight of the 
need to achieve a ceasefire”.116  More telling of British opinion though was Lennox-Boyd’s 
statement to Parliament given on 24 May.  He said that, despite supporting the passage of 
Resolution 918 “there was no question of UNAMIR providing an interposition force in the 
civil war without a full ceasefire between the parties”.117  UNAMIR, he explained, could 
only be successful if it had the consent and support of the opposing factions.  Malcolm 
Rifkind similarly wrote to David Clark on 23 May that “there is no support for any operation 
to enforce a peace in Rwanda”.118  Whilst it can be taken that Rifkind here was meaning 
there was no international support for a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission, he could 
equally have meant neither was there British support.   
 However, throughout this period Edward Clay, Britain’s High Commissioner in 
Kampala, continued to inform the FCO back in London that the chances of a ceasefire being 
negotiated were slim.  In one undated telegram, Clay reported that whilst a ceasefire had 
been declared in Kigali it “must continue to be exceedingly fragile, given that the RPF 
declared it unilaterally but subject to conditions which the RGF [Rwandan Government 
Forces] have not accepted”.119  In another, Clay reported that the RPF appeared to be “going 
for broke” and that “our impression is increasingly that the RPF hope to establish themselves 
as the only organisation remaining in Rwanda capable of doing business with the outside 
world”.120  In a third, Clay informed London of reports in the Ugandan press that the RPF 
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would attack any UN troops who attempted to prevent an outright military victory.
121
  The 
ODA assessment mission also highlighted the low likelihood of an imminent cease fire, 
noting in the 27 May report that “an early end to the civil conflicts is not anticipated”.122  
With this intelligence coming from Clay and ODA staff, one can fairly conclude that by the 
end of May the FCO knew there was little chance of a ceasefire being agreed; yet publicly 
this is still what the British government called for and was set as a precondition of UNAMIR 
II’s deployment. 
Britain, the US and UNAMIR II 
 Given the various claims of Melvern, Curtis and Des Forges that British policy at 
the UN was to simply support the US in their efforts to keep peacekeepers out of Rwanda, it 
is worth considering at this point how the British and American response to the UNAMIR II 
plans differed. 
 Whilst Boutros-Ghali was still drafting the report that would be released on 13 May, 
the US government was already trying to influence the recommendations.  In a 
memorandum to the US mission to the UN, the State Department wrote: 
 As Vice President Gore has indicated [to Boutros-Ghali], we are interested in 
exploring the possibility of using an expanded force to create one or more 
secure zones in Rwanda along the border for the protection of refugees and 





It is this plan that Samantha Power named “outside-in”, as it was the opposite of General 
Dallaire’s proposal to deploy new troops to Kigali and then work out across the rest of 
Rwanda (“inside-out”).124   The US clearly had significant reservations about deploying 
troops into Kigali whilst the civil war continued, noting that a “Kigali based operation in 
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current circumstances would require a Chapter VII mandate”;125 a Chapter VII mission being 
one mandated to enforce peace in a country without the consent of the host state.  As has 
been suggested by various authors, including Power and Holly Burkhalter, with the events in 
Somalia still fresh in the minds of the US Administration there was significant opposition to 
Chapter VII missions generally, especially at the Pentagon, and especially to ones in 
Africa.
126
  The proposed outside-in mission was a way of doing something, but at 
significantly less risk and with less troops than the alternative inside-out proposal.  The US 
would also have been conscious that the outside-in option had proved successful in 
Operation Provide Comfort, the joint US, British and French humanitarian mission to 
northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War.  In that mission troops had deployed to the 
borders of Iraq to protect Kurds being persecuted by Saddam Hussein’s government troops. 
 Whilst supporting the general principle that the UN should not deploy into Rwanda 
while the civil war continued, the FCO opposed the suggested outside-in mission.  As David 
Hannay described the situation, “People were being killed inside Rwanda, not outside.  You 
were not going to stop the genocide by operating in Uganda or Tanzania.”127  Even after 
Resolution 918 had been agreed the US plan did not disappear; on 3 June the FCO wrote to 
the UK mission in New York “We would hope to see resources concentrated in areas where 
there is a genuine risk to the civilian population, and not, for instance, on the border 
areas.”128   
  That the American outside-in plan was never implemented suggests that claims that 
Britain and the US were united at the UN are overstated.  The comments from Hannay show 
that the UK had real reservations over the efficacy of the proposed plan.  It must also be fair 
to assume that if the UK had been actively supporting the plan it would most probably have 
been implemented. If two permanent members, both of whom were key providers of 
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resources to UN missions, had supported outside-in it would have been unlikely that the 
remainder of the Security Council would have opposed it; with it being based in 
neighbouring countries, the proposed outside-in mission could not have been considered an 
infringement of Rwanda’s sovereignty and would most likely not have incurred the 
opposition of China and Russia.  The fact that outside-in did not proceed seems then to 
suggest American and British diplomats did not agree that this was the best approach.  
Instead it seems that Resolution 918 was a compromise agreement, acceptable to both the 
US and UK; inside-out, but only once a ceasefire had been achieved. 
Britain’s Limited Contribution to UNAMIR II 
 Despite having voted in favour of UNAMIR II there seems to have been no initial 
consideration of British troops being deployed.  Instead the government, in the words of 
Hannay, “actively encouraged African nations to contribute troops”.129  The FCO appeared 
keen on pursuing this option for three reasons.  First, there was no appetite amongst the 
press or in Parliament for Britain to send troops; and if Margaret Beckett’s comment about 
her conversation with President Mugabe is true,
130
 then African nations themselves had no 
appetite for a western intervention.  Second, the FCO did not feel that the UK had the 
resources to respond positively.  Chalker explained the dilemma as “How do you justify 
taking people off one valuable project to deal with another event”; the common view within 
the FCO, she suggested was that “we cannot take that on as well”.131  Britain at the time was 
after all the fourth largest troop contributing nation to the UN
132
 and was certainly heavily 
involved in Bosnia; for this reason it appears that there was a belief that someone else should 
deal with the Rwandan problem.  And this is the third reason; this was widely perceived to 
be an African problem that required an African solution.   
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The government did though agree to make a contribution to UNAMIR II.  On 15
 
June 
Hannay was instructed to inform the UN of Britain’s “readiness in principle to provide 50 
British Army trucks for UNAMIR”.133  Variously it has been suggested that these four-
wheel-drive trucks, each capable of carrying 20 soldiers, never arrived in Rwanda, that they 
were not fit for purpose, or that they were a mere gesture by the British government.  
Certainly the vehicles did arrive in theatre, but it appears that they did not impress General 
Dallaire.  He recalls: 
Not to be outdone by the Americans [who had offered to lease the UN 50 
armoured personnel carriers (APCs)] the British offered fifty Bedford trucks – 
again for a sizeable amount to be paid up front.  The Bedford is an early Cold 
War-era truck, which in 1994 was fit only to be a museum relic … The British 
later quietly withdrew their request for payment and provided some of the 





Dallaire is certainly correct that the trucks were initially offered to the UN “for a sizeable 
amount”.  The Secretariat was initially told that the “MOD were prepared to sell the trucks at 
a cost of 4,500 pounds per vehicle”; additionally refurbishment costs, including spraying the 
vehicles white, would add an estimated £1,500 per vehicle.
135
  Whilst a fax from David 
Hannay to FCO in London suggests agreement was reached to pay for the vehicles by 31 




 However, Dallaire’s suggestion that these vehicles were fit only to be placed in 
some military museum would seem unfair.  Whilst it is true that the Bedford was a Cold War 
era vehicle (in 1994 the MOD was in the process of replacing the Bedford with new Leyland 
DAF vehicles and the 50 Bedfords were being withdrawn from service as part of this 
process) these particular vehicles were on average only 14 years old.  The FCO memo sent 
to New York records “MOD have advised that the Bedford trucks have been well 
maintained ... Their average mileage is of the order of 60,000 ... since they have been 
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operational until the last minute MOD believe that a full service should be sufficient for 
most”.137  It is important to note that if these particular vehicles had not been offered to 
UNAMIR, they would have remained in frontline service with the British army for at least 
another year.  
Lt. Colonel Mike Wharmby, who commanded the British contingent deployed to 
Rwanda in July, also disputes Dallaire’s comments.  In response to the question “was 
Dallaire’s criticism of the trucks provided by the UK fair?” Wharmby answered “No – the 
same trucks were still in service with the British army.  They weren’t the newest, but they 
were what was available ... my soldiers managed to drive them everywhere.”138  It seems 
rather that it was not the Bedfords themselves that were the problem, but instead the fact that 
they were being driven in a very harsh and unforgiving environment, initially by soldiers 
with little experience of driving or maintaining that particular vehicle and that spare parts 
were not available for the vehicles.  One senior FCO official recalls, for example, that before 
the British troops arrived in Kigali in August 1994, UNAMIR did not even have the 
capability to repair punctures.
139
  Certainly, these vehicles were not the newest or the best, 
but once the British contingent arrived in Rwanda they were able to maintain and service the 
vehicles and provided experienced, well trained drivers.  At that point they began to make a 
valuable contribution to UNAMIR. 
 Dallaire’s cynical suggestion that the British government only offered the trucks so 
as not to be outdone by the American offer of APCs is also slightly unfair, though in some 
ways not too far from the truth.  Rather than trying to match the Americans, it appears to 
have been the French announcement that they were planning to send troops to Rwanda that 
had more influence on the British decision to offer trucks.  In a memorandum to the FCO, 
the mission in New York wrote: 
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 The latest French initiative seems to me to strengthen further the case for issue 
of an early press release announcing our offer.  If for any reason the offer is 
not followed up by the UN, we will have lost nothing by announcing it.  If we 






The FCO made such an announcement on 17 June, a couple of days before the French 
mission became public.  Given that the FCO and MOD had been considering the UN’s 
request for equipment since late May
141
 one could cynically conclude that the offer of the 
trucks was only made in response to the announcement of France’s plans.  However, whilst 
the FCO documents suggest that the timing of the announcement was certainly influenced by 
the French, the actual decision to offer the trucks was made independently of this.  Another 
relevant factor identified by David Hannay was that as the UK was actively trying to 
encourage African nations to provide troops to UNAMIR II, Britain had to be seen to be 
making a contribution herself, hence the offer of the trucks.
142
 
 Nor are suggestions that the trucks were merely gesture politics correct.  At this 
point in the crisis the UK had not been asked to provide personnel for the operation.  As 
Malcolm Rifkind wrote to his Labour counter-part David Clark “We have, along with 
several other nations, been asked by the UN whether we can provide vehicles for the 
expanded force and we are investigating this possibility” (emphasis added).143   African 
nations had offered to provide troops to the mission but they were incredibly poorly 
equipped and would be reliant on western countries to provide logistical support.  The offer 
to supply trucks, whilst on the face of things a rather ungenerous one, was in fact exactly 
what had been requested by the UN; as Lennox-Boyd responded to a Parliamentary question 
about the trucks “The hon. Gentleman grossly underestimates our contribution to assistance 
in Rwanda.  The 50 trucks that he dismissed so contemptuously are precisely what the 
Secretary General asked us to supply.”144  One should also recall that logistical support and 
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expertise were exactly what the media and Labour Party had been suggesting the 
government should offer. 
Reluctant Support of Operation Turquoise 
 The government’s response to the announcement that France would deploy troops to 
Rwanda unilaterally, albeit with Security Council support, was not entirely consistent; whilst 
publicly the FCO and ministers expressed support for the proposed mission, there is 
evidence that privately there was less enthusiasm. 
 Various British newspapers reported that whilst on a scheduled visit to the UN on 21 
June Hurd had expressed his support for the French mission: “‘I think the French are acting 
courageously, obviously at some risk, to fill a gap in time, while the UN force gets itself 
together,’ Hurd said” the Evening Standard reported.145  Correspondence between the FCO 
and the UK’s mission in New York however reflects less than wholehearted support for the 
proposal.  In a telegram to Hannay on 21 June the FCO wrote: “Ready to support a 
resolution backing the French plan, but remain concerned about its effect on UNAMIR and 
on the credibility of UN peacekeeping generally”.146  (That this telegram had to be sent to 
Hannay when the Foreign Secretary was already in New York, suggests that at this stage it 
was not Hurd who was leading policy on Rwanda.)  The FCO appear to have had two linked 
concerns; first the fact that the French military had actively supported FAR throughout the 
Rwandan civil war could not be ignored, and secondly, the RPF were indicating that they 
opposed the French mission believing it to be a veil for fresh French support of the interim 
government.  The telegram to Hannay continued, “the French will in practice have difficulty 
in maintaining impartiality”.147  The FCO were therefore aware that support for the French 
mission would most likely lead to some level of extra support being given to FAR against 
the RPF and also would almost certainly lead to RPF hostility towards the UNAMIR force 
proper; in fact the 21 June telegram references General Maurice Baril’s statement that the 
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RPF had already begun to view French speaking troops in UNAMIR as legitimate targets.  
In the FCO, the private view appears to have been that Turquoise was a high risk and 
unwelcome mission. 
 However, against this was the clear acceptance of the unfortunate truth that, due to 
difficulties in finding troops and logistical support, UNAMIR II would not be deployed in 
the immediate future.  In the meantime massacres would continue in Rwanda despite the 
Security Council’s call for something to be done.  Resolution 918, which had authorised 
UNAMIR II, had “under[lined] the urgent need for coordinated international action to 
alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and to help restore peace in Rwanda”148 yet 
still six weeks later nothing had been done, making the UN seem quite impotent.  The FCO 
concluded that this continued failure of the UN to do anything jeopardised the whole 
concept of UN peacekeeping.  In the telegram to Hannay the FCO wrote “UN credibility 
would be badly affected by an operational fiasco in Rwanda on top of last year’s problems in 
Haiti and Somalia.”149  This left the FCO in the position of not genuinely supporting the 
French mission, but on the other hand having to agree to it because there was no other viable 
option available.   
For most governments such a dilemma would have in reality been of little 
significance; however, as a permanent member of the Security Council, the British, through 
economic and diplomatic pressure, wielded a remarkable amount of power or at least 
influence with fellow Europeans, the US and those states dependent on the UK for aid or 
trade.  As Mark Curtis argues, the FCO’s diplomatic expertise makes Britain particularly 
powerful at the UN.
150
  This power was, John Dickie suggests, demonstrated by Britain’s 
role in building Security Council and international support for both the invasion of Iraq in 
1991 and the recapture of the Falkland Islands in 1982.
151
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It is clear that the Security Council was split on the idea of the mission, with some 
members, New Zealand in particular, opposed on the grounds of France’s historic role in 
Rwanda.  In an interview Hannay, also highlighting the fear of retaliatory attacks by the 
RPF, summed up the British position: 
No we were not enthusiastic about it at all ... We identified some of the 
subsequent problems that would arise; people with blood on their hands would 
be saved.  But we feared there could be massive loss of life amongst ordinary 
Hutus not just people involved in the killings if something was not done ... If 





The documentary evidence suggests that Hannay was instructed to neither openly oppose nor 
endorse the mission, but privately to caution other members of the Security Council of the 
risks of the mission.  Hannay was instructed to “continue to question the proposal” and to 
“not discourage others [redacted] from pressing for further briefing orally or in writing on 
the implications for UNAMIR”.153  The instructions also contain the intriguing part sentence 
“… and we do not wish to be associated with any attempts to sabotage it”; the first half of 
this sentence has been redacted and we can therefore only speculate at Hannay’s full 
instructions.  However, that the instructions conclude “if the French look like getting the 
votes, you should support” seems to indicate that the FCO did not support this proposal, but 
did not want to be seen as the country that prevented something being done in Rwanda.  A 
number of interviewees also highlighted the fact that there was no way that the UK would in 
the end oppose a resolution proposed by France, who at the time was Britain’s closest ally on 
the Security Council. 
 The British reluctance to wholeheartedly support the mission though is reflected in 
the fact that despite requests from the French, the government did not provide British troops 
or logistical support to Operation Turquoise.
154
  Douglas Hogg, Foreign Office Minister, 
confirmed that France had approached the UK and other European allies for logistical 
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support, but “in the event [the French] supported their operation nationally”.155  The British 
press however seemed to suggest that the French request had actually been refused by the 
FCO.  The Guardian wrote of Douglas Hurd that when “[a]sked why Britain had not 
contributed any troops, as France requested, he said: ‘We don't contribute troops to every 
peacekeeping initiative.’”156  The Times was fairly blunt in its coverage suggesting that Hurd 
had “rebuffed a personal appeal” from Alain Juppe, France’s Foreign Minister, to provide 
troops.  It continued to claim that a FCO spokesman had suggested that “for historic and 
practical reasons, it was unlikely that Britain would offer troops”.157 
Britain: The Uninterested Bystander? 
 It could quite easily be argued that in May and June 1994, the British media, public 
and politicians showed little interest in Rwanda.  There was fairly widespread recognition by 
the end of this period that genocide was taking place, but overall it is fair to conclude that as 
a bystander to the crisis, Britain was not particularly quick in stepping forward and offering 
some form of practical response or assistance.  But does this mean that Britain was an 
uninterested bystander? 
Was the British Public Interested in the Genocide? 
 On 11 May Edward Mortimer wrote in the Financial Times, “It would be wiser not 
to write about Rwanda. Very few FT readers want to know about it ... for most of us in 
London and New York and Tokyo, [Rwanda is] a very faraway country indeed.”158  This 
comment raises a question that has not been addressed in any depth in the existing literature 
that is, what was the level of public interest in the genocide?  As discussed earlier, there is a 
school of thought that in the post Cold-War period public opinion came to have a much 
more significant role in foreign policy making and humanitarian intervention in particular.
159
  
Proponents of the CNN effect especially argue that public opinion, as reflected in the media, 
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is a key driver of intervention.  Even if one does not accept the CNN effect, there is an 
argument that public opinion sets foreign policy regions of acceptability within which 
governments must operate; these dictate when a government will, for example, deploy or 
withdraw troops.
160
  Public opinion can then, arguably, be a powerful force on foreign 
policy.  Certainly it is a force that cannot be ignored in any multi-factor study of foreign 
policy decision making - after all public opinion appears to have influenced government 
policy in the US (to not send troops), Belgium (to withdraw troops) and in France (to launch 
Operation Turquoise).  If the public influenced governments in these three countries it could 
have influenced the government in the UK.   
 Measuring public opinion is of course notoriously difficult, especially in this case as 
there is no opinion poll data from the UK relating to the Rwandan crisis.
161
  The absence of 
poll data however is no surprise; as Knect and Weatherford note, poll data relating to foreign 
policy and public opinion is only collected occasionally.
162
  In this particular case the only 
useful poll data comes from the US.  Jentleson and Britton use data from five US polls in 
their research (unfortunately they do not record the date of the polls).  Their conclusion was 
that there was “very substantial” support for humanitarian relief in response to the refugee 
crisis but very low levels of support for what they call “internal political change” (i.e. 
involvement in the civil war).
163
  In fact support for intervention in Rwanda to alleviate the 
suffering of refugees received over 75 per cent support, the highest level in their survey 




In terms of wider surveys that can be dated, the Harris “key issue” surveys in August 
and September 1994, which asked respondents to name the two most important issues facing 
the US government, identified Rwanda as being a key issue for one per cent of respondents 
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in August and half a per cent in September.
165
  This is a very different question from whether 
respondents supported intervention, but demonstrates that the crisis was registering with the 
public.  Rwanda does not however register on the surveys earlier than August, i.e. during the 
actual genocide.  A couple of inferences can be made from these surveys.  Firstly, in the 
same Harris surveys, the crisis in Haiti registered two per cent in August and eight per cent 
in September; contrary to the idea of cosmopolitanism, Americans appeared to have been 
more interested in the crisis in their “own back yard” rather than those on other continents 
(Bosnia also only registered one per cent of the vote).
166
  Secondly, Rwanda only registered 
one per cent in August and less than half a per cent in September; during the genocide phase 
of the crisis Rwanda did not receive sufficient votes to register.  The American public’s 
interest seemed to have peaked during the refugee crisis.  This pattern fits in with the 
findings of empirical research in this field.  Wanta and Yu-Wei, for example, conclude that 
the public learn the relative importance of foreign policy issues through the amount of 
coverage issues receive.
167
  In the US, media coverage of Haiti always outweighed coverage 
of Rwanda and the coverage of Rwanda peaked in August exactly mirroring the poll data.  
Whilst it is always dangerous to extrapolate US data to the British public, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that a similar phenomenon would have been seen in the UK. 
 The absence of British poll data forces us to look elsewhere for evidence of public 
interest.  A second potential source is the number of letters from the public either to their 
MP or to the media.  In a letter to The Independent on 29 June Tony Worthington wrote, 
“Like all MPs, I am receiving dozens of cards and letters about Rwanda.  Your extensive 
coverage reflects public concern”;168 though the Wanta and Yu-Wei results above suggest 
that it may in fact have been the exact opposite that was true, namely the extensive coverage 
heightened public concern.  Worthington though is not necessarily correct in his assertion 
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that all MPs were receiving letters.   Of the 19 MPs who responded to this author’s survey169 
only Nick Harvey (Con, North Devon) recalled receiving letters from constituents and then 
“only in the tens”; sixteen MPs did not recall any correspondence at all.  Andrew Smith 
(Lab, Oxford East) was unusual in the small sample in recalling being visited by a Rwandan 
constituent before the scale of the genocide came to wider public attention; he also recalled 
receiving “tens rather than hundreds” of letters from constituents.  Obviously the vagaries of 
time may have led some to fail to recall accurately the number of letters they received on 
one particular subject over 17 years ago and responses from around three per cent of total 
MPs from 1994 does not allow us to make any claims of statistical significance, but here is a 
suggestion of an apparent lack of public interest.  Against this Andy Bearpark, Head of 
Emergency Aid at the ODA told The Independent in June 1994, at the time of the Tanzanian 
refugee crisis, that “We've had an enormous postbag on Rwanda.  It shows that Africa is not 
being marginalised.”170  Whilst this evidence is not entirely consistent, it does to some extent 
support the mechanics of the CNN effect; there were public calls for the government to do 
more and these seem to have come after media coverage of suffering during the refugee 
crisis. 
 In terms of letters sent to newspapers, in May and June less than 30 letters were 
published in total in The Times, Guardian, Independent and Financial Times; six of these 
were written on behalf of charities and one was from the MP Tony Worthington.  Whilst 
obviously it would be wrong to expect everyone with any interest in the genocide to write to 
the newspapers, 30 is not that many; at least twice as many letters were published relating to 
Bosnia in the same period.  However, this number does compare favourably to other 
humanitarian crises in which the British intervened; for example, in the month before the 
deployment of Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq) the author was able to identify 21 letters in 
the broadsheet press, and in the three months before the deployment of British troops to 
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Angola in 1995 only three letters were identified.
171
  There also seems to have been some 
public demand for the media to report the story of Rwanda.  For example, Jeremy Thompson 
who covered Rwanda for Sky News recalls being “asked to report daily for several weeks, 
often with many live broadcasts each day”. 172   A commercial media enterprise would 
unlikely devote such coverage to a news story that the public were not expressing an interest 
in.   
 So whilst there is evidence of public interest in the crisis and also some evidence of 
members of the public demanding a response from government, it appears that the public 
responded more strongly to the refugee crisis than the actual genocide.  For example, the US 
poll data shows Rwanda was considered a key issue only once the refugee crisis developed; 
letters to the media were more often related to the plight of refugees than about stopping the 
genocide; and, it was the ODA, not the FCO, who received the “enormous postbag”.  The 
very significant response to the DEC campaign, noted above, also demonstrates that the 
public was moved to respond to the refugees in a way that they were apparently not for the 
genocide.  The secondary literature explored in Chapter 1 can help explain this. 
 As we have seen, when it comes to foreign policy the public, due to their own lack 
of direct experience of an issue, are generally led by the media.  The way the media reports a 
story therefore influences how the public interpret it; effectively “media frames organise the 
world for consumers”.173  In the first few weeks the genocide was portrayed as tribal, as 
anarchy, as historical and inevitable and most significantly as unstoppable.  Media 
suggestions that there was little that could be done to halt the ancient enmity between Hutu 
and Tutsi would certainly have influenced public perceptions of the crisis.  By portraying the 
crisis as a civil war and concentrating on the grotesque, the media also made the Rwandans 
seem responsible for their own plight.  As the foreign correspondent Martin Bell has argued, 
such reporting does not allow a reader to get close to the story and as such there was little 
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chance of the public empathising with the plight of ordinary Tutsi.
174
  Without this empathy, 
as the psychologist Hans-Werner Bierhoff argues, bystanders are less likely to intervene;
175
 
or as in this case the public were less likely to demand intervention.  The public were also 
able to conclude that there was nothing that could be done, or the cost of intervention was 
too high.  The end result seems to have been that the public defensively redefined the crisis; 
it was civil war, the Rwandans were responsible for their own fate, there was nothing that 
could be done and as seen in the US poll data support for intervening in the civil war was 
very low. 
 In contrast the public responded positively to the refugee crisis.  The refugee crisis 
certainly generated a spike in media coverage, which in itself would be enough to make the 
public interpret the crisis as more important.
176
  The media also facilitated a public response; 
for example, details on how to donate were included in a number of newspapers and on both 
ITV and BBC, and the media showed how money was being used in refugee camps.  The 
images of homeless mothers and starving children also meant that the public could 
empathise more easily with the victims.  Suddenly the public seemed to be travelling down 
the path towards bystander intervention that Latane and Darley set out;
177
 they noticed the 
crisis, identified it as an emergency and took personal responsibility for responding to it.  
This response manifested itself as both donations to charity and calls for the government to 
act.  This was no longer a public that could be described as uninterested. 
Was Parliament Interested? 
 In A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide Linda Melvern 
wrote “In the House of Commons there was no attempt to address the issue [of Rwanda]”.178  
Whilst she is correct to suggest that it was a number of weeks before Parliament showed an 
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interest in the crisis, Parliament’s response was not as limited as she suggests.  Parliament 
was not disinterested in the crisis. 
Michael Clarke reminds us that in the UK, “Parliament has no constitutional rights 
to be consulted about foreign affairs and no constitutional role at all in foreign policy 
making”.179  He continues that this results in very few MPs having anything more than a 
passing knowledge of foreign affairs; only 20 to 30, he suggests, could genuinely call 
themselves foreign affairs experts.
180
  There are also few mechanisms for MPs to hold the 
government to account over foreign policy.  In terms of formal scrutiny this task falls to the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee; however its scope is fundamentally retrospective.  It 
would be very rare for the Committee to comment on contemporary issues and it certainly 
made no assessment of Rwanda in 1994. 
A second route available to MPs and Lords is to ask questions of ministers with 
responsibility for foreign policy.  Erskine May, the politicians’ handbook of parliamentary 
procedure, informs MPs that “the purpose of a question is to obtain information or to press 
for action”.181   By asking a question an MP is able to highlight subjects that they consider 
important and worthy of further government explanation.  Questions can then be considered 
a barometer of parliamentary interest in an issue.  Whilst in this two month period there was 
a steady flow of questions, more in June in fact than there were on Bosnia, with questions 
being raised most days that Parliament was in session, these came only from a handful of 
MPs, Labour’s Tony Worthington, who was one of Clarke’s handful of foreign policy 
experts, in particular.  If questions are considered a barometer of interest, ministers would 
have concluded that whilst there was strong interest amongst some MPs, overall there was 
limited pressure to do more. 
The third avenue available to MPs to address foreign policy, now and in 1994, is 
through an adjournment debate.  Such debates come at the end of a parliamentary day and 
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provide an opportunity for a backbencher to question a minister in much more detail than 
possible in normal questions.  However, the right to lead an adjournment debate is made by 
ballot and as such each backbencher can expect to lead only one per year and then not at a 
time of their choosing.
182
  When Worthington was able to raise the issue of Rwanda in such 
a debate, he himself noted that “we are able to discuss the issue only because of my luck in a 
raffle”.183  That there was not a debate sooner is not then evidence of lack of interest, but 
rather a demonstration of the parliamentary system.  In fact a search of Hansard suggests 
that Rwanda received much more parliamentary attention than Angola did in 1995 when 
British troops were deployed again as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. 
However, whilst it may be difficult for backbench MPs to bring forward a debate on 
a foreign affairs issue, it would be within the power of the Opposition to do so.  As Robert 
Blackburn et al suggest one of the key roles of the Opposition is to “take the initiative in 
seeking to bring to the public’s attention aspects of the Government’s policies and 
administration which would not otherwise be brought before Parliament.”184  However, as 
the Shadow Cabinet papers show, even the Labour front bench was not able to force the 
debate on Rwanda through a PNQ without the Speaker’s approval.  The issue was included 
in an Opposition Day debate of 22 June and would have come earlier had it not been for 
John Smith’s death.  The only other public avenue available to the Opposition was to 
highlight Rwanda at PMQs, where the Leader of the Opposition had the opportunity, twice a 
week, to ask the Prime Minister three questions.  Whilst one can argue that if Labour truly 
thought Rwanda an important issue they would have raised the subject at PMQs, this does in 
some ways misunderstand the dramatic nature of PMQs.  Whilst questions to the Prime 
Minister should focus on the key issues of the day, in truth the Opposition leader will 
typically ask questions intended to embarrass the government and receive media attention – 
Rwanda fell into neither of these categories.   
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 The difficulty of actually winning the opportunity to ask an oral question or lead an 
adjournment debate aside, there were a number of other relevant issues which affected how 
much attention Rwanda received in Parliament.  First of these is the fact that the House of 
Commons was in recess twice in the period of the genocide; first from 1 to 11 April for 
Easter and then 27 May to 14 June for campaigning for elections to the European 
Parliament.  Elections themselves were another factor that distracted attention from Rwanda.  
The Labour Party archives show clearly that throughout April and May the Shadow Cabinet 
was heavily focussed on campaigning for these elections, as well as local elections and a 
number of by-elections.  The third factor to note is the sudden death of Labour leader John 
Smith on 12 May.  Smith’s unexpected death clearly affected the Labour Party significantly, 
both at a personal level but also by refocusing much of Labour’s attention inwards until 
Tony Blair was elected leader on 21 July. 
 The various factors combine to mean that we should not actually be surprised that 
Rwanda did not receive more attention in Parliament.  The recesses, the various elections 
and the difficulties of actually finding time on Parliament’s agenda meant that there was 
little opportunity for debate.  We do know though that behind the scenes Labour did try to 
force a debate and this was refused by the Speaker, Betty Boothroyd.  As we have seen 
Shadow Cabinet Ministers also wrote to their opposite numbers questioning why more was 
not being done by the government.  Hansard also shows that a number of MPs called for the 
UK to provide logistical support to the UN mission and asked for the government to put 
more pressure on the UN to speed up its response, some even called for direct British 
involvement.  Taking all these points into account it is not clear what more Parliament could 
really have done. 
What More Could the British Government Have Done? 
 If we are to judge Britain’s responsibility for the crisis, we must again turn to the 
question of what more the government could have done; we must, as Kroslak suggested, 
178 
 
measure their capacity to respond.  This question can be split down to diplomatic efforts and 
capacity for military intervention. 
The Diplomatic Effort 
 As the British focus throughout May and June was on achieving a ceasefire, the 
government could arguably have played a more active role in this process, rather than 
delegating it to the UN.  However, it is hard to see what role the UK would have performed.  
As we have seen, the FCO did not have any meaningful relationship with the members of the 
Rwandan interim government (remember the British Ambassador to Rwanda had spent only 
one weekend in the country in three years).  The FCO view was that they were not 
positioned to compel the interim government to move towards a ceasefire.  They would also 
have been aware that France maintained links with the government in Rwanda and we can 
reasonably assume that the FCO were happy to leave negotiations with the Rwandan leaders 
to the French.  Nor does it seem that the UK’s relationship with the RPF was sufficiently 
close to have been influential in encouraging that party to the negotiating table.  Numerous 
reports from Edward Clay in Uganda show that he did not have free access to the RPF and 
keeping close to the UK was not a RPF priority; Clay wrote in one telegram “We have tried 
but failed to contact RPF spokesman in Kampala” before continuing “Like you, we rely 
largely on Reuters and press reports about the situation in Rwanda”.185  Certainly the British 
government continued to publicly call for a ceasefire, but there is no reason to believe that 
they were in any way well placed to have had any more success in achieving a negotiated 
end to the fighting than anyone else. 
 Sending home diplomats is a standard way of expressing objections to the policies 
of a particular government and in the case of Rwanda would have demonstrated the isolation 
of the interim government from the international community.  A number of authors, 
including de Waal and Omaar of African Rights,
186
 have for example criticised the US 
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government for not dismissing the Rwandan Ambassador to Washington and his staff sooner 
(this was eventually announced on 14 July).  No such course of action was available to the 
UK as, at the time, there was no Rwandan embassy in London.  The UK could however, 
have argued for the Rwandan Ambassador to the UN to be dismissed from the Security 
Council, to which, in one of those coincidences of fate, the country had been elected on 1 
January 1994 (Tony Worthington indeed suggested this in Parliament on 24 May).  This 
move would have had two effects; it would have firstly indicated that the international 
community did not condone the actions of the Rwandan government and secondly would 
have stopped Rwandan officials having access to and attempting to influence the private 
discussions of the Security Council about how the UN should respond to the crisis.  In one 
telegram to London, David Hannay expressed his frustration that the Rwandans were able to 
use the Security Council as “a mouthpiece for their faction”.  Hannay wrote: 
 Highlights, and low points, of the Council debate on Rwanda.  Rwandan 
Foreign Minister makes offensive speech blaming four centuries of Tutsi 
domination, and Ugandan interference, for Rwanda’s problems.  Puts 
responsibility for the massacres on the RPF.  New Zealand reacts sharply, 
questioning Bicamumpaka’s right to sit at the Council table.187 
 
 
However, whilst at least some individuals within the FCO would have liked to have taken 
some form of action, Hannay explains that such a move would have been almost impossible 
to achieve: 
 [Rwanda] had been elected [to the Security Council] by the General 
Assembly.  No provision exists to expel a member.  Personally I felt strongly 
that they should at least have been suspended, but the Russians were 
desperately opposed to this and the Americans were not keen. There was 
concern over the precedent this would have set.  Remember, we were not too 






With hindsight it is easy to dismiss this Cold War dimension; however, at the time it clearly 
was incredibly relevant.  Hannay was clear that despite behind the scenes discussions of 
Security Council members, the Russians feared such a move would create a precedent that 
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the western allies would at some point abuse and would have vetoed any move to expel 
Rwanda.
189
  Dismissal was then not a viable option. 
 Other diplomatic measures that were never properly considered were economic 
sanctions, the public naming and condemnation of the leaders of the genocide or the public 
threat of indictment of perpetrators.  Given the limited nature of trade and aid between the 
UK and Rwanda, unilateral economic sanctions would have been worthless.  There was 
though no reason why the British government could not have brought these potential 
measures to the UN or European Union for discussion.  However, there is no evidence that 
British diplomats did do this.  It seems that instead British diplomats, like other members of 
the UN, the media and NGOs, got caught up in the calls for a ceasefire or the discussions of 
the need for a UN force.  The misinterpretation of the crisis as civil war made this approach 
almost inevitable and meant that other diplomatic measures, which may have had more 
impact, were not considered.  In this respect then it can be said that the British government 
could have done more, but their failure to do so is explained by a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the crisis. 
Military Intervention 
 Looking now at military intervention what more could the UK have done?  First is 
the question of whether frontline British troops could have been deployed as part of 
UNAMIR II.  Linda Melvern correctly suggests that in 1994 the UK had two military units 
that could have been rapidly mobilised for deployment overseas - the 5 Airborne Brigade 
and the Special Air Service (SAS);
190
 however, there were other units that were also 
available that could have been deployed.  The SAS, the army’s special forces unit, was not 
really suited to the proposed peacekeeping mission if for no other reason than the fact that it 
did not have the necessary manpower; the SAS only consists of one regiment (approximately 
400 men) and at least one quarter of the force was (and continues to be) on permanent stand 
by in an anti-terrorist role.  The SAS are also known to have been committed in Bosnia and 
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Northern Ireland.  Any suggestion that they could have been sent to Rwanda should then be 
dismissed.  Elements of the 5 Airborne Brigade, however, could have been deployed.  The 
Brigade was made up of two battalions from the Parachute Regiment and various support 
units (a battalion being approximately 550 men).  In 1994 some of 5 Airborne’s units, 
including one of the Parachute battalions, were maintained on a state of readiness of five 
days (meaning that from receipt of orders deployment in theatre could be achieved in under 
a week).  There are however reasons that made deployment of this Brigade unlikely.  First it 
cannot be ignored that when British troops did eventually deploy to Rwanda in August 1994 
they depended on the US Air Force for airlift capability; without this support the deployment 
of 5 Airborne Brigade at this stage would have been much slower if not impossible.  
Secondly, 5 Airborne Brigade was in 1994 the army’s rapid response force.  Given the 
British involvement in Bosnia, which at any time may have required reinforcement to ensure 
the troops’ safety, the MOD would have been less than eager to send a combat element of 
this force to Africa; to do so would have increased the risk faced by troops already deployed. 
 In addition to 5 Airborne Brigade there were, however, a further eight infantry 
battalions that were not deployed on active service (including Northern Ireland), recently 
returned from active service, or training for imminent deployment and could therefore have 
potentially been deployed to Rwanda.
191
   Additionally two of the three Royal Marine 
Commandos were available to deploy.
192
  The Royal Marines particularly had experience of 
peacekeeping operations, having served as part of Operation Provide Comfort, and as would 
be shown in October 1994, when 45 Commando deployed to Kuwait to deter a threat of 
another Iraqi invasion (Operation Driver), were able to deploy overseas on very short notice.   
 The question of ability to deploy to Rwanda though must be addressed before 
simply accepting that British troops could have been sent.  As Melvern notes 5 Airborne 
Brigade was on five day movement orders, and certainly when British troops did deploy to 
Rwanda in July at least some units were in country within a matter of days; however this 
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movement was largely reliant on the US Air Force.  Other units would certainly have taken 
longer than 5 Airborne.  Major General Andrew Farquhar, in 1994 the Commanding Officer 
of the infantry battalion The Green Howards, believes that assuming airlift capability was 
available, his battalion would have been able to deploy a command group within 48 hours, a 
lead company within seven days (a company being around 120 men) and the whole battalion 
within 30 days.
193
  He continues that given their experience in Northern Ireland, British 
soldiers were more experienced in peacekeeping than most other armies and as such would 
have required little special training or reorganisation.  As further proof of the speed of 
deployment, in October 1994 over 1,000 Royal Marines deployed to Kuwait as part of 
Operation Driver in just ten days.  Whilst a deployment to Kuwait would have been much 
quicker than one to Rwanda, given the differences in infrastructure, it does seem feasible to 
suggest that practically British troops could have deployed to Rwanda, in sizeable numbers, 
in around one to two months.  However, such claims are all dependent upon the availability 
of air lift capacity.  The deployment of British troops in August demonstrated that the RAF 
alone did not have the capacity to move large numbers of troops and equipment to Rwanda 
on its own.  Without the support of the US Air Force, any deployment of British troops 
would have been much delayed; in May and June, as we have seen the Pentagon was 
adamantly opposed to any role for the US military in Rwanda. 
 However, despite their availability, in this period no British troops were 
volunteered to either UNAMIR or Operation Turquoise.  As we have seen Malcolm Rifkind 
informed his Opposition counterpart that the UN did not make any request to the UK to 
provide front line troops; instead the UN requested Britain provide logistical support.  
Whilst this may be true, Melvern suggests it is not,
194
 alone it does seem a rather 
unconvincing explanation of why Britain did not send troops to Rwanda.  Britain may not 
have been asked directly to provide troops, but the government was certainly aware that the 
UN was desperately trying to find 5,500 soldiers; Britain had after all supported the 
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enlargement of UNAMIR.  If there had been the will amongst the British political elite to do 
something practical in Rwanda, infantry troops were available and could have been 
volunteered even if they had not been requested.  Such a deployment would have had a 
massively positive impact on UNAMIR II; the British troops would have been well trained, 
well equipped and certainly some were able to deploy relatively quickly.  A British 
deployment may also have encouraged other nations to provide troops.  Whilst we must 
acknowledge Alan Kuperman’s very convincing argument that given the speed and scale of 
the genocide a deployment of troops in early June would probably have been too late to save 
the majority of Tutsi;
195
 if Britain had sent troops at this time, some lives, probably running 
into the tens of thousands, would have been saved.   
 Even without British troops being deployed it has to be questioned whether the 
government could have done more to speed up the deployment of UNAMIR II.  First they 
could have been less stringent about deployment being conditional on a ceasefire and 
secondly they could have accelerated the offer of the 50 trucks.  Looking first at the need for 
a ceasefire it is easy to see why the British government was so adamant about this 
precondition.  As we have seen, the British were concerned about the reputation of UN 
peacekeeping generally should the mission to Rwanda fail.  The government seems to have 
been genuinely concerned that the deaths of more UN troops, so soon after the Somalia 
fiasco and the Belgian deaths in Rwanda back in April, would have seriously undermined 
the credibility of neutral peacekeeping.  The government also continued to believe that there 
was nothing that could meaningfully be done while the war still raged.  The UN mission, 
they reasoned, would only be successful once fighting stopped; Somalia had shown that the 
UN could not stand in the middle of a war.  The insistence on there being a ceasefire in place 
was then not just a way of delaying the deployment of UNAMIR but was the government’s 
genuine belief on how the crisis would best be solved.  It must also not be forgotten that the 
Americans would have, and did, oppose any attempts to deploy without a ceasefire being in 
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place first.  Therefore, even if the British had removed this pre-condition UNAMIR still 
would probably not have deployed any sooner.   
With regard the second issue of why it took so long for the UK to approve the offer 
of the Bedford trucks there appears to be no obvious explanation and the British government 
must face some criticism for this procrastination.  The UK, like other countries, was 
formally asked what equipment they could provide on 16 May (and possibly informally even 
earlier); yet the offer of the vehicles was not made to the Secretariat until 16 June,
196
 a whole 
30 days later.  However, even then the UN did not accept the offer immediately, responding 
that they required some time to consider the offer whilst they awaited final equipment 
requests from the troop contributing nations.  It would seem a safe assumption that these 
various delays were driven largely by bureaucratic inefficiency, as the UN’s request passed 
from the mission in New York to the FCO in London to the MOD and back through the 
same long and tortuous chain – an indication perhaps that there was no senior figure in the 
British government, at this stage, championing a quick and positive response that could have 
bypassed these steps.  If the vehicles had been made available sooner it is possible that at 
least one of the African battalions that would eventually serve with UNAMIR II could have 
deployed sooner; there is no way of telling what the impact of this would have been but we 
can reasonably assume that some Rwandan lives would have been saved.   
Summary 
 To call Britain an uninterested bystander does not seem fair.  Certainly the 
government were not particularly proactive in intervening in this period, but there was 
interest in the crisis and both the government and public response to the flow of refugees 
into Tanzania was quick and significant.  But the response to the genocide was less 
impressive.  For much of the period the government believed that someone else should lead 
the response, whether that be the UN or other African nations; Britain was after all, along 
with France, already leading the intervention in Bosnia.  Whilst the media, Parliament, the 
                                                          
196 Hannay made the offer to the UN the day after receiving the telegram from London. 
185 
 
Labour Party and NGOs all called on the government to provide logistical support and press 
the UN to speed up the deployment of UNAMIR II, no one seriously suggested that Britain 
should actually intervene directly.  The government could have done more in this period, 
certainly in terms of military intervention – the failure to offer troops or the delay in 
providing the trucks did cost lives.  But the UK was no different in this respect from other 
countries; certainly the government was less hostile to intervention than the Clinton 
Administration.  There was also a gradual shift in direction in this period; having supported 
the partial withdrawal of UNAMIR, by the end of June Britain was actively encouraging 
African nations to send troops to Rwanda, and as we will see in the next chapter, by August 





THE BYSTANDER WHO DID TOO LITTLE TOO LATE? 
1 JULY to 31 AUGUST 1994 
 
 Having approved UNAMIR II back in May, the international community, with the 
exception of France, was not quick to go much further.  In the UK, trucks had been offered 
to the mission and aid was being donated to the refugee camps in Tanzania but there was 
little serious consideration of doing more.  However, in July this suddenly changed; Britain, 
and various other western nations, agreed to send troops to Rwanda and massively ramped 
up the level of aid flowing to the region.  However, the historian Sir Adam Roberts describes 
this response as “too little too late”.1  This chapter explores the change in policy in July and 
August, in order firstly to address Tony Blair’s suggestion that the UK did not respond to the 
crisis and secondly to try to understand the motivation and mechanics of the foreign policy 
decision making process.  In line with previous chapters it explores media coverage of the 
crisis and then looks at parliamentary debate.  The chapter then moves on to consider the 
UK’s decision to deploy troops to Rwanda as part of UNAMIR, before looking at the role of 
NGOs and the ODA.  The chapter concludes with a review of Britain’s involvement in three 
other peacekeeping missions, in Iraq, Libya and Bosnia, to determine whether these help us 
better understand the intervention in Rwanda and answer the question of whether more could 
have been done – was the UK the bystander that did too little too late? 
Media Coverage 
 By July Rwanda was almost fully open to journalists.  In the north and east, 
reporters were able to travel relatively easily accompanied by Rwandan Patriotic Front 
guides; in the west, the French controlled zone was now safe; and the refugee camps in 
neighbouring Tanzania and Zaire continued to provide newsworthy stories.  Only the small 
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area in the north-west, which the interim Hutu government continued to hold, remained 
unsafe and inaccessible (it was of course in this area that genocide continued).  This easing 
of access meant that coverage of the crisis grew in quantitative if not qualitative terms 
throughout July; the sudden explosion of journalists covering Rwanda in no way helped 
clarify or better explain the crisis to the public.  Instead as Mel McNulty argues “the western 
news consumer was fed a series of unlinked reports about seemingly unrelated crises, which 
generally fitted into the typical African mould of biblical catastrophes.”2 
 In the first two weeks of July, media focus shifted from the refugee crisis in 
Tanzania to western Rwanda as journalists entered the recently opened up French controlled 
safe zone.  This led, for a short period at least, to fairly extensive coverage of the RPF’s 
continuing advance, and a potential standoff between French and RPF troops when the two 
met.  The RPF’s objection to France’s involvement in the west of the country was of course 
based on France’s history of supporting Habyarimana’s regime.  The RPF viewed Operation 
Turquoise not as a humanitarian mission but an attempt by the French government to 
prevent the RPF achieving an outright victory against the old Hutu government.  In early 
July a war of words developed, with both France and the RPF demanding that the other did 
not interfere in its mission.  The media, sensing the potential for open conflict between the 
two, reported this mini-crisis enthusiastically; notably, despite the media cynicism of 
Operation Turquoise only a few weeks earlier, it was the French who were now portrayed as 
the heroes in this drama as they attempted to protect refugees from the advancing, and 
villainous, RPF.  For example, Sam Kiley wrote in The Times “French forces came under 
attack from the Rwandan Patriotic Front yesterday during an operation to rescue the front's 
own Tutsi supporters”.3 
 This particular angle was part of a noticeable shift in reporting that suddenly started 
presenting the Hutu as victims and Tutsi dominated RPF as aggressors.  Whether this was 
because journalists in the west now saw firsthand the suffering of Hutu refugees or because 
                                                          
2 McNulty, “Media Ethnicization and the International Response to War,” p.270. 
3 Sam Kiley, “Rwanda Rebels Fire on French Force,” The Times, 4 July 1994. 
188 
 
of deliberate media efforts to achieve some level of objectivity in reporting the crisis is not 
clear; the eminent journalist Martin Bell suggests it may have been the latter.
4
  Having 
reported the atrocities committed by the Hutu militia since April, the media now seemed 
desperate to identify and report examples of Tutsi violence; almost as if editors could not 
believe that only one side was committing atrocities.  Mark Doyle, who reported for the 
BBC, for example recalls: 
 I used to take regular calls from BBC editors in London asking me to make 
sure that I ‘put the other side’.  The implication, of course, was that the RPF 
must be killing as many as the Interahamwe and the government army and I 





The print media similarly assumed that the RPF must be either carrying out atrocities or 
would as soon as they reached areas where Hutu control had been strong.  Robert Block, on 
the front page of The Independent, for example, was not exceptional: 
To the east an angry rebel army pressed ahead with its offensive ... The speed 
of the assault on Butare [Rwanda’s second city] led to a daring French mission 
yesterday to evacuate 600 Rwandan orphans and displaced children, and 100 
nuns and priests ... Hutus in government-controlled areas say the RPF is 
killing Hutus in retribution for attacks on the minority Tutsi population ... 





The Herald similarly quoted the commander of the French troops in Rwanda as having 
predicted “If Kigali falls there will be massacres”.7   
 Mirroring the sudden criticism of the RPF was the media’s sudden sympathy for the 
suffering of the Hutu refugees that were beginning to flee westwards in the face of the RPF 
advance.  Whilst the reporting of the refugee crisis would reach a crescendo in the second 
half of July and into early August, the media began reporting the potential for a crisis from 
the second week of July: “Hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing a rebel offensive in 
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northwest Rwanda, creating a fresh humanitarian crisis”; 8  “The first wave of refugees 
stripped the crops from the fields. Those following behind must often make do with roots, 
bulbs and leaves that make them sick.”9  Whilst media coverage continued to depict Rwanda 
as war savaged and unstable, there was a definite shift in the second week of July away from 
reporting the war to reporting the impending refugee crisis.  Suddenly the more empathetic 
word “refugee” became more prevalent in the press than “rebel”, “troops” or “soldier”.10  
Such a change in language, Piers Robinson argues, reminds people of the humanity of the 
victims and the similarity to themselves, making some form of bystander response more 
likely.
11
  It also gave the reader the impression that the Hutu were in no way responsible for 
the position they found themselves in, thereby, as Bierhoff suggests, increasing the 
likelihood of people empathising with their suffering.
12
 
 This shift added to the confusion of the reporting of the overall crisis.  As McNulty 
suggests, in the eyes of the western media consumer Rwanda was a collection of separate 
crises: there had been a civil war, a massacre, refugees were in Tanzania, then bodies 
washed up in on the shores of Lake Victoria, then in July the war was being won by the 
rebels and there were still more refugees.  Newspapers readers and television audiences 
especially could be easily excused for not really understanding the crisis and whether it was 
the Hutu or Tutsi who were the victims, or indeed both or neither – maybe they were as bad 
as each other.  As both Mike Woolridge and Fergal Keane
13
 suggest is typical of reporting of 
Africa, journalists failed to contextualise the various elements of the crisis in their reporting; 
instead the reader/viewer was presented with unlinked “snapshots” 14  and the dominant 
snapshot by the middle of July was of the suffering Hutu.  Over the next few weeks this 
became even more apparent as the Goma refugee crisis unfolded. 
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The Media in Goma 
 From around 17 July the reporting of Rwanda changed completely, the new focus 
was solely on the Goma refugee crisis.  Fearing the advance of the RPF, huge proportions of 
the Hutu population, including the genocidal militia and the army, moved westwards en-
masse, stopping first in the French safe zone and then travelling further west into Zaire, 
particularly the town of Goma.  As many as one million Hutu became refugees in the second 
half of July.  This mass movement of people again made Rwanda front page news; in the 
week 18 to 24 July the crisis appeared on the front page of The Guardian 5 times, The 
Independent 3 times and even The Evening Standard once (the first time that the Standard 
led with Rwanda since the first week of genocide back in April).
15
  The refugee story was 
also extensively covered on television news, partly because it was so easy for journalists to 
travel to the refugee camps and the images made strikingly good television; but also, as 
Mark Colvin of the Australian Broadcasting Corporations points out, because aid agencies 
practised a policy of encouraging journalists to cover the story so as to generate public 
interest.
16
  The academic Susan Moeller acknowledges the same point; she recalls one 
television image that demonstrated the sudden influx of journalists to Goma: “One showed 
Rwandans dying somewhere near Goma.  The camera panned out toward ten other cameras 
surrounding and filming the dying”.17  There would eventually be over 500 journalists based 
in Goma, whist the number actually in Rwanda remained fairly low.
18
 
 Two particular aspects are evident in the reporting of this period; both fall into what 
McNulty describes as the media’s tendency to report Africa through “ready recourse to 
cliché”.19  First is the frequent description of the crisis as being Biblical, which McNulty 
accepts is typical of reporting Africa.  The Times for example described the crisis as being an 
                                                          
15 The Guardian: 18, 20, 22, 23, 24 July.  Independent: 20, 23, 24 July. Evening Standard 19 July.  The database used does not 
record which page articles from The Times appeared on. 
16 Mark Colvin, “Letter: Reality and Rwanda,” The Guardian, 6 August 1994, p.24. 
17 Moeller, Compassion Fatigue, p.295. 
18 JEEAR, “International Response to Conflict, Vol. III,” p.36. 
19 McNulty, “Media Ethnicization and the International Response,” p.270. 
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exodus of “biblical proportions” on 20 July;20 on 23 July The Guardian in a leading article 
wrote “The hell fires are burning in Goma”;21 and, the Daily Mail perhaps employed the 
most exaggerated biblical cliché with the headline “Exodus of Lost Tribe: Refugee Scenes of 
Biblical Proportions Overwhelm Aid Effort”. 22   Such terminology however, had the 
potential to distort the public’s, and indeed politicians’, understanding of the crisis.  Words 
such as “exodus” and “lost tribe” were not neutral; instead they recalled the story of Moses 
leading the Israelites to freedom pursued by their former Egyptian enslavers – this kind of 
reporting easily led to the incorrect assumption that the Hutu were the wronged party fleeing 
the murderous Tutsi.  Ibrahim Seaga Shaw also argues that describing events in these 
biblical terms, which he points out was also the case in the reporting of the 1984 Ethiopian 
famine, strips the human responsibility from the crisis; rather than being a human disaster it 
becomes one that must have divine causes and one therefore likely to stimulate a bystander 
response.
23
  To represent the movement of Hutu across Rwanda, fleeing the pursuing RPF as 
being in any way similar to the Moses story was of course to ignore the previous months of 
history when the Hutu had been enacting genocide on the Tutsi minority.  The media 
representation ignored this and projected the Hutu refugees very much into the role of 
innocent and powerless victims suffering their own hell. 
 The second aspect of the reporting in this period is entirely in line with the findings 
of the 2001 report by the charity VSO, Live Aid Legacy.  The main conclusion of the report 
was headed “starving children with flies in their eyes” and found that “the British public 
strongly associate the developing world with doom-laden images of famine, disaster and 
western-aid ... these images are still top of our minds and maintain a powerful grip on the 
British psyche”. 24   It was these doom-laden images of starving children that were to 
dominate the coverage of Rwanda in late July.  The coverage started with stories of families 
                                                          
20 Anon, “Devastated Rwanda,” The Times, 20 July 1994.  Inigo Gilmore, “World Agencies Helpless as Refugees Pour out of 
Rwanda,” The Times, 20 July 1994. 
21 Anon, “Leading Article: The Hell of Reproach that is Goma,” The Guardian, 23 July 1994, p.24. 
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separated in the flow of refugees; one article in The Independent was fairly typical of the 
heart wrenching stories that journalists were witnessing in Goma and choosing to report:  
Children ran screaming in terror, tears pouring down their cheeks. Women 
desperately cried out the names of the children they had lost in the 
pandemonium ... A man wandered hopelessly in the crowd with a piece of 
paper mounted on a stick.  It gave his name and said: ‘Reward of 500 




This was one of the few occasions that a journalist actually quoted a Rwandan’s name in 
their article; whilst coverage of the genocide had been completely depersonalised, the 
reporting of the refugee crisis was certainly becoming more human.  The focus on the dead 
and the dying though soon took over.  Two articles from the Daily Mail were fairly 
representative: “[M]ore than 100 lay dead in the dust.  One baby slept beside the 
bloodstained body of her mother ... Starving survivors scratched among the bodies for single 
grains of maize or lentils;”26 and “One young boy had a baby strapped to his back who was 
clearly close to death.  A flicker of life appeared in the infant's eyes after a Red Cross nurse 
went along the row of seven children, slowly pouring water into their mouths.”27  The 
outbreak of cholera in the camps only heightened this lack of balance in the reporting.  For 
example, one article in The Independent ran “Out of a refugee population of 1 million [a 
cholera epidemic] would mean 5,000 to 10,000 deaths within days.  Cholera can kill in 
hours.  One refugee family said their son died within two hours of falling ill,”28 - there was 
no mention that the average daily death toll during the genocide had exceeded 10,000.  This 
reporting, that time and time again centred on the suffering of the children, heightened the 
empathy readers felt for the Hutu refugees and reinforced the status of Hutu as victims.  
Only a handful of times did the press recall, or try to explain, the horror of the genocide in 
which many of the Hutu, children included, had participated.   
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  Television coverage was not much different.  A study by the Glasgow Media Group 
focuses specifically on the portrayal of the refugee crisis on television in late July.
29
  The 
study shows that television reports of Central Africa in July were almost double what they 
had been in April and May at the peak of the genocide.  More significantly the study notes, 
that whilst a lack of context in the coverage of wars and humanitarian crises is not unusual, 
there was an almost complete failure of the television news to contextualise and explain this 
particular crisis; it concludes:  
The media were drawn to the images of chaos and death in Goma, which were 
so compelling for their audiences, but there was much less coverage of what 
had caused the exodus to Goma and what had happened to Rwanda’s Tutsi 
people ... Many British viewers – who had no previous knowledge of Central 
Africa – saw little or nothing of the genocide, but were given very extensive 





Drawing on personal experience, George Alagiah, the first BBC journalist to report from 
Goma, reaches similar conclusions.  He recalls working 18 hour days in order to “feed the 
beast that is the newsroom on a headline story” and of deliberating whether to present the 
“exodus as primarily a humanitarian or political problem”;31  he opted for humanitarian.  
Unlike most in the media however, Alagiah publicly admits that he “lost the plot” when from 
20 July he began for a week to concentrate on the risk of cholera in the camps.  For at least a 
week in the print media and on television, Alagiah says, “the genocide was forgotten, and 
cholera became the story.  That was all the newsroom wanted to know about.  How were 
they treating it? How did it spread?  What could Britain do to help?”32  Like the newspapers, 
television news gave the impression of Hutu as victims without much regard for the recent 
past. 
 It was of course easier for the British public to understand and empathise with a 
refugee crisis; as McNulty argues, “This was something that the western reader could 
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understand: a massive disaster, dying children, western aid needed, make a donation.”33  The 
coverage of the refugee crisis did indeed very quickly include calls for western aid and for 
public donations.  Whilst the media had been fairly quiet in calling for a response to the 
genocide this was not the case once the crisis reached Goma.  Greg Philo however, records 
that in the six days to 21 July the British television news contained 28 references which were 
critical of the western relief effort, far in excess of the number seen during the genocide.
34
  
The press for the first time reported calls from Labour and the Liberal Democrats for Britain 
to do something and both Malcolm Rifkind and Baroness Chalker found themselves having 
to defend the government’s response.  Chalker informed journalists that Britain had offered 
support to Operation Turquoise
35
 and was providing financial aid and Rifkind told the press 
“Britain could ‘hold its head high’ over its contributions to alleviate the suffering.” 36  
Newspaper coverage was the same, with all the majors now calling for more to be done and 
most providing readers with details on how to donate.  On 22 July The Daily Record even 
announced on its front page that ten pence would be donated to the crisis for every copy of 
the paper sold.  Whilst the same could not have been said of the genocide, the press was 
unanimous in calling for a response to the refugee crisis from the international community, 
including Britain; as The Independent suggested “The moral imperative to help is clear”.37  
The first stages of the CNN effect, “Television images of atrocities  journalists and 
opinion leaders criticise government policy in the media”38 were now evident. 
Declining Interest – Media Coverage in August 
 The cholera epidemic, however, proved to be short lived, as in fact did the media’s 
interest in Rwanda.  Whereas The Guardian ran 28 articles about Rwanda in the week ended 
31 July, there were only nine in the week ended 21 August.  The crisis was replaced on the 
front page by stories of more domestic interest: British athletes failing drugs tests at the 
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Commonwealth Games, threats of a strike by train-drivers and fresh calls for an IRA 
ceasefire.  Even the fear in mid-August of a second wave of refugees, following the 
departure of Operation Turquoise, did not re-spark media interest; this story, like most 
foreign news stories, had run its natural course and moved first to the inside pages, before 
slowly vanishing from the press almost completely. 
 The deployment of British and American troops was reported and briefly dominated 
newspaper coverage of Rwanda in early August.  As the BBC’s Mark Doyle recalls, the 
MOD and Pentagon were both keen to get positive coverage of the deployment: “The US 
and British army media relations staff promptly announced to the world, in keeping with the 
usual image of western troops arriving in Africa, that they had ‘taken control’ of the airport 
... the airport had been in the control of the RPF for weeks”.39   Lt. Colonel Mike Wharmby, 
the commander of the British troops sent to Rwanda, similarly notes that “All countries that 
get involved in this sort of mission want to get maximum credit out of it.  I received some 
criticism from superiors for not getting more media coverage of what we were doing,” 
before continuing “but there were no journalists for me to speak to – there was no-one 
there.” 40   Wharmby’s point is borne out by the fact that whilst there were some 500 
journalists in Goma, newspaper by-lines suggest that throughout July and August less than a 
dozen British journalists reported from Rwanda itself, and even then some of those, 
including The Guardian’s Lindsey Hilsum and Greg McGreal, relocated to Goma once the 
refugee crisis developed.  The similarities in coverage across the various newspapers 
demonstrates that most of the coverage of the work of British troops was in fact not firsthand 
reporting but instead relied on MOD press releases, mostly from Whitehall.  As Richard 
Keeble would suggest, this is common in foreign affairs reporting, the elite (in this case the 
MOD) were now directing the story.
41
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 Criticism of the western response also continued in this period.  Comments such as 
this from one reader’s letter to The Scotsman were not unusual: 
[pleas for action are] likely to fall on deaf ears in Whitehall where anything 
other than the deployment of rhetoric, and token parcels of administrative 
troops and aid, conflicts with current policy objectives ... Now, [the 
government] drags its feet over Rwanda, only giving ground when shamed 





The Guardian’s description of the British and US deployments as “worthy but piecemeal ... 
enfeebled by the absence of a unified political and humanitarian mandate,” similarly 
reflected a fairly common media opinion.
43
  The media debate about how the international 
community and the press should have responded to the crisis also broke out amongst 
columnists.  Richard Dowden, in The Independent, and Simon Jenkins, in The Times, for 
example disagreed over how the international community should respond to the growing risk 
of violence in neighbouring Burundi.  Whilst Dowden called for western aid and “tough 
action to protect democracy”,44 Jenkins noted that it was in fact western interference that led 
to the genocide in Rwanda in the first place, rather than needing western input “[Burundians] 
must chart their own course to heaven or hell”.45  Germaine Greer also provoked numerous 
responses from journalists when she accused the media of “wrong-headed analysis,” 
manipulating the story in an effort for a good picture or a Pulitzer Prize and of fickleness 
“when the dying stops”.46   She was certainly correct with this last point.  The British press 
had suddenly begun to debate Rwanda in a way that it never had throughout the four months 
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 Whilst it would be misleading to claim that Rwanda was a major issue in either the 
Commons or the Lords in July,
47
 it was, however, debated orally more than it had been 
previously and it did receive more attention than Bosnia in late June and into July.
48
  The 
crisis was raised at questions to the Foreign Secretary, questions to the Secretary of State for 
Defence and Prime Minister’s questions, as well as in the House of Lords.  Despite, or 
possibly because of, this level of debate, the Labour front bench continued to be refused 
permission from the Speaker “on an almost daily basis” to demand a formal statement on 
Rwanda from the government.
49
  During these first three weeks of July the nature of the 
parliamentary discussion also changed slightly; like the media, there was a noticeable 
increase in MPs now calling for more to be done in response to the crisis.   
The parliamentary debate can be split in to two separate categories: first calls for the 
UN response to be speeded up; and, secondly suggestions that the UK itself should be 
responding more robustly.  In respect of the UN mission the dominant view in the Commons 
continued to be that the UN had prime responsibility for the crisis.  There was however clear 
frustration that despite the approval of UNAMIR II, nothing seemed to be happening in 
terms of troop deployment.  Tony Worthington (Labour MP for Clydebank) asked on 20 
July for example, “what are the principal causes of the further delay in the deployment of 
UN troops in Rwanda?”  In his next questions he answered himself by suggesting that 
inefficiency and lack of resources at the UN were to blame.
50
  A week earlier Jack 
Cunningham, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, had similarly asked: 
The United Nations agreed a force for Rwanda, but did not agree its 
deployment.  Now that its deployment has been agreed, we are told that it has 
been held up because of lack of logistical support from western countries. 
Why is further delay occurring? ... We want to know from Foreign Office 
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Ministers whether it is lack of capability or lack of political will that is 





Implicit in this question was the suggestion that the government should be providing more 
logistical support than the 50 trucks already offered.  In fact in the same debate Worthington 
made Labour’s point explicit “Surely the Minister realises that 50 trucks are wholly 
inadequate as supplementary logistical support.”52  Some Conservative MPs made it clear 
however, that they believed responsibility lay with countries with closer links to Rwanda 
than the UK; Peter Luff (Con, Worcester) for example: 
Does he [the Secretary of State for Defence] also understand that, against the 
background of the many demands on British forces around the world, there is 
general support for the view that Francophone countries should take prime 





However, even Luff accepted that the UK could possibly provide limited specialist military 
assets if they were necessary to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda.   
 The second aspect of the debate, suggestions that Britain should be more involved in 
the response to the crisis, was less evident and generally fell into three categories: Britain 
should provide more logistical support; Britain should press for those committing genocide 
to be punished; and, Britain, through NGOs, should provide aid to Rwanda.  Labour 
continued to press the government on the issue of logistical support; Worthington alone 
asked questions on five occasions on logistics in this three week period.  In terms of calls for 
justice these came from both Houses and were led by the Liberal Democrats.  In the 
Commons, Simon Hughes (Lib Dem, Southwark) asked “Given the [UN’s] finding that 
genocide has been perpetrated in Rwanda, can [the Foreign Secretary] assure the House that 
all responsible for it will speedily be brought to justice by the relevant international 
authorities?”54  In the Lords, Hughes’ colleague, Lord Avebury went further by suggesting 
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the government call upon the UN to invoke the Genocide Convention to punish those 
responsible for the genocide.
55
 
 However, it was the final area of aid to Rwanda and Rwandan refugees that received 
most cross bench support.  Andrew Rowe (Con, Mid-Kent) for example called for 
assurances from the ODA that NGOs working in Zaire would receive “every possible 
assistance as quickly as possible”. 56   It was, however, noticeably, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat MPs who seemed most attentive to the refugee crisis.  Simon Hughes recalled the 
government’s donations to other crises before calling for money for Rwanda to be 
“forthcoming”;57 Paddy Ashdown (Leader of the Liberal Democrats) on 19 July used the 
opportunity of PMQs to ask about Rwanda;
58
 and Labour’s Tom Clarke reminded the 
government that tens of thousands of lives were at risk in Zaire and that “humanitarian 
intervention on a massive scale is now absolutely necessary”.59  In correspondence with the 
Foreign Secretary, Jack Cunningham repeated these calls, writing “I urge the British 
government to take the lead in actively and generously supporting the humanitarian effort”.60  
The number of questions relating to the refugee crisis or the cholera outbreak however is 
indicative of how MPs generally interpreted the overall Rwandan crisis; parliament, like the 
media, emphasised the refugee crisis over the genocide.  As one MP suggested, MPs thought 
the response needed to be through aid, rather than focussed on trying to solve the region’s 
political problems.
61
   
The Government’s Military Response 
 In the same way that media and parliamentary debate picked up in July, 
consideration of Rwanda also increased within government – as we will see there is limited 
evidence that the latter was a result of the former.  The government’s response was to both 
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offer aid to Rwanda and to authorise the deployment of British troops.  The deployment 
would become known as Operation Gabriel and British troops would, at their peak, make up 
the second largest contingent within UNAMIR, with some 600 troops deployed out of 
UNAMIR’s total strength of just over 5,000.  The troops were to prove essential to the UN 
mission in that they provided services, logistical and engineering, which UNAMIR did not at 
the time have access to; as the FCO recognised, the British soldiers “filled in the gap until 
UN contractors [Brown & Root] were able to come on line”.62 
The decision in principle to deploy troops was taken on 28 July, and the formal 
directive issued three days later.
63
  The first troops deployed on 1 August.  The exact 
chronology of the decision making process, however, is slightly unclear.  UNAMIR II had 
been approved by the Security Council on 16 May; at that stage the UK, and other western 
states, were asked what equipment they could provide.  On 18 May the UN Secretary 
General made requests for troops to African states only.
64
  The UN had still not requested 
the British government provide troops by 15 June, when the offer of the 50 Bedford trucks 
was made.
65
  The first mention of a UN request for British troops, in the documents made 
available to the author under FoI, appeared a month later in a letter from Douglas Hurd’s 
private secretary to the Malcolm Rifkind’s secretary, at the MOD.  It was dated 12 July and 
read: 
 There has been no response to the UN Secretary General’s request for 
logistical support, so the UN propose to award a contract to the US 
contractors, Brown and Root ... The Foreign Secretary proposes that, in 
response to the UN’s request, the UK should offer a REME [Royal Electrical 
and Mechanical Engineers] company and workshop to UNAMIR for about 8-
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The eventual deployment would, however, be quite different from the company of REME 
soldiers (about 120 men) proposed at this stage.  Noticeably the MOD did not initially 
support Hurd’s proposal.  A week later however, whilst the Foreign Secretary himself was 
also suggesting that “the REME idea should be shelved” as “life has now moved on”, it was 
agreed by both the MOD and FCO that a military official, posing as a civilian, should 
accompany Baroness Chalker on her visit to the region departing on 24 July.
67
  In less than a 
fortnight the government’s position had moved from not wanting to send troops to actively 
considering and planning for deployment. 
 At the same time as Chalker departed for Uganda on Sunday 24 July, the Current 
Operations Group met at the MOD.  Chaired by Rear Admiral Brian Goodson, (Assistant 
Chief of Defence Staff) and attended by Brigadier Simon Pack (Director of Defence 
Commitments - Middle East and Africa) and Glyne Evans (Head of UN Department at 
FCO), the group met to “develop an outline list of military options for the provision of 
assistance in Rwanda”.68  The fact that the committee met on a Sunday is an indication that 
the plan to deploy British troops was really picking up momentum, suggesting it had support 
at senior levels.  It is also noteworthy that part of this particular minute has been redacted 
“as it contains information supplied by the Security Services”;69 demonstrating that MI6 did 
show some interest in the crisis, though at what stage and how much remains uncertain.  The 
group concluded that a recommendation should be made to the Chief of Defence Staff that 
British troops be deployed to Rwanda with a stipulated date for withdrawal.  This 
recommendation was then discussed at a meeting between the Chief of Defence Staff and 
Malcolm Rifkind at 08.00 on Monday 25 July, where it was agreed that, pending a formal 
request from the FCO, the MOD would approve the deployment of troops.
70
  Lt. Col. Mike 
Wharmby, who would command the British element, was informed of the possible 
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deployment at 13.30 that day.
71
  On 27 July, following discussions with the UN and reports 
back from a Colonel Joscelyne, who had accompanied Chalker to Rwanda, Glyne Evans 
wrote to the Foreign Secretary advising that the “UN are enthusiastic about a possible 
British offer to UNAMIR. We now need to make a formal response”.72  The following day, 
28 July, the Foreign Secretary received approval from the Cabinet subcommittee on 
Overseas Policy and Defence, to make the formal offer to the UN;
73
 the first British troops 
deployed in Rwanda just three days later. 
The Evolution of the Decision 
 As this chronology shows, the decision to deploy troops evolved very quickly.  The 
government moved from a position of not considering any form of troop deployment in late 
June, to a decision to deploy over 600 just four weeks later.  It is also apparent that the 
FCO’s initial request to the MOD was rejected; demonstrating as Graham Allison suggests, 
that government is not one unified entity, but instead “a conglomerate of semi-feudal, 
loosely aligned organisations, each with a substantial life of its own”.74  To understand how 
this decision evolved, we need then to look separately at the two government departments 
involved. 
The Foreign Office 
 From the FCO’s perspective the key question is why ministers and officials moved 
from not supporting, or even considering, a British deployment to then suggesting one on 12 
July – why did they move from being an almost passive bystander to suggesting 
humanitarian intervention?  A clear understanding of why the position changed would after 
all go a long way to explaining the general question of what motivates humanitarian 
intervention.  Unfortunately the answer to this question is not wholly clear.  Despite 
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numerous freedom of information requests by the author, none of the documents released to 
date fully explain this shift, underlining Paul Williams’ claim that the foreign policy making 
“process remains among the most secret in government”,75 or alternatively suggesting not all 
decisions are fully documented.  However, it is possible to piece together some relevant 
points from interviews and the documents that have been made available. 
 The first point of note is that the decision seems to have been made in the FCO 
without serious recourse to its subsidiary organisation the Overseas Development 
Administration.  In 1994 the ODA was an agency of the FCO rather than an independent 
department in its own right, as it would become in 1997 under Labour.  The ODA, under 
Baroness Chalker, was generally responsible for sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of 
South Africa; the FCO, however, retained responsibility for British relations with the UN 
including all peace keeping missions.  Given its interest in, and knowledge of, Africa, one 
would expect the ODA to have been seriously consulted about the decision to send troops to 
Rwanda; however, this does not appear to have been the case.  The report by the Joint 
Evaluation of the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Committee for example records that 
“On 25 July, the Head of the Emergency Aid Department in the ODA informed his 
counterpart at the OFDA [Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance] in Washington that the 
UK was not planning to send a military contingent to Rwanda” (emphasis added).76  Given 
the close military links between the US and UK it seems unlikely that this demonstrates a 
deliberate reluctance to share information with the Americans.  Therefore whilst it might not 
be a surprise that an ODA official, albeit a fairly senior one, was not aware that that very 
morning the Secretary of State for Defence had approved the mission the claim that the UK 
was not even planning to send troops suggests a remoteness from the discussions that had 
already taken place within the FCO and MOD.  As further evidence of the ODA’s lack of 
involvement, a telegram of 22 July from Hannay in New York to Baroness Chalker includes 
a paragraph that begins “Separately we have received an informal request [from the UN 
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Secretariat] to examine the possibility of making available to UNAMIR a company sized 
REME unit.”77  It would seem odd for Hannay to inform Chalker of this a whole ten days 
after Douglas Hurd had written to Malcolm Rifkind about the UN request, unless Chalker 
had not up to this point been involved in the decision.  Despite this evidence Chalker does 
suggest that she did try to influence some sort of response; as she recalls “I kept saying 
privately in the Foreign Office ‘Can’t we do something, they are mad with killing’”.78  It 
seems though that the decision to recommend sending troops to Rwanda was ultimately 
made in the FCO proper, and therefore presumably by Douglas Hurd, rather than in the 
ODA.   
 The second point of note is that despite the arguments of proponents of the CNN 
effect in this case the media does not appear to have been a major influence on FCO 
thinking.  Clearly, politicians and FCO officials will have been aware of the media coverage 
and it was against this backdrop of media coverage that decisions were taken, however it 
does not seem that there was one particular news story that triggered the decision to send 
troops.  A review of the ITN archive, for example, shows that there was only one story on 
Rwanda on the ITV news in the week prior to Douglas Hurd’s 12 July letter.79  Whilst it has 
not been possible for the author to confirm coverage on the BBC news, the research by 
Georgina Holmes on Newsnight’s coverage of the genocide suggests that Rwanda was 
covered on the programme on 4 July (when in fact Hurd was in Geneva)
80
 and then next on 
15 July; both would seem unlikely to have influenced Hurd’s decision to write to his 




  BBC’s Panorama programme on 27 June had been a 
half hour special report by Fergal Keane on Rwanda;
82
 but whilst this programme was to 
eventually win the prestigious Royal Television International Current Affairs Award it 
received no contemporary newspaper coverage and it would again seem hard to draw a 
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direct line from this programme to Hurd’s letter written over two weeks later.  Nor is there 
anything of particular note in the print media in the week preceding Hurd’s letter to Rifkind.  
There was then no obvious trigger media story that outraged politicians into action. 
What triggered this policy shift at the FCO then is not entirely certain.  In response 
to the author’s question why was there a change of heart about sending troops, Malcolm 
Rifkind (himself Secretary of Defence and therefore not necessarily intimate with the 
thought process within the FCO) replied “It was not so much a change of heart, but by that 
time the full horrors had become evident ... When it became clear that it was not just killing 
but genocide there was a realisation that we should do something to assist.”83  He continued 
that if there was to be a major initiative it was likely that the UK, given what the 
Conservative Party called “[Britain’s] unique place in the world’s affairs”,84 would not have 
wanted to be outside of that, “We would probably have looked to be involved in a major 
initiative in some way.” 85   Whilst Hurd regularly suggested that the UK was “not 
volunteering to be an international policeman”86 Rifkind’s comment, supported somewhat 
by the internal Conservative Party campaign guide for the 1994 European and local 
elections, suggests that the British government felt their position as a permanent member of 
the Security Council, as a prominent member of NATO and as a leading industrial nation, 
gave them some responsibility to be part of major international interventions.  Whilst this is 
to some extent contradicted by the UK’s refusal to become involved in Operation Turquoise 
(though this can be explained by suspicion of French motives), it does suggest that the 
FCO’s decision to support intervention was less altruistic and more about meeting 
international expectations.  David Hannay makes a similar point when he claims “we 
actively encouraged African nations to contribute troops [to UNAMIR], but how would this 
have looked if we offered nothing – we had to do something ourselves.”87   
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The 12 July letter may simply then have been triggered by a direct request from the 
UN for British troops; although there is no direct evidence of this, it is feasible given a 
Security Council Presidential statement issued on 14 July that called “upon Member States 
to provide the necessary contributions in order to ensure the deployment of the expanded 
UNAMIR in the immediate future.”88  The view within the FCO that the UK ought to be 
involved in major humanitarian interventions and the evident difficulty in finding troops 
may then have been the catalyst for Hurd to write his letter to Rifkind.   If so, it was less 
moral obligation to help needy Rwandans that influenced decision making and more a belief 
that the UK, as a key member of the international community had a responsibility to be 
involved in the international response when it was asked. 
The Ministry Of Defence 
 Whilst the change in policy happened in the FCO around 12 July, it was not until 24 
July that the MOD moved to a position of supporting the deployment having originally 
dismissed the suggestion 10 days earlier.  First of all we must acknowledge that the 
bureaucratic nature of government meant the MOD was unlikely to have considered a 
deployment to Rwanda before it was approached by the FCO.  Both Rifkind and William 
Hague, both of whom have experience as Foreign Secretary, agree that the FCO, not the 
MOD, takes the lead on any decision to offer British troops to UN missions.
89
  The BBC 
documentary which charted the deployment of British troops to Angola in 1995 also 
demonstrates that when it comes to UN missions the MOD responds to the FCO rather than 
leading or even anticipating the offer of troops.
90
  It therefore seems reasonably certain that 
no-one at the MOD, at least at a senior level, had seriously considered sending British troops 
to Rwanda until the Foreign Secretary’s proposal of 12 July was received.   
In a MOD minute responding to this first proposal a number of practical and 
political arguments against the deployment were listed.  The practical objections included 
                                                          
88 S/PRST/1994/34, 14 July 1994. 
89 Author’s interviews with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, 22 March 2010 and William Hague, 10 July 2009. 
90 “Mission Angola,” Defence of the Realm, BBC Television, 29 August 1996.  
207 
 
the fact that the deployment of a self-supporting REME company, once force protection and 
logistical support were factored in, would be much larger in terms of military personnel than 
the Foreign Secretary envisaged; that the REME was already overly committed; and that it 
would take so long for equipment to arrive in Rwanda that it would make the mission 
useless.
91
  It suggested, “The gravity of the situation in Rwanda is quite clear.  It is also true 
that a suitable contingent of technicians could do a very useful job in maintaining vehicles ... 
It does not, however, follow that it is necessarily for the UK to fill this breach.”92  The 
minute continued that Britain was already shouldering a heavy burden on other UN missions 
and that there were other countries with closer links to the region currently less committed 
than the UK – at the time the UK was providing 3,668 of the UN’s 73,210 deployed 
peacekeepers, making the UK the fourth largest troop contributor after Pakistan, India and 
France (3,240 were deployed in Bosnia, 413 in Cyprus and 15 in Kuwait).
93
  A draft letter 
accompanying the minute, meant for Rifkind to send to the Foreign Secretary, therefore 
ended “The Secretary of State has to conclude, with regret, that he cannot accept the Foreign 
Secretary’s proposal”.  In the final version sent to Hurd on 19 July this closing sentence was 
softened to “The Defence Secretary sees significant problems with the Foreign Secretary’s 
proposal.”94  Despite the softening, this was a fairly serious disagreement at the heart of 
government and, as Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins suggest, such institutionalism 
demonstrates how intervention does not automatically follow even when it is the preferred 
option of the political decision makers, in this case the FCO.
95
  It also demonstrates how 
cost/benefit analysis does feature significantly in bystander decision making; at this stage the 
MOD deemed the cost of intervention to be too high and to justify their decision MOD 
officials listed numerous reasons why intervention was not possible; many of these reasons 
remained unchanged just days later when the MOD reversed its decision. 
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With the plan rejected, Hurd and Rifkind met face to face that night to discuss both 
Rwanda and Haiti.  The record of the meeting recalls Rifkind as having said that the 
proposed mission to Rwanda “would be controversial, it would put pressure on our own 
resources, and it would not be all that relevant to the problem as it now stood.  We should 
only proceed if it were clearly seen to be in our national interest”.96  Things would have to 
change for the MOD to alter their position.  Two things, however, did change between 19 
and 24 July and these meant that the MOD suddenly could support the proposed mission.   
The first, made clear at the meeting of the Current Operations Group on 24 July, was 
that “[in the last week the] climate for an offer of help had improved, due to a change in the 
security situation in Rwanda.”97  The change in security situation referred to was the RPF’s 
declaration of a ceasefire on 18 July following what they believed to be victory in the war.  
Prior to this western militaries saw the situation on the ground as too risky.  A CIA briefing 
paper, for example, as late as 14 July stated “We believe that the military capabilities of the 
RPF and rogue Hutu military units could potentially pose serious threats to air operations in 
to Kigali.”98  Following the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane it was of course 
known that at least one side in the war had access to anti-aircraft weapons and the RPF had 
publicly made it clear that they would consider the UN, or other western countries, 
legitimate targets if they were believed to be siding with the Hutu government.  With a 
ceasefire in place and the Hutu army and militias having crossed into Zaire as well as the 
French forces stabilising the southwest of the country the situation had changed; Rwanda 
suddenly appeared a relatively safe environment into which peacekeepers could be deployed.  
This removed the fear within the MOD of being “sucked into someone else’s war”.99  The 
effective victory of the RPF had two other consequences.  First it meant the re-opening of 
Kigali airport, thereby removing one of the logistical problems that the MOD had foreseen 
in the note of 19 July.  It also meant that the Pentagon’s objections to becoming involved in 
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Rwanda reduced.  Whilst US troops would not deploy into Rwanda in any large numbers 
(the US Operation Support Hope operated in Zaire, outside of UN control) the US was now 
willing to authorise flights into Kigali; as Operation Gabriel would be dependent on US 
airlift capability this was an enabling factor for the British mission.
100
  The suggestion that 
bystander intervention becomes more likely when the perceived costs of intervention are 
lower seems in this case to be accurate. 
The second change was that there was now said to be political will within the British 
government to support some form of deployment; or as it was worded in one MOD letter 
“there is a growing political imperative”; whether the MOD felt this was being driven by 
parliament, the media, public opinion or the government is not made clear.
101
  However, at 
the meeting of the Current Operations Group this factor was described as “The Government 
require a visible and actual presence in area.”102  Rifkind also spelled this out to the Chief of 
Defence Staff, “Presentational gestures were not on the agenda”. 103   If the British 
government was going to authorise the deployment of troops, which by 24 July seemed 
likely, it was to be a meaningful deployment focussed on providing UNAMIR with the 
resources that it most needed.  From where this “political will” was emanating is not clear; 
presumably given the MOD had refused the FCO’s request to authorise troops on 12 July it 
had to be coming from somewhere other than just the FCO.  Although there is not yet 
publically available evidence to confirm this, nor in fact anything in his autobiography or 
subsequent biographies which all remain quiet about Rwanda, one can perhaps assume that 
Prime Minister John Major was now suggesting that some form of British involvement was 
desirable.  Writing generally about how government works, Williams, Kavanagh, Seldon 
and Coles all dismiss the idea that such pressure would have come from anywhere else in 
government, other than possibly the Overseas Policy and Defence sub-committee of the 
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Cabinet, which the Prime Minister himself chaired.
104
  As has been the case in numerous 
interventions, there seems a high likelihood that the involvement of the political leader 
contributed to the decision to intervene. 
Operation Gabriel – Financing, Make Up and Orders 
 Once the decision had been made to deploy Gabriel, much of the FCO’s attention 
shifted towards the practicalities of funding the mission.  As both Rifkind’s military 
secretary, Commander Timothy Laurence, and Douglas Hurd suggested in a BBC 
documentary aired in 1996, agreeing the funding of peacekeeping missions and winning the 
support of the Treasury was typically the hardest part of deploying troops.
105
  This appears to 
have been no different in 1994; the difficulty is highlighted in an internal FCO document: 
 I need hardly say that the FCO has no financial provision for this and, if the 
UN are not to pay within this financial year, we would have to put a case to 
the Chief Secretary [of the Treasury] for access to the Reserve.  We are very 





There was in the case of Rwanda a potential issue regarding the UN reimbursing 
Britain’s costs meaning that a drawdown of the government reserve may have been needed - 
by July the funds authorised by the Security Council and assigned to UNAMIR back in April 
had been exhausted.  The cost of withdrawing the bulk of the force, and then resupplying 
Dallaire’s rump headquarters by air, meant that UNAMIR’s budget was fully spent.107  Cost 
and bureaucratic inertia again risked stalling British involvement even though it now had the 
support of the FCO and the MOD.  In New York, Hannay therefore pressed the UN 
Secretariat to schedule an emergency meeting of the Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions to authorise an additional contingency to cover UNAMIR’s costs 
from July through to September.  He also suggested the FCO contact other governments, 
                                                          
104 Williams, “Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?” p.918.  Coles, Making Foreign Policy, p.92.  Kavanagh & Seldon, The 
Powers Behind the Prime Minister, (London: HarperCollins, 1999), p.202. 
105 “Mission Angola,” Defence of the Realm, BBC Television, 29 August 1996. 
106 FCO. Internal memorandum sent to Resource and Finance Department, undated.  Released to author under FoI. 
107 FCO. Telegram from UK Mission to UN New York to FCO London, “UNAMIR: Budget,” 17 August 1994.  Released  to 
author under FoI. 
211 
 
particularly France, the US and Belgium, to encourage support for such an extension.
108
  
Without such authority it would not be possible for the UN to authorise reimbursement of 
the UK for the costs of Operation Gabriel.  This extension was eventually given, in what 
Hannay described as a very poorly attended meeting.  Whilst the funding negotiations do not 
seem to have slowed down the deployment of troops it was not until late September that the 
UN finally agreed to the reimbursement of British costs.  The UN only approved the British 
funding claim after the FCO had submitted justification of why money was needed for 
rations (the supplies available in Rwanda did not provide sufficient calories), why there was 
a need for replacement uniforms (no laundry facilities were available in theatre until the 
British sent a mobile bath unit) and why the force would need petrol (whilst diesel was 
available in Rwanda the British ambulances used petrol).
109
   
Whilst the UN considered the reimbursement, Gabriel was funded from the 
Treasury’s emergency reserve – something that officials at the Treasury did not seem overly 
happy about as one internal note records: “I’m afraid the Chancellor agreed to a Reserve 
claim at Cabinet.  Good start to our campaign!!”110  Having seen the Chancellor agree to 
fund the British deployment, in what appears to have been a bit of a shock to officials, the 
Treasury was quick to determine whether this could be included in Britain’s official aid 
figures.  The Treasury wrote to the ODA a number of times questioning why if the mission 
had predominantly humanitarian aims the cost could not be included in the aid figures; from 
the Treasury perspective this was particularly relevant as the government had set an annual 
target for aid.  They were also conscious of “securing proper credit in international circles” 
for the effort that it was making.
111
  As would probably be expected, officials at the Treasury 
were keen for some return on what they saw as their investment in Operation Gabriel.  
Funding agreed, if somewhat begrudgingly, the British force that ultimately 
deployed to Rwanda was far in excess of the REME company that had initially been 
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envisaged by Hurd back at the start of July.  Instead it consisted not only of a REME 
contingent, but also of engineers, medics, logistics specialists, signallers, headquarters staff 
and a platoon of infantry.  This force seems to have been built up in response to a UN wish 
list; General Dallaire recalls meeting Baroness Chalker in Uganda in the last week of July 
during her visit to the region: 
 I met up with her at Kilometre 64, and we carried on northward, crossing into 
Uganda at the Gatuna bridge, while I pointedly explained why we needed the 
promised British trucks, engineers, maintenance platoon, field hospital, small 
headquarters and UNMOs [United Nations Military Observers].  She sent the 
colonel who was travelling with her to do a recce in Kigali and told him to 





This real need for logistical support was noted by other British officials who visited the 
region.  As one senior FCO official who visited UNAMIR in late July recalled, “by that time 
UNAMIR only had one operational armoured vehicle and was required to somehow 
transport vehicles back to Uganda for even the simplest repairs, including punctures.”113 
 Given the requirement for a full range of logistical and support resources the force 
that deployed to Rwanda was drawn from a range of units, both army and Royal Air Force. 
Table 2 shows troop numbers by unit over the period of the deployment.   
Table 2: British troops deployed to Rwanda, 1994  
 Troop Numbers: 
Unit: 13 Aug 13 Sep 13 Oct 13 Nov 
10 Airborne Workshop, REME 98 196 182 171 
9 Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers 84 150 144 122 
23 Parachute Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical 
Corps 
88 160 157 149 
29 Movement Control Regiment, Royal Logistics Corps 
(RLC) 
6 6 6 19 
30 Signals Regiment, Royal Corp of Signals 33 30 29 29 
UK Mobile Movements Squadron, RAF 
91 Squadron, 9 Supply Regiment, RLC 
160 Provost Company, Royal Military Police 
27 10 8 8 
A Company 2 Battalion, Princess of Wales Royal 
Regiment 
- 45 44 35 
Others - 9 6 6 
Total 327 606 576 539 
Source: MOD. Released to author under Freedom of Information   
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 Whilst compared to the 5,000 British troops deployed to northern Iraq in 1991 or the 
3,000 British troops in Bosnia in 1994, a deployment of 600 troops may not seem that 
significant, but it was at the time in fact the single largest contribution of troops by a western 
nation to a UN mission other than UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia.  By comparison Australia 
sent 313 medics to Rwanda, Canada 367 soldiers and Austria 16 military observers.  Other 
western nations including Italy, Ireland, Germany, Holland, Norway, New Zealand (whose 
representative at the Security Council had argued for a more robust response), Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden sent no troops.
114
  The British however, were clearly not willing to offer 
Dallaire everything he wanted.  On 23 August, the UN “urgently” requested a military 
helicopter unit to provide additional logistic support and assist in airborne surveillance and 
reconnaissance; the request was rejected without serious consideration.
115
 
The forces, which within UNAMIR were known as BRITFOR, were commanded by 
Lt. Colonel Mike Wharmby, who in 1994 was the Commanding Officer of the Combat 
Service Support Battalion, part of 5 Airborne Brigade, the UK’s out of area rapid response 
brigade.  Whilst US troops, deployed into Zaire at a similar time to Gabriel, remained 
outside of the UN infrastructure, Wharmby’s orders were very much to fit into UNAMIR.  
The British troops, unlike the Americans, wore the UN blue beret and the directive issued to 
Wharmby stated “You are to carry out the tasks given to you by the Force Commander 
UNAMIR ... BRITFOR will deploy in accordance with the Force Commander UNAMIR’s 
orders.  BRITFOR will provide engineering, maintenance, repair and medical support to 
UNAMIR”116  Wharmby’s orders continued to include more specific tasks that each element 
of the force was to achieve.  In terms of the Royal Engineer element, they were to “repair 
and drill wells for the provision of water; open 2 routes north of Kigali as directed; repair 
roads, bridges etc; be prepared to clear mines”.117  Whilst there was a mine clearing capacity 
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within the force it was not to be used for general mine clearance, but only where mines or 
booby traps impacted on BRITFOR’s capability to achieve its mission.  The REME 
workshop was to provide “repair and recovery” support to UNAMIR, prioritising first 
BRITFOR’s own vehicles, secondly the 50 “UK gifted 4 Tonne vehicles” and then other UN 
vehicles.  The field ambulance unit was directed to establish treatment centres ready to give 
medical treatment both to UN personnel and returning Rwandan refugees. 
 Wharmby recalls that during his briefings two things were made quite clear to him 
by senior officers.  First, that the British deployment was to be a humanitarian deployment 
and that the specialists under his command must not be used for other roles, such as general 
peacekeeping.
118
  Although there was a platoon of infantry forming part of the Gabriel force, 
this was to be used purely as protection for the other British troops, particularly the medics, 
rather than as a peacekeeping force; peacekeeping was to be left to other contingents, such as 
the Ghanaians and the Ethiopians.  The rules of engagement (RoE) under which Gabriel 
acted also made this clear; whilst the British troops were authorised to “carry personal 
weapons (pistols, rifles and light machine guns)” these were to be carried unloaded and were 
only to be used in self defence and after a verbal warning had been given (in French and 
English – troops were provided with phonetic instructions on how to issue the French 
warnings) and warning shots fired into the air.
119
  However, Wharmby does admit that whilst 
on paper these rules seemed quite clear in practice that was not quite the case: 
 The RoE did cause us some confusion and we did have a number of 
discussions over the satellite phone late into the night.  Essentially we were 
there for humanitarian reasons and not to intervene.  If people under our 
protection were attacked, for example if they were in one of our medical 
facilities and that came under attack, we would have been justified to use 
lethal force.  But if we saw someone being attacked in a field as we were 
driving down the road, we would not.  It would at the end of the day be up to 
the individual soldier to justify their actions.  We were never there to 
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Secondly, as noted above, it was made clear to Wharmby that he was to fall under the 
tactical command of General Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR.  However, even this was 
not as clear cut as the order may have seemed: 
There was some uncertainty amongst the UN staff.  This was partly because of 
the French Operation Turquoise and party because of the US mission.  Also 
they had seen the Belgians fly into Rwanda and assume command of their 
units that were supposed to be part of UNAMIR.  Amongst Dallaire’s staff 
there was an institutional uncertainty and suspicion about national missions 






Operation Gabriel in Rwanda 
 Ironically, when the order was given to deploy British troops, Wharmby and his 
soldiers were on exercise on Salisbury Plain.  The format of the exercise was that the brigade 
had deployed on a UN Chapter VII mission in Africa and was keeping the peace in a border 
dispute between the “Hutu” and “Tutu”; Wharmby believes any such similarity to the 
mission in Rwanda was purely coincidental.
122
  It did however, mean that the units were 
already assembled and equipped to deploy relatively quickly.  The first elements of 
Operation Gabriel, 50 men, deployed on the morning of 1 August, many of them initially 
having to put up with tented accommodation due to war damage across Kigali.
123
  Whilst it 
was hoped that the remaining troops and the associated heavy equipment would deploy very 
soon after, this was in fact delayed due to “transportation difficulties”.124  The particular 
difficulty being that despite the US government agreeing with the UN Secretariat that they 
would make a C5 transport plane available to the British, no C5 had actually arrived in the 
UK.  Whether this was due to further deliberate delays by the US military, genuine technical 
faults with the plane or because the US Air Force was giving priority to assisting the 
deployment of the Ethiopian battalion joining UNAMIR is not clear.  The impact, though, 
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was that the deployment of the British mission temporarily stalled until 5 August.  Operation 
Gabriel was considered operational by 17 August and was fully deployed by the 21
st
.  At this 
stage the bulk of the force was deployed in Kigali; the field ambulance unit (178 men in 
total) was deployed in Byumba (near the border with Uganda) and the engineers (44 men) 
were in Kitabi (in the southwest).   
 The speed of the deployment and more significantly the reconnaissance, which was 
completed in less than 36 hours, though were in some ways to limit the effectiveness of the 
deployment for the first weeks.  For example, the first detachment arrived in Rwanda 
without adequate vehicles, which severely hampered their ability to move around Kigali let 
alone the country as a whole.  There was also a lack of clarity over the role of the fairly 
substantial medical contingent; namely whether they were there to treat UN personnel or 
refugees.  This resulted in the medics lacking medicines suitable for treating the local 
population who would make up most of their patients throughout the three month 
deployment; as one army medic recalls “we had to beg, borrow and steal” equipment and 
medicine from NGOs nearby, including ironically a consignment of machetes shipped to the 
country by one Irish NGO.
125
 
Once in theatre, much of Gabriel’s work was aligned with the general FCO belief 
that “the key to tackling the humanitarian crisis lies in creating conditions within Rwanda 
which will attract refugees and displaced persons back to the homes.”126  In fact the mission 
statement drawn up by the Commanding Officer of 23 Parachute Field Ambulance was 
initially “to provide humanitarian assistance in northwest Rwanda in order to encourage 
refugees to return to the country from Zaire”. 127   In line with this statement, the unit 
reopened the abandoned hospital at Ruhengeri in the northwest of Rwanda, which was on 
the route home for many refugees.
128
  The operation of this hospital also demonstrates how 
the army and NGOs worked together in Rwanda; whilst the army doctors provided the 
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health care at Ruhengeri, distribution of food and water was managed by a British NGO.  
After ten days of operating Ruhengeri hospital, the field ambulance unit was moved south as 
part of Dallaire’s plan to prevent a further exodus of refugees following the planned 
withdrawal of the French Operation Turquoise troops.  Once relocated to the south of the 
country the unit split into eight mobile treatment sections.  The mobile teams, each made up 
of a doctor and six paramedics, travelled daily to the camps for internally displaced persons, 
providing immediate aid and also, hopefully, encouraging people to remain in Rwanda 
where they were receiving care.  Wharmby sees the medics’ performance in the southwest as 
a key achievement of Operation Gabriel: 
Our presence fixed several hundred thousand people in the region in what 
would have been an exodus once the French withdrew – so this prevented the 
situation in Zaire worsening.  Our presence drew NGOs in and they were able 




Meanwhile the Royal Engineer detachment was heavily involved in road repair and 
the provision of clean water.  In Gatuna the main bridge linking Uganda and Rwanda had 
been destroyed in the fighting and replaced by tree trunks covered in earth; not surprisingly 
this was collapsing under the weight of traffic.  To ensure the continued flow of aid from 
Uganda the tree trunk bridge was replaced by the Engineers.  In Kitabi a reverse osmosis 
plant was set up to provide clean water to the British field hospital.  In the towns of 
Mukarange, Manuyagiro, Gikore, Shangasha and Bushara water pumps or storage tanks, 
damaged during the war, were repaired; this alone had a massive impact on public health 
reducing the risk of both cholera and dysentery.  And in Kigali the Engineers cleared roads 
of unexploded ordinance and reinstated the refuse tip in order to remove major health 
hazards from the city.   
Overall, during the three months that Gabriel was deployed 132,605 medical 
treatments were given, 95,453 children vaccinated against meningitis and measles, 5.4 
million litres of clean water produced, 98 culverts repaired, 12 bridges built, 3,308 mines 
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and unexploded ordnance made safe, 467 vehicles repaired, 1,500 tonnes of aid delivered, 
20,000 refugees transported home and five orphanages refurbished.
130
  Additionally, British 
soldiers worked in Dallaire’s headquarters, providing communications across the country 
and also logistical support to various other UN contingents and NGOs.  In addition to the 
official taskings, the British troops also voluntarily assisted in the reconstruction of Rwanda.  
For example, the units based in Kigali helped rebuild the Missionaries of Charity Orphanage 
where 300 children were being cared for.  The troops rebuilt the walls, refitted the electrics 
and repaired the water supply and sanitation.  The wives and families of those serving in 
Rwanda also became involved in a fundraising appeal, which was used to buy cooking, 




The Aid Community’s Response 
 Given the close relationship between the Overseas Development Administration and 
NGOs in this period and the fact that much of the ODA’s aid funding was channelled 
through British NGOs it is appropriate here to explore the response of both together.  Whilst 
Operation Gabriel was essentially a military, and perhaps the UK’s most visible, response, 
the ODA was fairly heavily involved in addressing the humanitarian crisis both in Rwanda 
and in neighbouring countries.  For example, on 16 July three chartered planes left the UK 
carrying aid for refugees in Zaire.  The first, a huge Antonov 124, carried 11 trucks; the 
other two carried 80 tons of plastic sheeting, tents and blankets for use in the growing 
refugee camps.
132
  The ODA continued to fund the hire of two of these planes for the 
UNHCR to use for a period of one month.  Additionally, ODA logistics experts travelled to 
Zaire to assist UN staff with the distribution of aid and the team that had been managing the 
airport in Mwanza (Tanzania) also redeployed to Goma in response to the new crisis there.  
This team remained at Goma for at least three weeks, until they were eventually replaced by 
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US military handling teams.  After a brief respite, the team was then reassigned to work at 
Kigali airport.  At the request of UNHCR, a second ODA airfield cargo handling team was 
also deployed to Entebbe (Uganda) in late July.   
 However, by mid August the ODA increasingly believed that the best solution to the 
crisis was for the refugees to return to Rwanda and British aid was refocused towards this 
aim.  The US Ambassador to London reported a conversation he had with Baroness Chalker 
around this time:  
[she said] she had visited many refugee camps throughout the world but had 
never seen anything as horrendous as the Rwandan refugee camps at Goma.  It 
was ‘like the middle ages’ with thousands of bodies wrapped in blankets left 
along the roads.  She returned to London even more determined to take action 
to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda.
133
   
 
 
Consequently, the British bilateral aid effort shifted its focus to Kigali, rather than Goma, in 
an attempt to improve conditions there so as to encourage refugees to return home.  Chalker 
also remained conscious of the potential for the refugee situation to worsen once the French 
Operation Turquoise withdrew from southwest Rwanda at the end of August.  Therefore, as 
well as the redeployment of British troops to this region, £3.5 million of ODA funding was 
targeted at supporting NGO and UN programs there.
134
 
The ODA were clear however that they did not intend to become involved in long-
term reconstruction or development work in Rwanda.
135
  Instead its activities were 
concentrated on three broad areas: encouraging reconciliation through the use of mass 
media, mainly radio (broadcasting equipment was purchased from the BBC to assist with 
this); providing a kick start to the economy; and, supporting the new administration’s 
structure and systems.  In terms of the third area an ODA assessment team, for example, 
recognised that the Rwandan Minister of Health was working out of a hotel room with no 
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equipment or transportation.  £120,000 of ODA aid was therefore channelled into 
purchasing office equipment and vehicles for the minister.
136
 
On 27 July, Peter Burton, head of the disaster unit in the ODA, informed contacts at 
the US Embassy in London that UK aid to Rwanda at this stage stood at £18 million 
bilaterally, as well as £22 million of assistance being channelled through EU programs.
137
  
During her visit to Rwanda on 29 July, Baroness Chalker announced a further £10 million of 
aid, bringing the total British contribution to £50 million since the beginning of April.  By 
the end of August, this had increased by a further £10 million to £60 million.  It was not 
until the end of September that the ODA concluded that the emergency crisis was over in 
Rwanda and therefore the provision of aid could be wound down.  As ODA officials told 
American diplomats “[the] ODA has no plans at this point to engage in rehabilitation 
programs since it has never had a country program in Rwanda”138  All told the UK would be 
the fourth largest donor to the crisis in Rwanda, behind the US, EU (to which the UK was 
again one of the largest contributors) and Japan.
139
   
In terms of NGOs, whilst media coverage may not have influenced the FCO in an 
obvious or clear way, it certainly seems to have influenced public opinion and therefore the 
NGO response.  The head of the charity Feed the Children for example recalled “By early 
July our supporters were calling to say what were we doing?  We are responsive to the 
wishes and intentions of our supporters.  We don’t want to let them down”.140  What ensued 
was what can be called the “Scramble for Rwanda”, as hundreds of aid workers flocked to 
the region, mainly Zaire.  The JEEAR report on NGOs records that over 100 turned up to 
“help” in Goma.141  Nicholas Stockton describes Goma as being “awash with the modern 
symbols of international aid: T-shirts, car stickers and flags”.  With so many NGOs in Goma, 
he continues, they “all clamoured for television coverage and made claims about what could 
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be achieved, some of which were indeed outrageous”.142  Careful not to miss an opportunity 
for publicity Oxfam had their name painted six foot high on water tanks in one refugee camp 
and ensured they were used as a backdrop for television reports.  CARE UK acknowledges 
that they “had never received media coverage like that before”.143   
The conspicuous presence of NGOs combined with ongoing and sympathetic media 
coverage appears to have influenced public donations to the aid campaigns.  The level of 
donations to the Disasters Emergency Committee seems to demonstrate this influence of 
media coverage; donations peaked in August at £5.1 million, the height of the Goma crisis, 
followed by May at £1.8 million, the height of the refugee crisis in Tanzania.   By 
November, when media coverage was negligible, donations had reduced to £0.3 million.
144
  
Similarly John Grain, who logged credit card donations to Oxfam noted that donations 
“mirrored almost exactly the ebbs and flows of TV and tabloid coverage of Rwanda: May 
1,000 calls, June 134, July 6,000 (the largest ever response to an appeal in a month), August 
2,500, September 100.”145  As Feed the Children were also to recall, after some weeks the 
media lost interest in Rwanda and “the money dried up immediately.  It was like turning off 
a tap”.146  It seems then that donations closely correlated with press coverage, but are also an 
indication that claims of the public’s compassion fatigue in the early 1990s are overstated.  
The public were more than willing to help the sick and the hungry if not the victims of 
genocide.  Once the media lost interest though so did the public. 
Given the fairly substantial funding channelled through them by the ODA on top of 
the generosity of the public, British NGOs were able to play a significant role in the 
humanitarian relief both in Rwanda and also in neighbouring countries.  The following is a 
description of just some of the activities performed by British NGOs.  In July, fearing the 
imminent flow of refugees, Oxfam used £400,000 of its own reserve funds to preposition 
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water pumps and pipes in Goma.  Whilst this was only sufficient to provide water to 50,000 
people, and therefore quite inadequate in terms of the eventual exodus of refugees to Goma, 
it did provide emergency relief in the first few days until more equipment could be shipped 
over from the UK and therefore potentially averted many deaths.
147
  Also in Goma, 
ActionAid responded to the difficulties of digging toilets in the volcanic rock by shipping 
heavy plant from Scotland and operating this is in the camps.  Seeing the overload of 
agencies in Goma, Save the Children UK decided to operate just in Rwanda and developed a 
role in two very specific areas.  Firstly, it worked with UNICEF to support the Ministry of 
Family and Rehabilitation in Rwanda with regards to protecting women’s rights; 
traditionally women were not able to own land in Rwanda and therefore the death of their 
husbands in the genocide led to many women having their claim to property questioned.  
Secondly, Save the Children took the lead role in reuniting parents and children separated 
during the genocide and refugee exoduses.  Save the Children also provided training to 
Rwandans so this work could be carried on once their involvement reduced.
148
 
 Despite the good and well intentioned efforts of the NGOs, their role has been held 
up for criticism in a number of ways.  The first is a debate about whether NGOs were right to 
be offering assistance to people involved in the genocide, particularly elements of FAR that 
had fled to Zaire.  It has been suggested, particularly by the new Rwandan government and 
the organisation African Rights, that providing aid in Goma was morally wrong, given what 
FAR and the Interahamwe had done in Rwanda.  However, as CARE UK articulated “Our 
remit is to provide humanitarian assistance.  That is what we do.” 149   Or as Nicholas 
Stockton of Oxfam was later to suggest, to do anything other than feed the refugees would 
have in itself been a breach of human rights and would have effectively constituted the 
vengeful punishment of the Hutu masses, many of whom were not involved in the genocide, 
without trial.
150
  In fact it is clear that many NGO workers did not even have to consider this 
debate.  Many who travelled to Goma were not aware that they were providing aid to the 
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perpetrators of genocide; a large proportion of aid workers, like the wider public, believed 
those in Goma were actually the victims of the violence.
151
   As Storey highlights, this 
ignorance of the political dimensions of the crisis meant that many aid workers gave 
misleading and misinformed interviews to the media.  Media coverage of comments by one 
aid worker, for example, about how his daily routine began at 5.30 each morning and 
involved helping Hutu who faced the dilemma of remaining in the refugee camp and risking 
cholera, or returning to Rwanda and the prospect of a revenge killing at the hands of the 
Tutsi army, simply added to the British public’s difficulty in understanding the crisis.152    
A second debate that emerged after the immediate crisis had elapsed was whether 
NGOs had overly focused on Goma to the detriment of relief in Rwanda itself.  As Andy 
Storey highlights, in 1994 only “35.3 per cent of all aid had been allocated for use within 
Rwanda ... By September 1995, 20 times more aid had gone to refugees outside the country 
than to support refugee resettlement within Rwanda.”153  Much of this is blamed on the 
NGOs’ need for media coverage to increase public awareness of their actions and thereby 
stimulate donations.  In an ironic vicious circle, which is repeated in most humanitarian 
emergencies, journalists were in Goma because that is where the NGOs were and the NGOs 
were there because that is where the journalists were; each depended on the other.  Certainly 
the impact of NGOs focusing so heavily on Goma, and continuing to provide aid to all, was 
to prolong the insecurity in the region.  As long as NGOs from Britain and other western 
countries continued to operate in Goma the FAR and Interahamwe continued to be fed and 
clothed and were able to continue launching attacks on Rwanda.  As the NGO Save the 
Children UK also argued, the availability of aid in Goma deterred ordinary Hutu refugees 
from returning home, something that the British government considered key if the crisis was 
to be solved.
154
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Could More Have Been Done? Other Peacekeeping Missions 
 Again, to address the issue of responsibility, we return to the question of whether the 
UK could have done more in Rwanda.  Having already addressed what more could have 
been done in the months preceding the genocide and also what capacity the military had to 
respond during the genocide, here the question is addressed by comparison to other 
peacekeeping operations.  Since the end of the Cold War the British military has been 
involved in various interventions, by comparing the response to the Rwandan crisis to some 
of these it may be possible to determine whether the response to Rwanda was unusual.  
Three interventions are considered here; firstly two interventions that are generally 
considered to have been successful Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq, 1991) and Operation 
Unified Protector (Libya, 2011), and then thirdly the rather less successful intervention in 
Bosnia in the early 1990s.  These three are all interventions in which the UK played a 
leading role, both diplomatically and in terms of resourcing, and all also took place during 
periods of Conservative government after the end of the Cold War.  Like Rwanda, all also 
involved civil war (though in the case of Iraq limited to only one region of the country) 
evolving into a significant humanitarian crisis. 
Operation Provide Comfort 
 The Iraqi defeat in the first Gulf War in 1991 was followed by an unsuccessful 
Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein.  Hussein’s response was to brutally repress the 
uprising, forcing thousands of Kurds to flee their homes to the mountainous border region of 
Iraq and Turkey.  Within weeks one million refugees were just managing to survive on the 
border, but a shortage of food, water and shelter was creating a humanitarian crisis that the 
Red Cross described as a “public health catastrophe of immense proportions”.155 
 At the end of March the French and Turkish governments sponsored a joint UN 
Security Council Resolution (688) which “insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by 
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international humanitarian organisations to all those in need” and “appeal[ed] to all Member 
States and to all humanitarian organisations to contribute to these humanitarian relief 
efforts”.156  The Resolution did not call for, or even appear to permit, military intervention.  
At this point the narrative becomes slightly confused.  Popular opinion has is that John 
Major decided that a more robust, military led, intervention was required to alleviate the 
suffering allegedly after having been “appalled by what he saw and read in the weekend 
media”157 apparently whilst putting on his socks.158  The Sunday papers had certainly all 
dedicated a great deal of space to the Kurdish crisis, which The Observer described on its 
front page as “a belt of misery along the Turkish border”.159  John Major himself, however, 
suggests that he was already aware of the crisis and had raised the Kurdish issue at Cabinet a 
week earlier; this seems to be borne out by the fact that Baroness Chalker and the ODA were 
already coordinating aid drops to the refugees before the Sunday papers went to press.
160
  
Either way, on 8 April at a routine European Council meeting, Major presented a plan to 
establish safe havens in northern Iraq to provide protection to Kurds and to encourage them 
to return home.  Both Major and Hurd’s autobiographies suggest that this idea emanated not 
from the FCO but directly from the Prime Minister; Anthony Seldon likewise quotes Major 
as having told his closest advisers “Of course the Foreign Office won’t like it”.161  With 
French and German support obtained the safe haven idea was presented to President Bush as 
a European plan.  Bush’s initial response was to reject the suggestion, “he [allegedly] did not 
want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that has been going on for 
ages.”162  However, just three days later, following a visit to the region by Secretary of State 
James Baker, Bush not only announced his support for the plan but claimed it as his own. 
 On 16 April, coalition troops crossed into northern Iraq.  Their mission, as described 
to parliament by then Secretary of State for Defence Tom King, was threefold: stop the 
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immediate suffering, encourage the Kurds to move from camps in the mountains to more 
sustainable camps in the valleys, and to encourage Kurds ultimately to return home.
163
  The 
force, under American command, included paratroopers from USA, France and Spain; 
infantry from USA and Luxembourg; marines from USA, Britain and the Netherlands; and, 
special-forces from USA and Italy.
164
  Operation Provide Comfort would eventually number 
more than 20,000 allied troops.
165
 The British element, known as Operation Haven, included 
the bulk of 3 Commando Brigade, made up of two Royal Marine Commando units, a battery 
of Royal Artillery (six guns), as well as helicopters, RAF planes and various support units.  
In total about 5,000 men.
166
 
 Prima facie the response to the Kurdish crisis is rather damning evidence against the 
failure to respond sooner in Rwanda; Provide Comfort demonstrates the international 
community’s ability to deploy large numbers of troops, into a potentially hostile situation, in 
an incredibly short period of time.  Major General Robin Ross, who commanded Operation 
Haven, for example records that Iraqi forces in the region were “overwhelmed” by the scale 
of the coalition force.
167
  Provide Comfort also demonstrates a willingness to deploy troops 
without explicit UN approval and in the face of traditional claims of sovereignty.  Despite 
Resolution 688, military intervention had not actually been approved by the Security 
Council.  The US, France and the UK, Adam Roberts argues, knew there was little chance of 
Russia or China agreeing to the intervention and therefore did not ask for such authority.
168
  
The operation was therefore a NATO mission justified on the grounds of “overwhelming 
humanitarian need” and claiming to be “consistent with Resolution 688”. 169   Provide 
Comfort was also different from previous peacekeeping missions in that it was not neutral.  
The mission was launched very much to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi military, hence the 
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composition of the force, which included attack aircraft and artillery, neither of which are 
much use for relieving humanitarian suffering.
170
   
Why then were international leaders willing to respond so forcefully in Iraq?  
Firstly, there was a better understanding of the Kurdish crisis at senior levels of government.  
Seldon for example suggests Major did see the media coverage of the crisis himself and was 
genuinely responding to the suffering that he saw on the television.
171
  Baroness Chalker also 
suggests that the government’s understanding of what was happening in Iraq was quite 
different from the crisis in Rwanda.  In an interview with the author, she highlighted the 
presence of the large Kurdish population in the UK (many of whom held a protest at the US 
Embassy in London calling Hussein’s response genocide and demanding international 
support of the uprising), combined with media coverage and information coming from 
Turkey, as having had an impact on the decision to intervene.
172
   
Secondly looking at the ability to intervene, from a British perspective Provide 
Comfort shows that the government believed they were incapable of mounting such an 
operation unilaterally.  Major knew “this was too big and costly an exercise for the British 
alone” and therefore accepted “we would need American and European support.”173  Major 
therefore deliberately courted France and Germany before approaching the Americans.  
General Ross also suggests that the success of the mission depended on the presence of US 
planes and also a force of sufficient size to intimidate the Iraqi forces.
174
  Alone the UK 
could not have provided this and as such a unilateral British response in both Iraq and 
Rwanda would have been considered unrealistic.  In practical terms there was another 
significant difference between Rwanda and Provide Comfort in that the latter was launched 
from Turkey which had the infrastructure capable of supporting such a mission.  Rwanda in 
1994 on the other hand had no petrol and nowhere near enough aviation fuel.  The recent 
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end of the Gulf War, and the fact that the US Air Force had existing facilities at Incirlik 
airbase in Turkey, also meant that some military assets were prepositioned for use in the 
mission, which was not the case in Rwanda – in 1994 only France had soldiers based in 
Central Africa.  These various factors meant that, unlike a possible intervention in Rwanda, 
the Kurdish mission was expected to have a high chance of success.  The various militaries 
were confident given the recent defeat of Iraqi forces in the Gulf War and the size and 
composition of the force.   
The final point to note is that in Iraq there was a national interest argument to 
support intervention and there was political will.  Piers Robinson suggests that the 
intervention was not motivated by morality but by the desire to come to aid of Turkey, a 
NATO ally, who faced an unprecedented refugee crisis.  President Bush’s discussions with 
President Ozal of Turkey lend strong support to this argument, Robinson argues.
175
  In fact, 
both the NATO mission and Resolution 688 were justified on the grounds, not of moral 
obligation, but out of the need to maintain international peace and security.  In terms of 
Major’s support, Seldon also argues that despite what he saw on the television, perhaps the 
most significant motivation was the desire to appear statesmanlike, something his advisers 
deemed necessary so soon after becoming Prime Minister.
176
  The intervention then was 
driven not by moral obligation but by realist foreign policy; as we have seen the realist 
argument in support of intervention in Rwanda was less strong. 
Operation Unified Protector 
 Twenty years after Provide Comfort, in February 2011 an initially peaceful protest 
against another dictatorial ruler, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, was forcefully put down by his 
army.  Over the next weeks the protests spread and the number of civilians killed by the 
Libyan army and police increased.  As the government’s repression intensified, the 
protestors came together to form a rebel army and the country degenerated into open civil 
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war.  In response the Security Council issued a resolution expressing “grave concern” over 
the situation in the country and imposing an arms embargo.
177
  After the situation further 
deteriorated, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March.  The resolution 
condemned the “gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary 
detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions.”  It also authorized 
member states to use “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.178  In response to 
Resolution 1973 NATO, led largely by the UK and France, agreed to enforce the arms 
embargo, to enforce a no-fly zone and ultimately to use NATO aircraft to forcefully protect 
civilians at risk from attack by the Libyan military.  This mission was codenamed Operation 
Unified Protector. 
 In total, NATO planes flew more than 26,000 sorties over Libya, an average of 120 
per day.  40 per cent of these were strike sorties against military targets, which damaged or 
destroyed approximately 6,000 targets.  At its peak, Unified Protector involved more than 
8,000 servicemen, 21 NATO ships in the Mediterranean and more than 250 aircrafts.
179
  At 
no point were ground troops officially deployed into Libya; however, the British media did 
speculate that the SAS were deployed to act as forward air controllers and to advise the rebel 
army.
180
  In addition to this possible SAS role, the Royal Navy deployed 16 vessels at 
various times to the mission.  British frigates formed part of the blockade enforcing the arms 
embargo and were also involved in evacuating western civilians trapped in Libya; two 
nuclear powered submarines launched missiles against land targets within Libya; and the 
helicopter carrier HMS Ocean was used as base for the army’s Apache attack helicopters 
which were used across Libya.  The RAF was also involved; Tornado and Typhoon jets, 
relocated to Italy, attacked Libyan ground units and other aircraft provided logistical and 
intelligence support to the overall mission.   
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Again the deployment to Libya seems to demonstrate the west, and Britain’s, ability 
to intervene in response to humanitarian emergencies at short notice.  It is, like Provide 
Comfort, also an example of quite partisan intervention launched without the invitation of 
the host nation.  Whilst the mission’s objective was the relief of human suffering this was 
achieved by attacking and destroying military assets being used against the population.  
What then, if anything, differentiated Libya and Rwanda in the minds of decision makers? 
 Drawing on Kroslak’s factors for assigning responsibility there were at least two 
distinct differences between Rwanda and Libya.  Firstly there was an understanding of what 
was happening in Libya and more significantly this knowledge was interpreted quite 
differently in the two crises.  Whilst Libya, like Rwanda, was in the midst of a civil war, it 
was a war in which the west easily discerned a good side and a bad side; the rebels were 
seen to be fighting for democracy, Gaddafi, on the other hand, was described by The Times 
as “mad ... murderous and evil”.181  So whilst the civil war in Rwanda was reported in the 
media and understood by politicians to be an ancient tribal war, the war in Libya was 
described by Prime Minister David Cameron as a war for democracy and as a war to 
overthrow a leader that had inflicted “murderous attacks”182 on his own people and, through 
the sponsorship of terrorism, the world.  The rhetoric of FCO ministers speaking about the 
two crises reflects this fundamental difference in interpretation of the crises and explains 
why intervention was deemed appropriate in one case and not the other; for William Hague 
the war in Libya was an opportunity that “gave Libyan people a chance to determine their 
own future”183 for Mark Lennox-Boyd the war in Rwanda was nothing more than a “a tragic 
civil war”.184  The crisis in Libya, unlike the genocide in Rwanda, was also understood by 
the UK, France and NATO to be a threat to western national interests.  A speech by the 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, shows this: 
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 Let me remind everyone just why this matters to all of us ... This is a regime 
that for years supported terrorism around the world and was implicated in the 
biggest mass murder ever on British soil, the Lockerbie bombing ... and if we 
don’t sort out the current problems the risk is again of a failed pariah state 
festering on Europe’s southern border, threatening our security, pushing 
people across the Mediterranean and creating a more dangerous and uncertain 





There was a genuine belief, amongst both western and Arab leaders, that continued violence 
in Libya would lead to a breakdown of international peace and security in both the 
Mediterranean region and the wider world.  There was then a fundamental difference in 
western knowledge and understanding of the two crises that made intervention, to maintain 
international order as well as to ease the humanitarian suffering, more likely in Libya.  
Secondly, in terms of ability to respond, it is easy to highlight once again the relative 
logistical ease of intervening in Libya compared to Rwanda; NATO was able to launch 
planes and helicopters both from air bases in Italy and also aircraft carriers in the 
Mediterranean.  The nature of the Libyan conflict also meant that intervention by air alone 
had a reasonable chance of success; NATO aircraft could target Gaddafi’s tanks, artillery 
and other armoured vehicles and therefore, as Prime Minister David Cameron put it, “stop 
tanks rolling into Benghazi ... [and] prevent a bloodbath”.186  As Secretary of Defence Liam 
Fox suggested, these targeted strikes were seen as being able to reduce Gaddafi’s forces’ 
“capacity to kill their own civilians.”187  The geography of the uprising also meant that 
NATO could fairly easily differentiate between government and rebel forces and keep 
collateral civilian damage to a minimum. In Rwanda, the fact that the genocide was 
perpetrated in towns door-to-door using machetes and hand grenades meant that air 
intervention alone would not have been effective; as The Independent suggested of Libya 
“hitting tanks in the open is meat and drink to coalition aircraft, but firing into cities is much 
more difficult”.188  Whereas air intervention was effective in Libya, stopping the genocide in 
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Rwanda would have, as Alan Kuperman explains, required thousands of troops on the 
ground.
189
 This was something that the international community, US President Obama 
especially, rejected out of hand in the case of Libya;
190
 in fact the UN Resolution, as David 
Cameron said, “absolutely and specifically rule[d] out” ground troops.191  However, even 
without the use of ground troops intervention in Libya was considered achievable, and 
therefore as Piers Jakobsen would suggest, was more likely than intervention in Rwanda.
192
 
A third factor of note, which Latane and Darley would perhaps suggest is explained 
by their experiments into bystander intervention,
193
 is the fact that the NATO intervention 
came in response to widespread international calls for western intervention.  As well as UN 
support for intervention there were calls from the Arab League and its members for 
something to be done in Libya.  Unlike in Rwanda, the international community said that 
Libya was an emergency that required a bystander response and indeed David Cameron 
drew on this international support on numerous occasions including when he announced the 
initial use of British aircraft above Libya.
194
  In an interview with the author, Foreign 
Secretary William Hague suggested that this international support was a significant factor in 
the UK’s decision to support intervention.195  Similarly, he continued, at the time of the 
interview the debate about a possible role for the UN in Syria, where in 2011 and 2012 in a 
similar way to Libya the government attacked its own citizens, was being shaped by the 
absence of support for intervention there; without these calls from regional powers, he 
suggested, intervention was less likely.  Notably, during the genocide phase of the Rwandan 
crisis such international support was absent. 
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 The civil war in Bosnia was contemporary to the crisis in Rwanda and therefore 
significant when considering the response to the genocide.  This significance is heightened 
by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s suggestion that the international community was 
quick to respond to the rich man’s war in Bosnia but were willing to stand by and watch 
thousands of Africans be killed in Rwanda.
196
  However, whilst at its peak UNPROFOR, the 
UN’s mission to Croatia and Bosnia, would number nearly 39,000 men, it is also noteworthy 
that the debate on how to respond to the crisis tore the international community apart; there 
was no consensus on how, or even whether, to respond.  Boutros-Ghali’s claim also ignores 
the fact that the UN only deployed a peacekeeping mission to Bosnia, and its neighbour 
Croatia, in February 1992, nearly a full year after war had broken out.  Indeed troops were 
sent to Croatia only after a ceasefire had been agreed and in 1992 Marrack Goulding, at the 
time head of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operating, did not support the intervention in 
Bosnia as the war there was on-going.
197
  Far from being quick, the response to the crisis 
was slow, often under resourced and in many cases reacted to terrible events on the ground, 
such as the mortar bombing of the Sarajevo market, rather than being proactive.   
 British involvement in the mission certainly also appears to have been less than 
enthusiastic; David Reynolds in fact suggests that the Major government initially “resolutely 
opposed military intervention”.198   Douglas Hurd notes that the Cabinet and indeed the 
House of Commons generally were “sceptical of the need for even the limited intervention 
we undertook”.199  Seldon makes similar claims, noting that when Cabinet discussed the 
deployment of British troops in August 1992 “Deep reservations were expressed about 
troops getting sucked irrevocably into the area; this time the British were citing American 
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analogies, this time Vietnam.”200  Despite the reservations, Britain “reluctantly” sent a 300 
man field hospital unit in April 1992 and then five months later a battle group (around 2,400 
men) to protect aid convoys.
201
  Over the next couple of years British troop numbers would 
steadily increase; growing eventually to a brigade size deployment which included heavy 
artillery, Challenger tanks and RAF support. 
  Why then if there was such reticence did the Major government agree to send 
British troops to Bosnia?  Hurd makes it clear that it was not out of belief that Yugoslavia 
was of “huge importance to British interest” or that the conflict would explode into some 
pan-European war.
202
  Nor was British involvement intended in any way to stop the war 
through active involvement; Major believed that the war was a result of ancient hatreds and 
intervention would not bring an end to the violence; there was no way, he believed, at this 
stage that the British should take sides.
203
  As Adam Lebor rather critically suggests Britain 
and France sent troops not because they wanted to go to war, but precisely because they did 
not want to; the small humanitarian force, he suggests, we an “alibi for not taking more 
robust action”.204  All troops could achieve, Major believed, was some alleviation of the 
humanitarian crisis by providing protection to the aid convoys.  In fact in 1992 it seems that 
Britain simply did the minimum that was expected of them by other European governments.  
The French government believed that the EU had to intervene and should do this without US 
support; similarly the German government called for intervention, but made it clear that for 
historical reasons they could not send troops.  Hurd recognised this pressure and records in 
his memoirs that in September 1991 he warned the prime minister that the UK “could not 
exclude absolutely and for ever the deployment of British troops in Yugoslavia.”205  The 
European pressure made British involvement inevitable for Hurd; as Lawrence Freedman 
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would suggest, ignoring Bosnia would simply not have been consistent with Hurd and 
Major’s desire for the UK to be seen as “a full and responsible member of the EU”.206 
 As Mary Kaldor argues, the hesitancy in committing troops and then the 
international community’s failure to deploy enough troops though meant that the 
humanitarian relief effort was far from effective.
207
  The UN force, despite the presence of 
armoured units, artillery and air support, was unable to provide protection to the population 
of Sarajevo, to prevent the massacre of thousands of Muslim men at Srebrenica, or even to 
ensure the distribution of aid supplies as it was mandated to.  Despite designating a number 
of cities as safe havens the UN’s timidity meant that the violence, ethnic cleansing and war 
continued.  The French and British governments were so concerned about the risks to their 
troops on the ground that many, if not most, of the objectives could not be achieved.  As 
would also happen in Rwanda, and as Michael Barnett explains, the “obligation to protect 
the lives of peacekeepers ... overrode the needs of those who were the victims of 
genocide”.208  This timidity became so prevalent that in 1995 General Janvier, the head of 
the UN mission in Yugoslavia, issued guidelines that made it explicit that “the execution of 
the mandate is secondary to the security of UN personnel”.209  As David Rieff wrote in his 
book Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, “Wasn’t it incongruous that UN 
soldiers and UNHCR convoy drivers risked, sometimes lost, their lives to bring in food to 
isolated areas, but steadfastly refused to silence the guns that were causing the 
emergency.”210  To actually use troops to stop, or to stand in between the warring armies, 
was simply considered too high risk and was never seriously considered.  By clinging to the 
concept of impartiality in the war and so desperately trying to avoid casualties, the 
peacekeepers were, as David Reiff suggests, “consigned to the role of a eunuch at the 
orgy”.211  
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 To suggest that Rwanda was ignored whilst a successful peacekeeping mission took 
place in Yugoslavia does not seem fair or accurate.  In the early 1990s, the west 
begrudgingly deployed troops (the US did not send troops until 1995) and then they were 
sent in numbers that were incapable of achieving their objectives with a mandate that did 
nothing other than allow them to protect aid convoys.  Two incidents demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeepers; the first only resulted in one death, the second in 
over 8,000.  In January 1993 the Vice President of Bosnia was being transported in the back 
of a French armoured personnel carrier that was stopped at a Serb roadblock.  Under 
pressure, the French colonel commanding the small convoy allowed it to be searched; the 
Serbs discovered the Vice President and shot him.  The French troops stood by and watched 
this happen.
212
  In the second incident, following the fall of Srebrenica to Serb forces in July 
1995, 8,000 Muslim men and boys were separated and executed in nearby woods; Dutch 
soldiers had watched the men be led away powerless to intervene.   
Rwanda – Could More Have Been Done? 
These three missions are all potential evidence that the international community, and 
the UK in particular, could have done more in Rwanda.  Provide Comfort provides proof 
that a sizeable military force can be deployed quickly and rapidly alleviate humanitarian 
suffering.  Libya is a demonstration that the international community can, when it wants, 
intervene proactively on one side in civil war.  And Bosnia is evidence that in 1994 Britain 
was, however reluctantly, ready to commit peacekeeping troops into a hostile environment, 
and indeed incur casualties. 
However, there are key differences.  In Provide Comfort there was the infrastructure 
to support a mission in neighbouring Turkey; there was better understanding in the west of 
what was happening in Iraq; there was national interest at stake; and there was political will 
to do something being led by national leaders.  But most significantly, Iraq, unlike Rwanda, 
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was not by the time of the intervention a full scale civil war.  In Iraq the victims and the 
aggressor were obvious; in Rwanda the west simply saw tribal violence with victims and 
aggressors on both sides.  Similarly in Libya, intervention was practically easier; again there 
was a national interest and there was political will to do something.  And although there was 
a civil war in Libya, it was one where the two sides could be clearly differentiated and 
support for the rebels fighting for democracy against the dictatorial leader easily justified.  
Finally, Bosnia is not proof that the UN gave preference to the protection of white men over 
black.  It is a demonstration of the UN, and Europe’s, reticence in the early 1990s to become 
involved in peacekeeping; their reticence to put their own troops at risk; their reticence to 
support one side over another in a complicated civil war; and their inability to offer security 
to those they claimed to protect. 
The three cases though also give us some indication of why no intervention force 
could be found until it was too late to save so many Tutsi civilians.  Firstly, in terms of 
understanding of the crises, whilst Libya and Iraq demonstrate that the international 
community is willing to intervene on behalf of one side, Bosnia shows that this is the case 
only when the west can identify or sympathise with that side or is already opposed to the 
other.  The war in Rwanda, where the west, other than France, had no particular sympathy 
with either side, was more akin to the situation in Bosnia than that in Libya or Iraq.  
Supporting the argument of proponents of the theory of realist foreign policy, in these three 
cases intervention was justified on the grounds of national interest, though defined 
differently in each case; there was no perceived national interest in Rwanda.  These other 
examples also show the importance of high level knowledge of crises and support for 
intervention.  In Iraq and Libya where the prime ministers were personally supportive, the 
missions were better resourced and more successful than the Bosnia example where Major 
was reluctant to become involved.  We know of Rwanda, that Major and Hurd showed little 
interest in the crisis until July.  In terms of ability to intervene, the examples, demonstrate 
the importance of policy makers’ view on likelihood of success.  Libya and Iraq were 
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considered achievable and received support.  Bosnia and Rwanda were complicated and 
policy makers tried to ignore the two crises; as Barnett puts it, the “UN and member states 
[have a desire] to pick winners and to avoid failures”.213  None of these factors excuse 
Britain’s decision to not do more in Rwanda sooner, but they do go some way to explaining 
the decision. 
Summary 
 July and August were the months during which the British government moved from 
being an ignorant or disinterested bystander to an active participant in the relief of the 
humanitarian crisis.  The combination of aid and military resources meant that overall the 
UK became one of the largest contributors to the Rwanda relief effort; though, like most of 
the international community this aid did not arrive in the country until the civil war, and 
genocide, had ended – hence, Adam Robert’s claim of too little, too late.  Whilst the 
argument that the UK did eventually do more than most other countries, is not enough to 
appease the critics, such as Linda Melvern or General Dallaire, it is true.  The British 
government, British NGOs and the British public responded to the humanitarian crisis in a 
way that other countries simply did not.  But this does not absolve the UK of criticism.  The 
media in particular were responsible for a gross misunderstanding of what was happening in 
Rwanda; the focus on Goma and cholera without the historical perspective of the genocide 
was an insult to the memory of the nearly one million Tutsi that had been murdered during 
the genocide.  The media led the public and NGOs to focus on Goma whilst the situation in 
Rwanda itself received little attention.  Of course overall it can be argued that the UK did 
too little too late, but the truth that cannot be ignored is that the government, NGOs and 
public did something eventually that saved thousands of lives. 
                                                          





 We started this discussion of Britain and Rwanda with a quote from Tony Blair; 
speaking of humanitarian crises he wrote “If we know and we fail to act, we are responsible.  
[In April 1994] Rwanda erupted in genocide. We knew.  We failed to act.  We were 
responsible.” 1   Having now explored the evidence, do these claims about Britain’s 
culpability hold true?  This final conclusion returns to the questions of what Britain knew of 
the 1994 crisis; how the UK responded and whether more could have been done; and  finally 
considers whether the UK should be held responsible for the crisis. 
Did Britain Know? 
 In the years and months leading up to April 1994, if you looked hard enough, there 
were signs of impending genocide.  In Kigali Edward Clay, Britain’s High Commissioner in 
Uganda, for example, saw for himself the build up of soldiers, the arming of militias and 
heard stories of murders.  In New York, reports from Romeo Dallaire recorded the 
increasingly volatile atmosphere in Rwanda (the British contingent at the UN may or may 
not have seen this) and the Secretariat produced reports highlighting the human rights 
abuses.  In Washington, US intelligence agencies predicted massive loss of life should civil 
war resume, again these may have been seen by the British.  And in the UK, NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International, wrote to members about the increasingly common murder of 
civilians in Rwanda and called for the UN’s response to be stepped up.  For historians 




However, simply listing these signs oversimplifies the complexity of foreign policy 
making; although the signs are now obvious they were anything but obvious in 1994.  As 
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John Coles suggests “so often exhaustive accounts, written well after the event, fall into the 
trap of hindsight and fail to take account of the other pressures on policy makers”.3  Authors 
that catalogue the various indicators and then conclude that the British government must 
have known about the threat of genocide ignore a fundamental fact - government is a 
disjointed bureaucracy.  As Graham Allison demonstrates “information does not pass from 
the tentacle to the top of the organisation instantaneously.  Facts can be ‘in the system’ 
without being available to the head of the organisation”.4  Maybe, for example, a British 
official at the UN’s New York headquarters did see Dallaire’s infamous Genocide Fax, but 
David Hannay insists that he did not; a senior official at the FCO’s UN department insists 
they did not; and it is almost a certainty that Douglas Hurd, the man who had the capacity to 
actually respond to the fax’s contents, did not.  Authors, like Des Forges, also underplay the 
fact that these discreet pieces of information, many of which were nothing more than 
rumour, fell onto the desks of officials with a thousand other priorities, more focussed on 
existing crises than hypothetical ones.  And finally they ignore the fact that this information 
was being reviewed by people with no experience of spotting genocide and, in the case of 
the FCO, with almost no knowledge of Rwanda.   
 Even when genocide did begin this was not immediately obvious in London.  The 
official UN report into Rwanda concludes “the persistent attempts to view the situation in 
Kigali after the death of the President as one where the cease-fire had broken down ... rather 
than one of genocide ... was a costly error of judgement”;5 it is one though, that in the case 
of the UK at least, can be understood.  The British government, unlike the US, France, 
Belgium and China, did not have officials in Rwanda in April 1994; the FCO was unable to 
communicate with the honorary consul in Kigali because phone lines had been destroyed; 
and the nearest High Commission, in Kampala, was unable to report on what was happening 
in neighbouring Rwanda because the border was closed and fighting made the northern route 
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into the country unsafe.  In April 1994 the government had no first hand intelligence coming 
directly from Rwanda; London’s intelligence instead came from other countries, the UN 
Secretariat and the media, none of which in early April were able to give an accurate 
indication of what was happening in Rwanda. 
With no access to direct intelligence for the first few weeks of genocide, government 
ministers knew of Rwanda only what they read in the newspapers like everyone else.
6
  
Significantly this reporting, which in the absence of other sources had the potential to shape 
both the government and publics’ understanding of the crisis, was “appallingly misleading”.7  
The British media failed to identify the killings as anything other than anarchic and a 
resumption of the civil war for at least the first three weeks of genocide.  The BBC’s Mark 
Doyle for example accepts that “during the first few days, I, like others, got the story terribly 
wrong”.8  Instead of reporting the systematic murder of civilians, the media spoke about 
“tribal warfare”, “anarchy” and “chaos”.  It, of course, cannot be denied that reporting from 
Rwanda was hard; The Independent’s Richard Dowden, for instance, recalls the practical 
difficulties, dangers and expense of getting into the country, of travelling around and of 
filing reports with editors back in London.
9
  These factors, combined with the fact that the 
presidential election in South Africa was diverting the media’s attention away from Central 
Africa, do explain, but not necessarily excuse, why the press got it so wrong.  The effect 
though of this inaccurate coverage was that people in the UK fundamentally misunderstood 
what was happening in Rwanda until at least early May. 
 Whilst looking at intelligence, it is also necessary to briefly revisit the question of 
Britain’s relationship with the RPF.  Hazel Cameron and Wayne Marsden both suggest that 
the RPF’s 1990 invasion of Rwanda was made with full knowledge and approval of the 
British intelligence services and the RPF subsequently benefited from British aid,
10
 but there 
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is, at the time of writing, no credible evidence or sensible motive for either claim.  Whilst it 
cannot be categorically disproved that individuals within either MI6 or the FCO were aware 
of the invasion plans and possibly assisted the RPF, there is plenty of evidence to show that 
contact between the RPF and the British was minimal, low level and never constituted 
official support of the rebels.  
 The absence of intelligence sources and the inaccurate press coverage meant that the 
British government, like other countries many of whom had much closer links with the 
country, was not aware that the events in Rwanda constituted genocide until early May, by 
which time over three quarters of those that would ultimately be killed were already dead.
11
  
Whilst there is evidence, obvious now, that suggests the genocide could have been predicted 
or identified for what it really was sooner, the reality is this was not fully recognised at the 
time. In London, the government was no more likely have to foreseen the Rwandan 
genocide than they were to have foreseen the Nazi Holocaust following Kristallnacht. 
Did Britain Fail to Act? 
 Blair’s suggestion that the government failed to act has to be addressed by 
separating the crisis into two distinct phases.  From early April to the end of July the British 
government did indeed do little to ease the tragedy unfolding in Rwanda; but by August 
British troops were deployed and aid had been significantly ramped up.  Having now 
explored the British response over a number of months we look at how the policy of non-
intervention followed by active intervention can be explained and secondly whether more 
could have been done. 
Non-Intervention Explained 
 The British decision to not intervene has simply been explained as lack of national 
interest.  There was nothing General Dallaire, for example, claims in Rwanda “that impinged 
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on [the British government’s] narrowly defined national interests ... not geographically, 
strategically or economically” 12  or as Anne Mackintosh less bluntly suggests “Unlike 
Kuwait, [Rwanda] does not produce oil and was of no consequence to the influential 
members of the UN Security Council”.13  However, such an argument fails to address the 
obvious question of why the UK did eventually intervene – if there had been no national 
interest in May, still none existed in August when the UK did intervene.  Despite the 
suggestions of authors such as Aidan Hehir that intervention in distant lands is typically 
motivated by national interest,
14
 in the case of Rwanda there must have been factors others 
than lack of strictly defined national interest that prevented the UK from doing more sooner. 
Foreign Policy Ideology 
Certainly the government’s initial failure to respond fitted into the dominant 
Conservative foreign policy ideology of the time.  Despite the end of the Cold War and the 
growing school of liberalism, Conservative foreign policy remained, as the historian Michael 
Clarke suggests, distinctly realist in this period.
15
  A response to any humanitarian crisis 
grounded simply on moral obligation was therefore highly unlikely; as Douglas Hurd has 
suggested “My view is that there is and there should be a moral part of British foreign 
policy, but in deciding what to do you have to account for reality.”16  The mere existence of 
genocide was not enough to demand a response.  The Conservative government of 1994 just 
did not ideologically believe that humanitarian intervention was a moral obligation; this is 
demonstrated not only by the response to Rwanda but also by the determination to stay out 
of Bosnia.  Combined with a belief that foreign policy should be focused on promoting 
national interest and an inherent belief in the primacy of sovereignty (breached only briefly 
during Operation Provide Comfort), there was also a general view within the party that 
intervention would do more harm than good.
17
  For Leonie Murray this is partially explained 
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by the fact that the Conservative government of 1994 was still a product of the Cold War; 
the liberalist foreign policy, shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the associated 
peace dividend, that Clinton brought to the US in 1993, she argues only reached the UK in 
1997 when Tony Blair became prime minister.
18
  Until that point the government remained 
resolutely realist. 
Additional to this, the government retained a belief in the idea of spheres of 
influence; as a Francophone country with historic links to Belgium, Rwanda did not fall into 
a British sphere and was therefore someone else’s problem.  As late as mid July, for 
example, the MOD acknowledged the need for the UN’s efforts in Rwanda to be stepped up, 
but did not conclude that this necessarily meant British involvement.  This view also 
permeated the House of Commons, where MPs from across the House agreed that something 
should be done, but very few suggested that this actually meant a British response.  In this 
respect Britain’s failure to intervene sooner can be partially explained by its colonial past; 
for example, whilst one MP recalled being contacted by constituents who had lived in Sierra 
Leone and Sudan urging him to call for a response to the violence in those countries he 
recalled no such correspondence relating to Rwanda, there were after all no constituents with 
a link to tiny Rwanda.
19
 
The Media and the CNN Effect 
In 1996 Nicholas Soames, at the time a Minister at the MOD, suggested that media 
coverage had played an important role in putting Rwanda on the political agenda and 
influencing the government’s decision to send British troops: 
 In the Rwanda deployment there had been such a build up of what is quite 
rightly called the Kate Adie factor, where night after night scenes of appalling 
suffering and misery are brought into your living room and people rightly in 
this country feel that they would like to make a contribution to the relieving of 




                                                          
18 Murray, Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarianism, p.58. 
19 Confidential interview with author. 




Yet whilst television images and newspaper reports from the very start of the crisis showed 
the atrocities, there was no government response in the first three months; there would then 
seem to be contradictory evidence of the significance of the so-called CNN effect.   
 Widespread reports of civil war, chaos and anarchy filled the early reporting of the 
crisis; indeed the media coverage significantly shaped the early understanding of the crisis 
and influenced the decision, taken by governments across the world, to not intervene sooner.  
As Alan Kuperman argues “early reports indicated that the Tutsi rebels were winning the 
civil war ... which contradicted any notion of the Tutsi as victims.”21  As Royce Ammon 
suggests, in April this style of reporting meant there was little empathy for the suffering 
being experienced by Rwandan civilians, there were, he says, no “good people to whom bad 
things were happening ... no innocents in hell”.22  The reporting was, as Peter Dahlgren 
suggests is common of the media’s portrayal of Africa, “devoid of social, political and 
historical context” and consequently the media consumer was left with a belief of Rwanda’s 
people, again common of reporting Africa, that “That’s just the way they are”. 23   As 
Robinson suggests “[this] distance framing ... implicitly supported a policy of non-
intervention”.24  As long as the media concentrated on the civil war, and drew on clichés of 
tribal savagery, calls for the government to respond, a critical element of the CNN effect, 
never materialised.  It also meant that the British government, which, as we have seen, drew 
on the media as an important source of intelligence on Rwanda, failed to recognise the true 
nature of the events on the ground until it was too late; Nicholas Soames’ “Kate Adie 
moment” certainly did not occur whilst Tutsi civilians were being murdered by their Hutu 
neighbours.   
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 Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others have suggested that the response to Rwanda was 
shaped by race;
25
 whilst the west was quick to respond to the contemporary crisis in white 
Yugoslavia, the argument goes, nothing was done about the crisis in black Africa.  Whilst 
no-one in government would admit that the response to the two crises was shaped purely by 
the colour of the victims’ skin it can be seen that racial stereotyping, if not actual racism, 
influenced decision making. 
 However, one must first acknowledge that comparisons to Bosnia do not particularly 
help in this debate.  It is true that Europe responded more robustly to the war in the former 
Yugoslavia; but as we have seen the response was neither quick, universally acknowledged 
as right, nor especially successful.  It is true that Bosnia received more attention in 
parliament and media than Rwanda, but as Michael Clarke argues “parliament is not 
concerned with what is important but what is controversial”;26 the absence of public debate 
is not in itself an indication of racism.  And whilst this argument may not satisfy liberals, 
who see no distinction between proximate suffering and that on the other side of the world, it 
cannot be denied that the crisis in Yugoslavia posed a greater threat to European and British 
national interests than did the crisis in Rwanda; a response to the Yugoslavian crisis was 
therefore more likely regardless of colour or race. 
 That said the initial, racially stereotyped depiction of the Rwandan violence as 
ancient, tribal warfare influenced Britain and the world’s decision not to intervene in the first 
weeks of the genocide.  As Myers et al point out in their study of American media the “press 
depiction of Bosnia’s war is that it is a logical and considered outcome of historical events.  
Rwanda’s war is simply centuries old tribal savagery”.27  The press was significantly more 
likely to describe Rwanda as “savage” or as experiencing “an orgy of bloodletting” than they 
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were to describe Bosnia in such terms.  This could not fail but to shape understanding of the 
crisis.  It was not so much the fact that Rwandans were black that led to hesitancy in 
responding to their crisis, but the long established western view that this is what Africans 
did.  As Philip Gourevitch has suggested, the popular view in the west is that Africans “die 
of miserable things” and there is nothing the west can do to stop that.28  That Rwanda fell 
into this established framing and led people to write to newspapers with comments such as 
“why not let them get on with settling their differences in their own traditional way”29 is a 
demonstration that long established views of Africa and Africans influenced the response.  
Harold Isaacs’ argument that “race or color (sic) does not often appear as the central or 
single most critical factor in conflicts affecting international relations”30 is probably true 
generally and certainly of Rwanda.  It was not the fact that the victims were black that 
delayed intervention, but the fact that the tragedy was being played out in remote Central 
Africa between two “tribes” certainly meant clichés as old as the west’s relationship with the 
“dark continent” influenced decision making and delayed the international response. 
Fighting the Last War - The Impact of Somalia 
 Recalling the memory of Somalia, US National Security Adviser Tony Lake 
suggested “Rwanda was a casualty of chronology”31 and whilst any explanation of the US’s 
failure to respond sooner to the genocide cannot escape consideration of the deaths of US 
Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993, it does not seem that this event influenced British decision 
making quite as markedly.  For Malcolm Rifkind Somalia was not a significant influence in 
the government’s hesitancy to intervene32 and whilst it would not be true to say that the 
Somalia analogy was never raised in British newspaper coverage, it is true that such 
analogies were infrequent and lacked force.  It must also be acknowledged that Britain had 
experienced its own Somalia in Bosnia.  By April 1994 six British soldiers had been killed 
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serving in Bosnia and on 16 April a Sea Harrier was shot down over the country; despite 
these incidents, there were no widespread calls for British troops to be withdrawn from the 
Balkans and in fact troops numbers increased after the Harrier incident.  Arguably, years of 
violence in Northern Ireland made the British public and government less sensitive to the 
deaths of soldiers than their American cousins. 
 But whilst the events of 3 October 1993 might not have materially affected decision 
making in London, they did shape David Hannay’s thinking at the UN.  Hannay was acutely 
aware, through his frequent contact with Madeleine Albright, that the US did not support 
intervention in Rwanda.  He was therefore conscious that, in the face of inevitable US 
opposition, to argue for a robust response was pointless.  US reluctance to become involved 
in Rwanda therefore influenced British behaviour at the Security Council; for example, in 
late April Hannay dismissed arguing for the reinforcement of UNAMIR – the US would 
have vetoed the suggestion – instead he argued for and received support to only partially 
withdraw UNAMIR and in the process demonstratively altered US policy.  In this respect, 
the scar of Somalia did influence the British response in that the government, aware of US 
sensitivities, felt unable to support the more robust response some other members of the 
Security Council sought. Jared Cohen’s suggests in his study of the US response “The US 
role in the collective failure is essential to understanding why many of the world’s great 
powers and the UN did not attempt to stop the genocide.”33  Britain appears to have been one 
of those great powers that Cohen had in mind. 
Lessons from the Field of Psychology 
 Some of the psychology theories discussed in Chapter One also add to the 
understanding of the delay in intervening.  Latane and Darley’s flow chart of bystanders’ 
decision making process, for example, demonstrates that there is only one path that leads to 
bystander intervention; they must notice the incident, must interpret it as an emergency and 
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then assume personal responsibility to act.
34
  It is not apathy, they argue, that leads to non-
intervention, but a genuine misinterpretation of the situation.  In the case of the UK and 
Rwanda we can see that at each junction of this decision path the FCO went down the path 
of non-intervention:  Rwanda fell outside of the FCO’s usual sphere of interest and therefore 
little attention was paid to the country during the civil war period; when the genocide did 
break out the FCO initially failed to recognise it as an emergency and instead interpreted the 
deaths as part of a civil war; finally when it was recognised that genocide was happening the 
FCO failed to take responsibility, instead they argued it was for Africa or France to do 
something.  The fact that other bystanders, including the British media and the US, were 
reaching the same conclusions at each stage, as Latane and Darley would also hypothesize, 
convinced the government that they were pursuing the right course. 
 Schwartz’s theory of defensive redefinition also goes some way to explaining the 
government, media and public’s response toward the genocide.  The horrific images and 
stories in the press could not help but alert people to the horrors occurring in Rwanda, but 
there were still only isolated calls for intervention.  By defining the crisis as civil war, rather 
than the humanitarian emergency it actually was, people and politicians in the UK became 
convinced that there was nothing that could be done, that the victims were responsible for 
their own fate or that it was for someone else to intervene (the UN or other African states).   
Intervention Explained 
 Whilst it is fairly easy to understand why the British government did not initially 
respond to the genocide, the explanation of why in July they offered troops to serve in 
UNAMIR II is less clear. 
The Media and the CNN Effect (2) 
Whilst the inaccurate media reporting of April and May delayed the response to the 
crisis, it is not apparent that the distinct shift in media coverage, once the Goma refugee 
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crises unfolded, actually triggered government intervention.  Compared to the coverage of 
the genocide which had been patchy and inaccurate, coverage of the refugee crises was 
almost blanket.  The framing of the refugee story was also markedly different from that of 
the violence in Rwanda itself; suddenly the media portrayed ordinary Rwandans as victims, 
rather than willing participants in tribal warfare.  The framing of the refugees in a more 
empathetic way, and clear suggestions that something could be done to alleviate their 
suffering, led for the first time for obvious calls for action from both the press and the 
public.  But Myers’ conclusion that “only when Rwanda became identifiable within the 
media frame for Africa of starving children, mothers and flies did the Clinton 
Administration finally act”35 places too much emphasis on the media’s role.  In the UK, at 
least, it does not appear to have been the media that led the government to shift towards a 
policy of intervention. 
 For starters, the FCO of the early 1990s was not an organisation that was susceptible 
to media pressure.  Whilst it is typical of the political elite to deny the influence of the media 
on decision making, throughout his time as Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd repeatedly and 
assertively dismissed the role of media in foreign policy; for example, in one article he wrote 
“there is nothing new in mass rape, the shooting of civilians, in war crimes ... What is new is 
that a selection of these tragedies is now visible”;36 in another speech on Bosnia he stated 
that the government would not be propelled into action “simply because of day-to-day 
pressure of the media”.37  The FCO was adamant that it would not be forced unwillingly into 
actions just for the sake of good media coverage.  This is arguably quite the opposite of the 
US government, who assembled the world’s media in Goma to witness a US funded air-drop 
of aid that was later revealed to have contained ski mittens and gruyere cheese!
38
  In stark 
contrast to Britain’s response to the Kurdish crisis, which is often explained by John Major’s 
reaction to media coverage of the refugees, there is no suggestion in the case of Rwanda that 
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the media was significant in shifting policy.  Interview responses suggest that the media 
played a relatively limited role in policy formulation; one MP said “there was no media 
lobby saying ‘this is the right response’”39 and Baroness Chalker told the author that at no 
stage did she feel under pressure to respond to the genocide.
40
  Nor is there any documentary 
evidence to support claims that media coverage triggered the decision to send British troops 
to Rwanda.  Whilst it cannot be denied that the daily coverage of the refugee crisis may have 
brought the issue to ministers’ attention or even made them more sympathetic to the crisis, 
there is no real evidence, anecdotal, official or otherwise, that the media, contrary to the 
suggestion of the CNN effect hypothesis, changed government policy. 
However, if the media coverage had little effect on government policy, it did 
certainly influence the public’s response.  If as Wayne Wanta and Yu-Wei Hu argue 
“members of the public learn the relative importance of issues through the amount of 
coverage these issues receive in the news media”41 the pure volume of coverage of the 
refugee crises made it a more important issue for the public than the genocidal murder of 
800,000 Tutsi.  There is clear evidence that once the media coverage shifted to a more 
empathetic portrayal of refugees and began to suggest something could, rather than just 
should, be done the public’s response changed.  For example, the clear correlation between 
volume of press coverage and contributions to aid agencies demonstrates the media’s 
significant role in moving the public from inactive bystanders to bystanders that intervene, 
or at least donate.  In a study of US charitable giving, Drury and Olson found that for every 
lead article in The New York Times about a humanitarian crisis, public donations to relief 
efforts rose by approximately half million dollars;
42
 the same phenomenon seems to have 
been true in terms of Britain’s donations to Rwanda – the media coverage led the British 
public to donate and very generously so. 
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 Suggestions, such as Alain Destexhe’s,43 that the international community, including 
the UK, responded so vigorously to the refugee crisis out of some collective sense of guilt 
for failing to halt the genocide do not adequately explain the shift in policy.  Hans-Werner 
Bierhoff may have been correct to suggest “caused distress motivates compensation, which 
leads to more intervention than neutral witnessed distress”;44 but in the case of Rwanda there 
was no belief amongst the political elite that the distress of the refugees had been caused by 
the west – the refugees were seen as victims of civil war, of tribal savagery, even of a 
Biblical tragedy, but not as victims of western failure.  Foreign policy makers, including 
John Major and Douglas Hurd, did not therefore feel they had anything to be guilty about.   
This absence of guilt is demonstrated by both Major and Hurd’s failure to publically address 
their role in the crisis since 1994.  Whilst President Clinton for example has expressed his 
regret at not having done more for Rwanda, Hurd wrote in his autobiography “It never 
occurred to us to send combatant troops to Rwanda to stop the killing.  I record this as a 
bleak fact”.  He continues to suggest that Clinton’s apology and claims that lessons have 
been learnt are unconvincing, concluding “We deceive ourselves with our own speeches.”45  
These do not sound like the words of a man racked with guilt.    
Chance of Success and Political Will 
 If neither the media nor feelings of guilt adequately explain the sudden British 
intervention, what we are left with is intervention motivated by the view that Britain could 
do something positive in Rwanda.  First though it was necessary for the idea of intervention 
to be put on the political agenda; as Hurd records until July the UK had not even considered 
the idea of sending troops to Rwanda.  It seems that rather than the media or public opinion 
putting Rwanda on the FCO’s list of priorities, it was a request from the UN Secretary 
General.  Whilst it is true that the UK had been involved in the authorisation of UNAMIR II, 
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until July the UK had only been asked to provide equipment and had responded positively 
by offering trucks.  It was not until sometime in the first two weeks of July that the UN 
actually asked the UK to provide troops.  Up to that point the FCO had been focussed on 
trying to encourage African nations to provide the bulk of the new UNAMIR II force.  The 
new request from the UN made it clear that the UNAMIR II mission could not operate 
without western logistical support and therefore demanded consideration. 
However, as we have seen even the idea of sending troops was initially rejected by 
the MOD.  Peter Jakobsen’s claim that “once [a conflict] has [been] placed on the agenda, 
the perceived chances of success become the principle factor determining whether an 
enforcement operation will take place”46 seems to explain this initial reluctance.  As long as 
the violence in Rwanda continued to be perceived as civil war it was widely held that 
nothing could be done to stop the killing, the risk to British troops would have been too great 
and the chances of actually stopping the “ancient tribal warfare” were minimal.  In line with 
the findings of the psychologists Piliavin and Piliavin, the perceived cost of intervening in 
Rwanda did not justify the anticipated benefits; intervention was therefore rejected.  It was 
only the RPF’s declaration of a ceasefire that led the government to believe that a British 
mission could be successful – and safe (i.e. at a cost the government was willing to bear).  
The fact that Britain was now being asked to provide troops combined with the new 
perceived chance of success largely explains the decision to authorise Operation Gabriel; 
realism then trumped ideas of liberalism, altruism or moral obligation.  
A second factor, that cannot yet be fully understood, is the role of the Prime 
Minister in the decision to send troops.  What we do have is a tantalising suggestion in MOD 
documents of a change in political will in mid-July and also the recollection of Baroness 
Chalker that she spoke privately to John Major in late June or July.
47
  Presumably in this 
conversation she would have urged Major to back intervention.  Given the evidence of 
political leaders’ direct involvement in the decision to deploy humanitarian missions – for 
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example, John Major in the case of northern Iraq, President Bush in the case of Somalia and 
Tony Blair in the case of Sierra Leone – one would expect Major to have been involved in 
the decision to deploy troops to Rwanda.  At the moment we can only surmise at this, but the 
MOD documents suggest his input was an influence. 
Could More Have Been Done? 
Tony Blair claims that the government failed to act in Rwanda, yet the UK was 
ultimately the second largest contributor to UNAMIR II in terms of manpower
48
 and was 
one of the leading donors of aid to the region following the genocide.  The British 
government can rightly claim to have done more than most to relieve the suffering of 
Rwandans.  But, Melvern and Williams largely dismiss the Major government’s claims that 
“it was doing more [in Rwanda] that many states, with the inference that it was therefore 
somehow absolved of guilt for its policy”.49  For a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council to justify their response by comparison “to the lowest common denominator”, they 
suggest, “is patently absurd”.  Was then the British response sufficient or could the UK have 
done more? 
As we have seen, at various stages the UK had the capacity to respond more robustly 
to the crisis, as examples: Hannay could have supported Belgium requests for 
reinforcements for UNAMIR; British troops could have been sent sooner; more could have 
been done to evict Rwanda from the Security Council; when the response did finally come, 
more soldiers could have been sent (the troops were after all available) or more aid could 
have been donated.  But as we have also seen, for various reasons at the time none of these 
options were deemed appropriate.  The intelligence available to the UK suggested 
UNAMIR’s manpower and mandate were appropriate; the military arguments against 
sending troops to intervene in the civil war were in the words of Hannay “quite 
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compelling”;50 the suggestion of evicting Rwanda from the Security Council was considered 
unfeasible;
51
 the UN had not asked for more troops; and any extra donation of aid to Rwanda 
meant less for some other crisis.   
The one thing we can say that Britain could have realistically done, without 
succumbing to hindsight or abandoning the dominant thinking of 1994, is to have deployed 
the 50 trucks donated to UNAMIR sooner.  There seems to be no explanation other than 
bureaucratic delay for why it took so long for these vehicles to arrive in Rwanda.  Whether 
their deployment sooner would have saved lives cannot be proved, but it is certain that 
whilst still parked in a barracks in Colchester the trucks were helping no-one.  Any other 
suggestions of what more the UK could have done are based either on knowledge that the 
British government did not have available, or fully understand, in 1994; assumes limitless 
resources at the FCO; or simply goes against the dominant ideology of the Conservative 
government. 
And despite Melvern and William’s condemnation of Britain’s failure to do more, 
one has to acknowledge what Britain did do in Rwanda.  Yes the trucks came too late, but 
they were what the UN had asked for and were the logistical resources that the media and 
the Labour Party suggested the government should have offered.  When the UK did finally 
provide troops it was on a scale far in excess of what the UN had requested in early July – 
the Secretariat asked for a REME company but ended up getting doctors, nurses, drivers, 
engineers, signallers, mine disposal experts and headquarters staff as well.  In terms of aid, 
British money both from the government and the public, saved thousands of lives by 
providing refugees with clean water, food and shelter.  In Rwanda, British money funded the 
re-establishment of government ministries and projects aimed at rebuilding society.  Whilst 
this all came too late to save those killed during the genocide, it was not, as Tony Blair 
suggests, doing nothing. 
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Was Britain Responsible? 
As we have seen, Tony Blair is not alone in suggesting the UK must bear some 
responsibility for the crisis in Rwanda.  Ingvar Carlsson, for example, condemns members of 
the Security Council for failing in their “responsibility to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide”.52  Romeo Dallaire accuses the UK, United States and France of “shirking their 
legal and moral responsibilities”53 in Rwanda, by failing to act sooner and Melvern suggests 
that having established a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, the UN became “responsible” 
for the country’s future.54   
 In the introduction we noted how Daniela Kroslak identifies three key factors which 
must be present if responsibility is to be assigned to a bystander; knowledge, involvement 
and capability: 
 How much did the bystander know about the preparation of the genocide or, 
during the genocide about its implementation? To what extent was the 
bystander involved with the genocidal regime prior to and throughout the 
atrocities? And what capabilities did the bystander have to intervene in some 





Applying these criteria to the UK and Rwanda we can say that Britain had very little 
knowledge about the preparation of the genocide and not until May did the government fully 
recognise that genocide was happening.  In terms of involvement with the genocidal regime, 
there was no such direct involvement.  Some authors have suggested that by authorising the 
withdrawal of UNAMIR in April and by failing to have Rwanda removed from the Security 
Council the UK gave tacit approval to the regime; but as we have seen the first action came 
before the UK recognised that genocide was happening and the second was not possible 
given almost certain opposition from China and Russia.  Finally, in terms of capabilities, as 
noted above resources were available; 5 Airborne Brigade and various other infantry 
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battalions could have been sent to Rwanda once the genocide became known but would have 
been dependent on US airlift capacity. 
The British government then can only be deemed to have any responsibility for the 
crisis from May onwards, before that date they did not have the intelligence available to pass 
Kroslak’s first test.  After that date the UK arguably had the capability to attempt to suppress 
the genocide but chose not to.  But even that claim must be placed into the wider context.  
First for Britain to have intervened unilaterally would have been very difficult; without the 
support of the US Air Force the deployment of British troops any earlier than late July, i.e. 
before the ceasefire, would have been almost impossible.  As the eventual Operation Gabriel 
deployment demonstrated, the speed at which the British could have deployed to Rwanda 
without American airlift capability would have been too slow to have made much of a 
difference.  And as Alan Kuperman shows, by mid May it was already too late to save the 
majority of the Tutsi killed in the genocide; only around 150,000 would be killed between 
May 12 and the end of the genocide.
56
  Obviously that is still a large number, but it would be 
a fiction to suggest the UK could have done much more to reduce the number of people who 
lost their lives in Rwanda.  Britain’s real capability to save many lives lost during the 
genocide was limited.  Where the British did have the capability to save lives, during the 
refugee crises both in Tanzania and Zaire, the government and public did respond.  The 
British knew little of the preparation for, or indeed the first weeks of, genocide; despite 
failing to censure the Hutu government more forcefully, Britain was not involved with the 
genocidal regime; and in reality the capacity to intervene unilaterally against the genocide 
was fairly low and the response to the refugee crisis was in excess of most other countries.  
Under this measure, we must conclude that the UK bears little responsibility for what 
happened in Rwanda. 
Returning finally to Fritz Heider’s model of levels of responsibility, the British 
government did not intend or foresee the consequences of their failure to act sooner.  There 
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was no wilful complicity with the perpetrators of genocide; no one in the British government 
sat down and conspired to allow the events in Rwanda to happen, and no-one sat down in the 
media and set out to wilfully misreport the crisis.  The British failure to respond quicker 
probably did lead to more deaths but these deaths were not caused by Britain’s failure to 
respond.  Tutsi died at the hands of their Hutu neighbours, high on drugs and jeered on by 
decades of propaganda, alone Britain could not have stopped this happening.  As such on 
Heider’s scale Britain can only be said to be at the level of association – the lowest level of 
responsibility.   
***************** 
Linda Melvern and Paul Williams, in one of the few articles specifically on the 
British response to the Rwandan genocide describe John Major’s policy as “official 
indifference”.57  They continue: 
 The best that can be said for Britain’s policy is that it rested on a tragically 
flawed interpretation of events on the ground and a desire not to jeopardise the 
future of UN peacekeeping ... A more accurate interpretation is that Britain’s 
policy of indifference and non-intervention was justified with reference to a 
deliberately misconceived version of events in Rwanda and a wilful neglect of 





Such claims though do not hold up to scrutiny.  Yes Britain could have done more in 
Rwanda; to argue otherwise is to ignore Britain’s place in the world as a member of the 
Security Council with a large and effective military, but a response would not have been 
anywhere near as easy or even as effective as some authors assume.  But to argue that 
anyone in the UK wilfully sat back and let genocide happen is unfair and demonstrates an 
unrealistic expectation of how foreign policy works.  It is a tragedy that so many people died 
in Rwanda but we can see why the UK did not respond sooner.  As Howard Adelman 
correctly identifies, “decision makers were faced with often confusing signals, numerous 
competing demands for their attention and limitations on the resources at their disposal”.59  
                                                          
57 Melvern and Williams, “Britannia Waived the Rules,” p.2. 
58 Ibid, p.22. 
59 Adelman, Early Warning and Response, p.295. 
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The mix of poor intelligence, inaccurate media reporting, competing demands elsewhere in 
the world, ideas of sphere of influence, racial stereotyping and the chronological accident of 
Somalia all combined to ensure that little was done in Rwanda until in reality it was too late.  
But these factor all combine to demonstrate Douglas Hurd was correct when he wrote, “The 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention will never be universal; it will always depend on time 
place and circumstance”.60 For the people of Rwanda, time, place and circumstance just did 
not coincide. 
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